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FROM OFFSHORING TO RESHORING: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
MANUFACTURING LOCATION DECISIONS IN A SLOW-STEAM WORLD 
by 
Jeffrey J. Risher 
 
Reshoring, the act of moving manufacturing operations from an offshore location 
to the nation of the parent company, is rapidly becoming one of the most researched 
topics in business.  Reshoring describes the reversal of a previous offshoring decision, 
whereby a firm either relocated its own manufacturing operations overseas or outsourced 
a significant portion of production to offshore suppliers.  With looming uncertainty in 
global consumer demand and diminishing returns in offshore markets, reshoring is 
gaining exposure as a viable strategy for firms experiencing a diluted competitive 
advantage as grounded costs approach market equilibrium.   
With academic literature on reshoring only beginning to emerge, many questions 
remain unanswered.  This study was designed to address some of those gaps by 
developing a conceptual framework linking the antecedents of reshoring to firm 
performance.  Both the resource-based view of the firm and transaction cost economics 
were used to provide the theoretical basis for determining the direct and intervening 
factors contained in the conceptual model.    
To empirically test the conceptual model, a longitudinal event study was 
conducted using archival data for 96 firms incorporated in the United States that 




study was conducted by gathering financial data for sample firms as well as closely 
matched firms which served as industry controls, thereby providing a to isolate the 
financial impact of reshoring for each sample firm.  Once these abnormal returns were 
analyzed using Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests, the structural model was tested using partial 
least squares structural equations modeling.  
This dissertation contributes to the global sourcing literature in several ways.  
First, the event study results strongly support the theory that American firms can 
significantly improve performance by relocating manufacturing to the United States.  
Next, although strategic drivers were not supported, path modeling using PLS-SEM 
provides statistical support for the proposed economic drivers of reshoring.  Finally, 
significant moderating effects were identified, offering further guidance to firms 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
For nearly two decades, U. S. manufacturing companies have pursued 
inexpensive labor in overseas markets with the belief that “global supply chains make the 
world go around” (Ellram, 2013, p. 3).  Many companies have, however, recently come 
to the realization that “there’s no place like home.”  This emerging trend of repatriating 
the manufacturing of goods to the U.S. is called reshoring and is rapidly becoming one of 
the most popular topics in business magazines and trade publications (Ellram, Tate, & 
Petersen, 2013).  Reshoring is fundamentally a manufacturing location decision that 
focuses on reversing a previous decision to locate manufacturing facilities overseas 
(Gray, Skowronski, Esenduran, & Rungtusanatham, 2013).  Proponents of reshoring 
suggest the resulting shorter supply chains should provide superior performance by 
increasing corporate flexibility and customer responsiveness (Arlbjørn & Lüthje, 2012; 
Harrington, 2011; Moser, 2011; Tate, 2014).  With looming uncertainty in global 
consumer demand and diminishing returns in offshore markets, reshoring is gaining 
exposure as a viable strategy for firms experiencing a diluted competitive advantage as 
grounded costs approach market equilibrium (Wu & Zhang, 2014).   
Many skeptics, however, question the ability of a traditional high-price market to 
sustain the function of low-cost provider (Pisano & Shih, 2012; Shih, 2014).  Firms still 
experiencing success in offshore markets state that decreasing returns are systematic and 
will therefore readjust as the market improves (Fratocchi, Di Mauro, Barbieri, 




production (Handley & W. C., Benton, 2013).  This suggests, therefore, that the ability to 
manage an efficient network, rather than location, drives supply chain success (Fine, 
2013).  For firms who experienced intellectual property infringements, strategic concerns 
outweigh the possible cost benefits as cultural and physical distances increase (Song, 
Platts, & Bance, 2007).  With nearly half of global partnerships failing in the first five 
years, it becomes evident that there is no “one size fits all” solution to global sourcing 
(Handley & Benton, 2009; Sanders, Locke, Moore, & Autry, 2007).   
Despite the sudden emergence of reshoring in the popular press, academic 
literature has been slower to respond (Martínez-Mora & Merino, 2014).  With better 
information needed to address these issues, the reshoring phenomenon has created the 
need for more mid-range sourcing theory and instilled a renewed interest in 
manufacturing locations and global sourcing decisions (Casson, 2013; Ellram, Tate, & 
Petersen, 2013; Gray et al., 2013; Schmeisser, 2013).  
Manufacturing location is one of the most important decisions faced by firm 
leaders due to the impact it has on firm capital allocation and supply chain performance 
(Bhatnagar & Sohal, 2005).  In the modern hyper-competitive era, competition has 
changed from business against business to supply chain against supply chain (Seuring & 
Gold, 2013).  Thus, the decisions concerning supplier selection and product country of 
origin affect many aspects of a firm’s ability to leverage its competencies and supply 
chain structure in order to serve the final customer (Autry & Griffis, 2008).  To create an 
advantage in sourcing, many firms in high-cost labor countries have traditionally sourced 
manufacturing to emerging or low cost economies (McCalman & Spearot, 2013).  The 




North American Free Trade Agreement created an influx of manufacturing jobs to 
Mexico and Honduras (Fine, 2013).  The “Made in Mexico” movement was short-lived, 
however, due to quality issues, more liberal trade agreements, and the potential for global 
retail markets overseas (Schoenherr, Rao Tummala, & Harrison, 2008).   
Nearly twenty years ago, the international search for low-cost labor moved from 
Central America to Asia (Tate, Ellram, Schoenherr, & Petersen, 2014).  Companies 
started moving manufacturing operations to China and India seeking lower production 
costs resulting from inexpensive labor, favorable exchange rates, and fewer 
environmental restrictions (Arlbjørn & Lüthje, 2012).  Offshoring soon became the 
prevalent method of manufacturing.  In 2003, nearly 25% of all countries in North 
America sourced some manufacturing in China (Wu & Zhang, 2014).  By 2008, 50% of 
all companies had relied on China for all or most manufacturing (Minter, 2009).  In 2010, 
China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest producer of consumer 
goods (Rein & Roy, 2012).  By this time, U.S. firms had shifted nearly 7.5 million total 
jobs overseas, while the U.S. manufacturing sector accounted for only 9% of all non-
agricultural employment (McMeekin & McMackin, 2012).   
More recently, though, companies have been reevaluating the decision to 
manufacture products overseas (Rein & Roy, 2012).  A Boston Consulting Group survey 
finds that 38% of industrial firms believe that a direct competitor is reshoring, and 14% 
of those surveyed currently have plans to reshore (Gray et al., 2013).  Other research 
indicates that in 2012, more than one-third of large U.S. based companies planned to 
reshore production to the United States from China (Tate, 2014).  As large manufacturing 




2012 survey finds that reshoring could bring up to 3 million jobs and $100 billion in 
output back to the U.S. by the end of 2015 (McMeekin & McMackin, 2012).  Wal-Mart 
has announced that by 2023, it has plans to increase its sourcing within the U.S. by $50 
billion (Ellram, 2013).    
This reversal creates the need to reevaluate the existing literature on offshoring 
and global sourcing in order to understand the current phenomenon of reshoring (Gray et 
al., 2013).  Nearly half of all outsourcing agreements failed within five years (Handley & 
Benton, 2009), many because firms simply failed to realize the hidden costs of offshoring 
(Larsen, Manning, & Pedersen, 2013).  Hidden costs result from unexpected expenses 
such as added travel, communication, and inventory carrying costs that cause the total 
cost of ownership to be significantly higher than the expected grounded costs (N. Song et 
al., 2007).   
Hidden costs can also result from failure to identify opportunism leading to 
strategic risk (Tate & Ellram, 2009).  Many high-tech firms, such as Apple and Intel, are 
choosing to reshore because of recent loss of intellectual property overseas (Fishman, 
2012).  In addition to intellectual property, firms that outsource valuable functions run the 
risk of losing strategic capabilities (Sanders et al., 2007).  The failed Boeing 787 provides 
an excellent example of tacit knowledge erosion that occurs as research and development 
moves further away from production (Kotha & Srikanth, 2013; Tang, Zimmerman, & 
Nelson, 2009).   
While reshoring represents the reversal of previous offshoring decisions, not all of 
these reversals occur due to failed overseas relationships.  Many decisions to repatriate 




economies of these low cost nations grow, so does the demand for the labor that they 
supply (Tate et al., 2014).  More importantly, developing nations continue to drive up the 
demand for fuel, thus creating transportation cost instability and higher energy costs 
(Ellram, Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013).  In response to rising fuel costs, ocean carriers have 
adopted a method called slow steaming (Ellram, 2013) to reduce the ship’s speeds, 
emissions, and fuel usage (Tate et al., 2014).  The practice of slow steaming significantly 
increases lead-time, requiring manufacturers to keep much more inventory on-hand and 
in-transit (Moser, 2011).    
Political instability, natural disasters, and natural resource shortages all have the 
ability to cause supply chain disruptions and contribute to the changing global 
environment as well (Chen, Olhager, & Tang, 2013).  As supply chains become longer, 
the impact of supply chain disruptions becomes more severe (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008; 
Bode, Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011; Ellis, Henry, & Shockley, 2010).  These 
disruptions can occur from late shipments, lost or stolen freight, or poor supplier 
performance (Schoenherr et al., 2008; Tang & Musa, 2011).  Larger scale disruptions 
occur from natural resource shortages or natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina or the 
constant earthquakes in Chile (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a).  Examples of synthetic 
catastrophes include the UPS cargo plane crash in 2013 or the explosion that caused the 
BP Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010.  Throughout many global regions, terrorism and 
political instability create the potential for supply chain disruptions (Ellram, Tate, & 
Petersen, 2013; Tate, 2014).  For example, political unrest forced Procter and Gamble to 
shutter two new production facilities along with its corporate operations in Cairo, Egypt 




Although reshoring is rapidly becoming one of the most researched topics in the 
popular press (Tate et al., 2014), academic research on this phenomenon is still at a 
nascent stage (Fratocchi et al., 2014).  An examination of existing research on reshoring 
reveals that current understanding of the reshoring phenomenon is limited to descriptive 
data and potential drivers.  To date, few quantitative studies exist in extant literature, 
most being exploratory in nature (Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013; Fratocchi et al., 2014; 
Kinkel, 2014; Tate, 2014).  Even though some exploratory research has emerged, no 
conceptual model exists (Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013; Kinkel & Maloca, 2009).  This 
gap in the literature creates a huge disadvantage to researchers and practitioners 
struggling to determine whether to remain engaged in Asian and Indonesian supply 
markets (Kinkel, 2014).  Direct and intervening variables must be identified and 
empirically tested to understand the impact of these driving factors and the conditions in 
which they exist.   
A weakening U.S. dollar along with these rising costs of overseas production 
could result in sourcing decisions favoring North America in the future (de Treville & 
Trigeorgis, 2010; Sirkin, 2011).  Due to currency valuations and rising wages in overseas 
markets, net labor costs in China and the U.S. could converge in 2015 (McMeekin & 
McMackin, 2012).  With limited expansion potential overseas and an extensive learning 
curve in the U.S., factor market rivalry suggests a first-mover advantage in reshoring 
(Ellram, Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013; Pisano & Shih, 2012).  With no conceptual framework 





Some products and companies should still benefit from offshore production, yet 
the academic literature has not addressed these issues (Martínez-Mora & Merino, 2014).  
Proximity to foreign demand, access to markets with high barriers to entry, and resource 
dependence all suggest that offshoring should still be beneficial if not necessary for some 
firms (Bhatnagar & Sohal, 2005).  In this scenario, the underlying question is not “where 
to produce,” but “what to produce where” (Baldwin & Venables, 2013; Martínez-Mora & 
Merino, 2014; McCalman & Spearot, 2013).  A gap in the literature emerges when we 
consider the limited understanding of the conditions necessary for reshoring success.  
Because of the changing global environment, questions also remain about which factors 
of the manufacturing location decision affect the ability of a firm to create a sustainable 
competitive advantage, which ultimately increases shareholder wealth (Arlbjørn & 
Lüthje, 2012; Chen et al., 2013). 
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and empirically test the most salient 
factors influencing manufacturing location decisions of U.S. manufacturing firms in the 
current economic environment.  In addition to factors directly influencing these 
decisions, the study will also consider firm-facing and market-facing characteristics that 
might create boundary conditions and intervening effects.  The proposed research will 
employ an archival event study using data collected from publicly traded firms that have 
recently relocated manufacturing facilities from offshore or nearshore locations to the 
United States.  This longitudinal approach will assist in isolating the effects of 
manufacturing location over time.  Upon completion of data collection using the event 
study method, hierarchical moderated multiple regression will be utilized to estimate the 




longitudinal method and subsequent regression analysis will assist in answering the 
following research questions: 
RQ1:  What conditions allow a firm to enhance procurement proficiency 
and ultimately firm performance by switching to a domestic supplier?   
RQ2:  When considering manufacturing location decisions, which factors 
affect the firm’s ability to create a sustainable competitive advantage?   
RQ3:  Concerning country of origin decisions, do market-facing or firm-
facing characteristics create boundary or interaction effects that might 
influence the outcome of these decisions? 
This study contributes to the academic literature in several ways.  Grounded in 
transaction cost economics and the resource-based view of the firm, this research 
contributes to the current literature by presenting a conceptual framework that addresses 
both tactical and strategic factors involved in global sourcing decisions.  The study also 
proposes to provide information concerning the company and product types most likely 
to benefit from reshoring.  The results of this study will provide a first step towards 
developing workable strategies for global sourcing decisions in the modern economy.   
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a theoretical 
foundation for the study with a review of transaction cost economics and the resource-
based view of the firm.  This is followed by an extensive review of global sourcing by 
U.S. based companies.  Next, constructs are defined and relationships in the conceptual 
model are posited.  Chapter 3 presents an overview of the research design, and then 




the hypotheses.  Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the results.  Chapter 5 concludes with a 






CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW   
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on global sourcing and presents the 
theoretical lens for the study.  The literature review updates the audience on the current 
economic environment, and defines all relative factors in the changing global market.  
The primary purpose of this chapter is to propose a conceptual framework, grounded in 
theory, which provides answers to the research questions presented in the introduction. 
This chapter contains four sections, organized as follows:  The first section 
defines reshoring and provides a review of the existing literature on global sourcing.  
Next, a theoretical foundation for the study is developed by providing a literature review 
of transaction cost economics and the resource-based view of the firm.  In the third 
section, the conceptual model is explained and construct definitions are provided.  
Finally, the theoretical linkages between the constructs are examined and hypotheses are 
developed to test the conceptual framework. 
2.1 Overview of Reshoring 
2.1.1 Defining Reshoring 
Reshoring describes the relocation of manufacturing operations from an overseas 
location to the country of the parent company (Ellram, 2013).  Backshoring is a common 
term used to describe the reshoring phenomenon in Europe (Fratocchi et al., 2014; 
Kinkel, 2014).  Authors have commonly used other terms, such as homeshoring and 
onshoring when discussing reshoring (Tate, 2014).  Any of these terms may be used 




similar sourcing terms, such as insourcing or nearshoring (Ellram, 2013; Gray et al., 
2013; Kinkel & Maloca, 2009).  For semantic clarity, it is therefore necessary to 
differentiate reshoring from other sourcing options (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009). 
Global firm boundary decisions fall into two dimensions: ownership and location 
(Gray et al., 2013; Kinkel & Maloca, 2009).  In terms of ownership, internalization is a 
more stringent form of organizational governance in which the production of goods 
occurs through vertically integrated hierarchies (Williamson, 1975).  Conversely, 
outsourcing involves the use of specialists to provide competence, technologies, and 
resources to manufacture products or provide necessary components (Harland, 
Brenchley, & Walker, 2003).  Relational contracting creates additional intermediary 
options, such as joint ventures and strategic alliances, in which firm boundaries are often 
blurred and not clearly defined (Williamson, 1991).  
The second dimension, location, provides three sourcing options: offshoring, 
nearshoring, and reshoring.  Offshoring concerns the production of any product or 
component in locations abroad (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009).  Offshore production may 
occur within firm boundaries or through open exchanges.  Offshore outsourcing is the 
term used to describe production via contracted manufacturers (Gray et al., 2013).  Often 
firms internalize overseas production through foreign direct investment, although the 
level of control that firm ownership provides locally is contingent upon the laws and 
culture of the host country (Fahy & Smithee, 1999; Teece, 1986).  To circumvent the 
geographical and cultural challenges of offshore manufacturing, nearshoring is emerging 
as a viable low-cost option (McIvor, 2013).  Nearshoring occurs when firms locate 




(Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013).  Canada and Mexico are nearshore options for U.S. 
manufacturers, although Canada is not a clear low-cost option for labor (Moser, 2011).   
Reshoring is simply the reversal of a previous decision to locate manufacturing 
overseas (Gray et al., 2013).  Reshoring requires the interlinking of at least two 
sequentially adjacent relocation decisions, therefore only concerns previous offshoring 
decision.  (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009)  This definition requires that the product must have 
been produced offshore, but does not imply that the reshored product was previously 
produced domestically (Gray et al., 2013).  For example, many companies in recent years 
adopted a sourcing strategy of designing products locally then producing overseas 
because the decision to offshore was inherent in the product design, and reshoring would 
occur if domestic production began (Casson, 2013).  This is common for the “born 
global” startups and firms with little resource slack (Cavusgil & Cavusgil, 2012).   
2.1.2 Summary of Academic Literature on Reshoring 
Given the recency of the phenomenon, academic literature on reshoring is only 
beginning to emerge.  Most of the current literature serves to define the reshoring 
phenomenon (Gray et al., 2013), establish the need for empirical analysis (Ellram, 2013), 
or provide theoretical grounding and conceptualization for future research (Casson, 2013; 
Fratocchi et al., 2014; Gray et al., 2013; McIvor, 2013).  Much of the current quantitative 
data on reshoring originates from private research firms.  For instance, Boston Consulting 
Group gathered survey data from U.S. manufacturing companies which determined the 
extent of current reshoring activity along with the propensity of firms to relocate 




While empirical evidence about reshoring is limited, some quantitative research 
does exist.  For instance, Kinkel and Maloca (2009) provide some of the earliest research 
on reshoring based upon secondary data from 1663 German companies.  Their study 
establishes reshoring as a quantifiable phenomenon identifies product quality and loss of 
flexibility as primary drivers of reshoring for European firms (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009).  
Tate et al. (2014) examine the effects of factor market rivalry on manufacturing location 
using survey results from 319 companies.  The most rigorous research to date comes 
from Ellram et al. (2013), who use multiple regression to determine the impact that 
perceived locational risk has on the propensity to repatriate manufacturing.   
To date, no research exists broadly linking reshoring to firm performance, 
although case studies addressing certain aspects of location decisions are beginning to 
emerge.  A qualitative multi-case study on the Spanish footwear industry suggests that 
reshoring is a response to macro-economic changes and the need for customer 
responsiveness (Martínez-Mora & Merino, 2014).  The same factors emerge from a 
single-case study on bicycle manufacturing in Europe.  In this study the authors also 
identified difficulty in transferring knowledge and processes as a driving factor in the 
relocation (Gylling, Heikkilä, Jussila, & Saarinen, 2015).  Both studies suggest that firms 
may improve performance by reshoring (Gylling et al., 2015; Martínez-Mora & Merino, 
2014).  Many of the examples of reshoring by U.S. firms have been anecdotal, and no 
studies link reshoring to long-term firm performance.  Research on American firms is 
limited to an archival study examining the effect of U.S. tax codes on reshoring activity, 





Table 1 summarizes the existing academic literature concerning reshoring.  Of the 
18 articles currently available, only one appeared before 2013 (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009).  
Four of these studies were identified within the past year (Ancarani, Di Mauro, Fratocchi, 
Orzes, & Sartor, 2015; Grappi, Romani, & Bagozzi, 2015; Gylling et al., 2015; Hanlon et 
al., 2015).  Six articles appeared in a special issue of the Journal of Supply Chain 
Management (Casson, 2013; Ellram, 2013; Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013; Fine, 2013; 
Gray et al., 2013; McIvor, 2013).  Another four articles emerged from a special issue of 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management (Fratocchi et al., 2014; Kinkel, 2014; 
Martínez-Mora & Merino, 2014; Tate, 2014).  Many of the articles that appeared in 
special issues are conceptual articles designed to spur future research.  This serves to 
highlight the recency of the reshoring phenomenon as well as the urgency of the need for 
empirical research concerning reshoring.  
Table 1: Academic Articles about Reshoring 
Article Focus Theory Variables Contribution 
(Ancarani et al., 
2015) 









This study uses secondary data to 
analyze 249 cases of reshoring in 
the U.S. and Europe based on 
previously identified drivers of 
reshoring.  Results indicate that 
highly technical products and 
automotive products are more 
likely to reshore within a shorter 
period.   




Conceptual Author uses internalization theory 
to provide a macro-level approach 
to manufacturing location 
decisions.   
(Ellram, 2013)* Reshoring  Editorial Intro to Special Issue of JSCM 














Empirical article uses quantitative 
survey data and exploratory factor 
analysis to identify the drivers of 
manufacturing location 
movement in and out of many 
global regions in the past and 
future 3 years.  Provides 3 
research propositions concerning 




(Fine, 2013)* Manufacturing 
location 
 Conceptual Firms should consider intelli-
sourcing rather than reshoring.  
The smarter network, rather than 
the better partnership or location 
sees superior performance. 







 Conceptual  Article provides a brief literature 
review and definition of 
backshoring.  The authors provide 
insights into strategy and future 
research on backshoring.  












Study conducts experiments to 
determine consumer response to 
reshoring.  In general, consumer 
sentiment changed from righteous 
anger to gratitude if they felt the 
firm had genuine motives.   











Essay article offers a definition of 
reshoring, an explanation to the 
onset of the reshoring 
phenomenon, and a list of the 
future implications of reshoring.   









Case Study Case study analyzes cost structure 
of a Finnish bicycle company that 
outsourced production to Taiwan.  
The study finds that a 25% cost 
reduction eroded due to the 
changing economy, currency 
valuation, and productivity, 
thereby making backshoring the 
more attractive option.   














Empirical longitudinal study 
analyzes secondary data to 
examine the effects of the U.S. 
repatriation tax rate on domestic 
and foreign investments.  The 
authors find higher repatriation 
tax rates encourage offshore 
investment, thereby discouraging 





 Conceptual  Paper provides some descriptive 
data about offshoring and 
backshoring activities in Germany 
over the past 15 years.  Paper 
offers insights on motivations for 

















Based on German manufacturing, 
the study uses probit analysis to 
determine the drivers of 
backshoring.  The study finds 
between 15% and 25% of German 
offshoring practices are reversed 
within 4 years, and poor quality is 















Study investigates reshoring in 
the Spanish footwear industry.  
The study uses semi-structured 
interviews to determine that the 
changing environment and the 
need for greater responsiveness 
are two primary drivers of 













Age of Model 
Study uses secondary data from 
trucks manufactured in Mexico 
and the U.S. in the NAFTA era to 
help explain which types of 
products might be outsourced and 
which products are manufactured 
at home.   






Conceptual Essay article suggesting the 
benefits of using transaction cost 
economics and resource-based 
view in tandem to guide 
manufacturing location decisions.   
(Tate, 2014)** Reshoring; 
Right-shoring 
 Conceptual Study provides insights into the 
possible directions and challenges 
of research regarding reshoring 
based on survey data.   







View - Factor 
Market Rivalry 
Labor costs, labor 
availability, 
energy, exchange 
rate, tax rate,  
Empirical article is one of the first 
to use quantitative data to identify 
factors and trends affecting 
reshoring decisions of U.S. 
companies.   













Paper uses mathematical 
modeling to simulate a sourcing 
game.  Examines strategic 
sourcing from a macro-level 
concerning efficiency and 
responsiveness.   
 *Journal of Supply Chain Management special issue on reshoring 
**Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management special issue on reshoring 
 
2.2 Theoretical Lens 
This dissertation employs the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm along with 
transaction cost economics (TCE) to provide a multi-tiered theoretical lens for examining 
the reshoring phenomenon.  Transaction cost economics and the resource-based view of 
the firm have traditionally been two of the most influential theories used to examine 
organizational boundaries (McIvor, 2009).  Organizational boundaries are fundamental to 
business policy because they define the level of vertical and horizontal integration that a 
firm employs as a competitive strategy (G. Walker & Weber, 1984).  The manufacturing 
location decision is central to business strategy and of crucial concern for most 
manufacturing firms (Tate, 2014).  As organizations consider offshore, nearshore, and 
domestic sourcing options, organizational boundary decisions must incorporate location 




key aspects of strategic enterprise positioning due to the long-term impact on the 
competitiveness of the company (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009). 
Although the RBV and TCE are two of the most commonly used theories for 
interim relationships, they have traditionally represented competing theories of the firm 
(Conner, 1991).  Transaction cost economics is a governance-based theory that uses 
transaction costs to explain why firms exist, while RBV is a performance-based theory 
that uses resources and capabilities to examine how firms compete (McIvor, 2009).  
Resource-based view theorists argue that the resource-based view is a creator of 
positives, while transaction cost economics is an avoider of negatives (Conner, 1991).  
Table 2 provides a comparison of transaction cost economics and resource-based theory. 
In the past few years, scholars have insisted that transaction cost economics and 
resource-based theory should be viewed as complementary, rather than conflicting 
theories (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; McIvor, 2009; Neves, Hamacher, & Scavarda, 2014).  
This is primarily because neither theory alone can fully explain the complex global 
environment (Poppo & Zenger, 1998).  Transaction cost economics specifies when 
conditions are suitable for outsourcing, while RBV helps to identify which functions to 
source and which to keep in house (Shook, Adams, Ketchen Jr, & Craighead, 2009).  
Using both TCE and RBV allows firms to examine outsourcing activities at both the 







Table 2: Comparison of TCE and RBV 
 Transaction Cost Economics Resource-Based View 
   
Purpose Why firms exist How firms compete 
   
Unit of 
Analysis  
Transactions Firm Resources 
   
Firm 
Definition  
Transaction cost economics 
describes the firm as “an 
efficiency-inducing 
administrative instrument that 
facilitates exchange between 
economic actors (Leiblein, 2003, 
p. 939).”  
Resource-based theory views the 
firm as a bundle of assets and 
resources that, if employed in 
distinctive ways, can create 
competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991; Penrose, 1959). 
 
Assumptions Market efficiency, bounded 
rationality, opportunism 
Heterogeneity, imperfect 
mobility, bounded rationality 
   
Basic 
Premise 
Markets and hierarchies are 
alternative modes of governance 
for economic transactions; the 
choice of governance should be 
made with a transaction cost 
economizing purpose (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1975).   
Firm boundaries define the 
possession and composition of 
the valuable, difficult-to-imitate 
resources that could ultimately 
create a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993). 
   
Central 
Tenet 
Economic organization is an 
effort to "align transactions, 
which differ in their attributes, 
with governance structures, 
which differ in their costs and 
competencies, in a 
discriminating (mainly, 
transaction cost economizing) 
way (Williamson, 1991, p. 79).” 
Resources and capabilities must 
be simultaneously valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and organizationally 
accessible to drive sustainable 
competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
 
2.2.1 Resource-Based View 
The resource-based view is a performance-based theory of the firm that uses 
resources and capabilities to determine how firms achieve competitive advantages and 




view of the firm is an internally based theory designed to explain differences in firm 
behaviors and performance (Wernerfelt, 1984).  Resource-based theory proposes that 
firms have different resource endowments, and that the manner in which firms acquire, 
develop, maintain, bundle, and apply these resources leads to the development of 
competitive advantage and superior performance (Shook et al., 2009).  The tenets of 
resource-based theory posit that resources and capabilities must be simultaneously 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally accessible to drive sustainable competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).   
Resources are the tangible and intangible assets that a firm may use to conceive of 
and implement its strategies (Hunt & Morgan, 1995).  Superior resources provide firms 
with higher production performance or lower average costs than other firms (Barney, 
1991).  Capabilities are subsets of resources, which enhance the performance or improve 
the value of the other resources possessed by the firm (Makadok, 2001).  Collectively, 
resources and capabilities represent bundles of tangible and intangible assets that include 
a firm’s management skills, its organizational processes and routines, and the information 
and tacit knowledge that it uses to implement strategies (Kozlenkova, Samaha, & 
Palmatier, 2014).  Resource-based theory suggests that superior resources and capabilities 
lead to core competencies, which are those attributes that are difficult or costly to imitate 
as the source of economic rents to drive firm performance and provide a competitive 
advantage (Conner, 1991). 
Resource-based logic relies on the assumptions that strategic resources are 
heterogeneously distributed across firms within an industry and that those differences are 




have differing resources, therefore each firm has an assortment of resources and 
capabilities that is at least in some ways unique (Hunt & Morgan, 1995).  Imperfect 
resource mobility implies that superior resources are not readily bought, sold, or traded 
within the marketplace (Hunt & Morgan, 1996).  These underlying assumptions suggest 
that superior resources are limited in supply and quasi-fixed so that supply cannot be 
expanded rapidly within industries (Peteraf, 1993).  Firms without access to superior 
resources must substitute resources of lesser quality (Hunt & Morgan, 1995); therefore, 
some firms are more skilled in accomplishing certain activities because they possess 
unique resources and capabilities of superior quality (Kozlenkova et al., 2014). 
Resource-based theory states that for a resource or capability to provide a 
sustainable competitive advantage, it must be simultaneously valuable, rare, imperfectly 
imitable, and organized in a way that makes it exploitable by the firm (Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993).  First, valuable resources are those that enable a firm to exploit 
opportunities or neutralize threats in the competitive environment (Barney, 1991).  
Second, rare resources are those accessible to only a small number of firms within the 
same industry (Peteraf, 1993).  Next, a resource is imperfectly imitable when it is costly 
to obtain and difficult to imitate by competing firms (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990).  To pass 
this test, a resource must be imperfectly mobile as well as non-substitutable (Hunt & 
Morgan, 1995).  Finally, to create a sustainable competitive advantage, the firm must be 
organized to exploit the competitive potential of the resource (Kozlenkova et al., 2014). 
Resource-based theory considers outsourcing from a strategic perspective, which 
involves employing outsourcing not only to reduce costs, but also to allow an 




suppliers (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  The ability of a firm’s strategies to generate 
suitable returns depends upon the attributes of its resources and capabilities (Barney, 
2014).  Resource-based theory states that activities in which firms achieve superior 
performance relative to competitors should be performed internally (Wernerfelt, 2014), 
while collaboration with external sources may provide a firm access to complementary 
resources, which could provide a comparative advantage (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). 
2.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost economics examines whether a transaction is more efficiently 
performed within firm boundaries or across independent entities (Steenkamp & 
Geyskens, 2012).  According to TCE, global sourcing decisions involve a comparison of 
the production costs incurred from producing a product internally with the transaction 
costs associated in purchasing a product from an external source (Williamson, 1975).  
Unlike production costs, transaction costs are difficult to measure because they represent 
the potential consequences of alternative decisions (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990).  The 
TCE framework provides a rational view for evaluating make-or-buy decisions by 
allowing the properties of the transaction determine the most efficient governance 
structure – market, hierarchy, or alliance (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; 
Geyskens et al., 2006; McIvor, 2009). 
Transaction cost logic depends upon two foundational behavioral assumptions: 
bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985).  Bounded rationality states that 
while decision makers intend to act rationally, they are limited by their own information 
processing and communication ability (Tate & Ellram, 2009).  Opportunism is defined as 




“incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985, p. 17).  
While not all economic agents behave opportunistically, transaction cost logic universally 
assumes opportunism because it is very costly to distinguish opportunistic agents from 
sincere suppliers (Williamson, 1981).  
The potential for opportunistic behavior in market-based exchanges generates 
transaction costs, making vertical integration more efficient than market governance 
(Geyskens et al., 2006; Williamson, 1975, 1985).  Transaction cost economics states that 
economic organization is an adaptation to transactional hazards emerging from 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1981, 2008).  Thus, the need for internal governance 
arises because all agents within an exchange are subject to bounded rationality, and at 
least some display opportunistic behavior when given the chance (Geyskens et al., 2006).  
Transaction cost economics focuses on the costs associated with exchange governance by 
identifying governance mechanisms that are most appropriate for the exchange conditions 
surrounding a given transaction (Williamson, 1991). 
The basic premise of TCE views markets and hierarchies as alternative forms of 
governance, in which market regulation results from the price mechanism and hierarchies 
govern internal exchanges by means of legitimate authority (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1985).  Drawing on the benefits of competition and scale economies, the transaction cost 
framework makes the a priori assumption that market governance is more efficient than 
vertical integration (Geyskens et al., 2006).  Under the TCE framework, asset specificity 
and uncertainty are the principal transactional dimensions in which opportunistic 




specialized assets required to support the exchange along with the uncertainty 
surrounding the exchange increase the complexity of transactions, thereby making 
external market-based exchanges inefficient (Klein et al., 1990). 
2.3 Conceptual Development and Construct Definitions 
This dissertation uses a multi-step theoretical lens to determine the antecedents of 
reshoring that ultimately affect to firm performance (Neves et al., 2014).  Using both 
RBV and TCE allows the focal firm to identify the hidden costs that plague global 
sourcing and to evaluate its ability sustain resource positions amidst a changing global 
environment (Fahy & Smithee, 1999).  Figure 1 conceptualizes the antecedents and 
outcomes of reshoring.   
At the exchange level, hazards generate transaction costs, which reduce the 
efficiency of market-based exchanges (Williamson, 1985).  These economic drivers of 
reshoring occur as a result of factor market rivalry and increasing logistics costs.   Factor 
market rivalry creates higher production costs , while total logistics costs provides a 
measure of all costs incurred when coordinating a global supply chain (Zeng & Rossetti, 
2003).  At the firm level, transaction hazards induce risks, which threaten the 
effectiveness of strategic resources and capabilities (Miller, 1992).  Strategic risk 
exposure represents the threat to economic sustainability due to the erosion of strategic 
assets used in offshore production (Handley & Benton, 2009).  Supply chain disruption 
risk indicates the potential threats to long-term firm performance created by the potential 
inability to obtain products and materials necessary for production (Chopra, Reinhardt, & 




Figure 1: Conceptualization of the Reshoring Phenomenon 
 
 
In addition to the direct factors driving reshoring decisions, potential intervening 
variables are also addressed.  Since no “one size fits all” strategy exists for strategic 
sourcing decisions, the benefits of reshoring will likely differ across industries and even 
across different firms within the same industries (Sanders et al., 2007).  To learn more 
about how reshoring might affect firms differently, it is necessary to examine the firm-
facing and market-facing situations that might affect the relationships (Esper, Ellinger, 
Stank, Flint, & Moon, 2010).  These contingent or situational constructs serve as 
moderating variables in the conceptual model.  Product innovativeness provides an 
indication of the industry dynamics and market turbulence that might lead to reshoring 
(Hult, Hurley, & Knight, 2004).  Likewise, the ability to create offshore relationship 
value is a supply-chain facing capability which allows some firms to create a competitive 
advantage in offshore markets (Ritter & Walter, 2012).  Both product innovativeness and 




an outcomes of reshoring.  Table 3 provides definitions and roles for all constructs in the 
conceptual model.  The remainder of this section provides additional descriptions for 
each of the variables in the conceptual model.  
2.3.1 Economic Drivers of Reshoring 
2.3.1.1 Factor market rivalry.  Factor market rivalry happens when firms must 
compete over the resources required to implement strategy (Barney, 1986).  Factors, also 
called inputs, are resources necessary for firms to manufacture products or provide 
services (Barney, 1986).  These resources are presumed to be vital, mobile, and scarce 
(Markman et al., 2009).  As scarcity increases for any necessary resource, competition 
emerges (Sanders et al., 2007).  Therefore, factor market rivalry, in its simplest form, 
happens when firms compete in upstream, rather than downstream markets (Ellram, Tate, 
& Feitzinger, 2013).  Factor market rivalry, like any competition, significantly reduces 
profitability (Barney, 1991; Porter, 2008).   
Markman (2009, p. 423) defines factor-market rivalry as “the competition over 
resource positions that occurs when two or more firms compete over necessary inputs.”  
Although a strong factor position may potentially create a sustainable competitive 
advantage in product markets, factor market rivalry does not imply that the competition 
involves valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources (Barney, 1986).  
Factor market rivalry may be derived from competition over raw materials, natural 
resources, real estate location, human resources, or even outsourced services (Ellram, 
Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013).  Often, firms overly focused on resources that contribute to a 
sustainable competitive advantage in product markets must face unanticipated 




Table 3: Proposed Construct Definitions 
Construct Definition Role 
Factor Market 
Rivalry 
Factor market rivalry represents the competition over 
resource positions that occurs when two or more firms 
compete over necessary inputs.  While these resources  are 
presumed to be vital, mobile, and scarce, they need not be 
simultaneously valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-





Total logistics costs consider the whole range of costs 
associated with logistics, which includes transport and 
warehousing costs, but also inventory carrying, 






Strategic risk exposure defines the sensitivity to attributes 
in the global environment that might diminish the 
strategic resources and core competencies that a firm 
employs to create value for its customers (Harland et al., 





An individual's perception of the total potential loss 
associated with the disruption of supplies, inventories, and 






“The trade-off between the multiple benefits and 
sacrifices of a supplier’s core offering, as perceived by 
key decision makers in the customer’s organization, and 
taking into consideration the available alternative 
suppliers’ offerings in a specific-use situation (Ulaga & 




Product innovativeness is the degree to which a product 
possesses new and unique attributes and features, as 
compared to other products in the same market (Fu, Jones, 





Superior operating performance represents the increase in 
efficiency of reshoring firms in comparison to those who 






Superior financial performance represents the increase in 
profitability of firms that reshore compared to those that 




Competitive blind spots emerge when firms must compete over resources that are 
not strategically important, or when firms must compete with unexpected rivals 
(Markman et al., 2009).  Many times unexpected competition occurs when companies 




This type rivalry often occurs when unrelated firms compete over limited logistics 
capacity or semi-skilled labor (Ellram, Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013).  Moreover, the 
competition can come from unexpected and even unrelated firms , because factor market 
rivalry does not require that firms compete in the same product markets (Markman et al., 
2009).  For instance, Chrysler met unexpected competition when a company that 
manufactured kitty litter began buying the clay that it needed for prototypes and molds 
(Ellram, Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013).    
2.3.1.2 Total logistics costs.  Logistics is the costly tactical function charged with 
getting the right thing to the right place at the right time (Mallik, 2010).  However, the 
logistical aspects of an exchange are substantially broader than loading, storage, and 
transport (Chen & Paulraj, 2004).  Logistics enables supply chains to oversee the flows 
of, materials, information, and cash in an effort to provide customer service (Zeng & 
Rossetti, 2003).  The Council of Logistics Management defines logistics management as 
“that part of the supply chain process that plans, implements, and controls the efficient 
flow and storage of goods, services, and information from the point of origin to the point 
of consumption in order to meet customers’ requirements” (Mentzer et al., 2001, p. 16).  
Thus, total logistics costs represent a substantial portion of total supply chain costs and 
serve as an important indicator of supply chain efficiency (Zeng & Rossetti, 2003). 
Total logistics costs include all direct and indirect costs incurred due to the 
transport, storage, and distribution of the product or supply part (Fawcett, Calantone, & 
Smith, 1996).  Total transportation expenditures comprise the largest component of all 
logistics costs, usually more than half (Gunasekaran, Patel, & Tirtiroglu, 2001).  Direct 




and distribution of a product or supply part (Bhatnagar & Sohal, 2005).  These costs 
include the tariffs, duties, handling and inspection costs incurred due to the import or 
export of a product to a foreign market (Baldwin & Venables, 2013).   
Firms also incur indirect logistics costs: coordination, inventory carrying costs, 
unplanned shutdowns, quality issues, reverse logistics, cash-to-cash cycle time 
(Bhatnagar & Sohal, 2005; Tate et al., 2014).  Since logistics crosses functional areas, 
many of the total costs of logistics are overlooked (Gunasekaran et al., 2001).  These 
costs are considered hidden costs, because they are often not realized until after the 
transaction is completed (Larsen et al., 2013).  Indirect costs may come from the demand 
market as well as the supply market.  Firms must also consider consumer resentment 
resulting from loss of responsiveness, stock-outs, or product failure (Ajzen, 1991; Fine, 
2013; Fishbein, 1979).    
Total logistics costs consider the whole range of costs associated with logistics, 
which includes not only transportation and warehousing costs, but also inventory carrying 
costs, administration expenses, and order processing costs (Zeng & Rossetti, 2003).  To 
minimize total costs, a firms must be able to identify and measure all logistics costs.  
Uncovering hidden costs requires supply chain personnel to understand the general way 
in which the costs are affected by the decisions at hand (Waller & Fawcett, 2012).  The 
total cost concept has been the cornerstone of logistics, and the ability to analyze the total 
costs of a supply chain is the key function of efficient supply chain management (Ellram 
& Maltz, 1995; Stock & Lambert, 2001; Waller & Fawcett, 2012).  Total cost analysis 
seeks to examine the aggregate costs for all logistics activities rather than focusing on 




While the goal of total logistics analysis is to identify and minimize the entire 
costs throughout the supply chain, this goal must be to eliminate costs without damaging 
firm performance (Bygballe, Bø, & Grønland, 2012; Gunasekaran et al., 2001).  Supply 
chain managers consider the logistics relative to other marketing objectives to reduce 
total logistics costs without endangering customer service (Bygballe et al., 2012).  Stock 
and Lambert (2001) present the logistics and marketing functions as a set of trade-offs 
that must be made to connect supply chains with demand markets. Therefore, extant 
research has noted that supply chain strategy should not be based on cost alone, but rather 
on the issues of quality, flexibility, innovation, speed, time, and dependability (Chen & 
Paulraj, 2004; Fugate, Mentzer, & Stank, 2010). 
2.3.2 Reshoring and Firm Sustainability 
2.3.2.1 Strategic risk exposure.  To increase efficiency, many organizations focus 
on developing a few core competencies internally and outsourcing all non-core activities 
(Hunt & Morgan, 1996).  This strategic focus can potentially liberate resources for 
subsequent investment in areas that are expected to yield competitive advantage (Handley 
& Benton, 2009).  However, many outsourcing decisions can have unintended 
consequences which expose the firm to substantial risks (Christopher, Mena, Khan, & 
Yurt, 2011).  As firms relinquish more control to suppliers, they assume more risk 
(Sanders et al., 2007).  Thus, when making outsourcing decisions, firms should consider 
the effect that the task might have on firm strategy (Spekman & Davis, 2004). 
Strategic decisions are in essence the aggregation of a sequence of tactical 
decisions leading to some common planned or emergent pattern (Ritchie & Brindley, 




(Harland et al., 2003).  Risk expresses the probability that a given adverse event occurs 
during a specific time activity (Harland et al., 2003), while exposure refers to the 
sensitivity of a firm to changes in any of a number of interrelated uncertain variables 
(Miller, 1992).  As such, organizational strategic choices determine a firm's exposure to 
uncertain environmental and organizational components that affect firm performance 
(Sanders et al., 2007).  Hence, strategic risk exposure characterizes the sensitivity to 
attributes in the global environment that might diminish the strategic resources and core 
competencies that a firm might employ to create value for its customers. 
Strategic risk describes any current or future threats to the strategic resources and 
core competencies that give the firm a sustained competitive advantage (Handley & 
Benton, 2009).  According to the resource based-view, a sustained competitive advantage 
is achieved when a firm adopts a strategy that is “not simultaneously being implemented 
by any current or potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate 
the benefits of this strategy” (Barney, 1991, p. 102).  Resources are likely to lead to a 
sustained competitive advantage when they are socially complex, causally ambiguous, or 
lacking clearly defined property rights (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990).  However, the mere 
possession of strategic resources will not provide a competitive advantage; firms create 
value through bundling these resources which lead to capabilities (Fahy & Smithee, 
1999).  Capabilities are higher-order complex resources that allow firms to organize and 
exploit resources to create value for customers (Hunt & Morgan, 1996; Teece et al., 
1997). 
Core capabilities are the primary drivers of sustainable competitive advantage, 




understanding how those capabilities help the business create value (Sanders et al., 2007).  
Firms must consider the functional interdependencies between core competencies and 
other related activities that provide no direct competitive advantage (Slepniov, Wæhrens, 
& Johansen, 2014).  For instance, many firms with core competencies in research and 
development often choose to outsource production to a contract manufacturer at arm’s 
length without considering the relationship between manufacturing and innovation 
(Denning, 2013b).  If the supplier provides poor quality or leaks proprietary information, 
the value of the firm’s tacit knowledge may be diminished (Min, LaTour, & Williams, 
1994).  Thus, it is in the self-interest of firms to keep many resources and capabilities in-
house to reduce the threat of imitation (Barney, 2014).  when deciding whether to 
outsource a particular activity, firms must thoroughly understand and consider their core 
competencies relative to achieving broader strategic goals (Handley & Benton, 2009; 
Harland et al., 2003; Sanders et al., 2007; Slepniov et al., 2014). 
Strategic risk assessment describes “the degree to which the outsourcing team 
evaluated the multitude of strategic risks associated with outsourcing the business 
activity” (Handley & Benton, 2009, p. 346).  Risk assessment must involve the exposure 
to and triggers of risk, while taking into account the potential tangible implications along 
with any intangible, non-regulated consequences and losses (Harland et al., 2003).  As 
markets evolve, capabilities that are expendable today may become valuable in the 
future; therefore, the strategic evaluation must also consider any resources or capabilities 
that might be critical to creating a competitive advantage in the future (Handley & 




2.3.2.2 Supply chain disruption risk.  Supply chain disruption risk characterizes 
the total potential loss resulting from a disruption of supplies, inventories, or finished 
products within a supply chain (Ellis et al., 2010).  Supply chain disruptions are events 
which create a breakdown or stoppage in the expected flow of supplies, inventories, or 
finished products within a supply chain (Bode et al., 2011; Ellis et al., 2010).  Supply 
chain disruptions may occur due to by terrorism, natural disasters, or even poor 
infrastructure (Christopher et al., 2011).   
Existing literature distinguishes supply chain disruptions from operational and 
logistics delays (Chopra et al., 2007; Revilla & Sáenz, 2014; Talluri, Kull, Yildiz, & 
Yoon, 2013).   Delays and distortions are recurrent transactional hazards that increase 
total logistics costs (Chopra et al., 2007), while disruptions are unplanned and 
unanticipated situations with large-scale consequences (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  Delays 
describe deviations from the prompt delivery schedules, often resulting from  (Chopra & 
Sodhi, 2004), while distortions describe discrepancies with the accuracy or expected 
quantity of an order (Talluri et al., 2013).  Distortions may result from minor quality 
issues, miss-pulls, or freight damages.  While recurrent interruptions may create 
unscheduled downtime or expedite costs, they may also be buffered with additional 
inventory (Chopra et al., 2007; Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  In 
contrast, supply chain disruptions occur “when the supply chain is radically and 
unexpectedly transformed through non-availability of certain production, warehousing, 
distribution, or transportation options” (Talluri et al., 2013, p. 254). 
Supply chain disruption risk is a measure of the probability of a disruption and the 




to supply products or materials faces the risk that a disruption in the supply chain could 
damage or alter the integrity of the business (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004); however, the 
probability of a supply chain disruption is much greater for global supply chains (Manuj 
& Mentzer, 2008a).  Supply chain disruptions are more likely to occur as supply chains 
become longer and more complex, thus global supply chains face much more risk of 
disruption due to increased geographical, cultural, and temporal distance (Christopher et 
al., 2011).  The risk of a supply chain disruption is further exacerbated by the increase in 
terrorism caused by the changing geo-political arena as well as the effects of severe 
weather due to climate change (Min et al., 1994; Wagner & Bode, 2006). 
The potential impact or magnitude of a supply chain disruption has a stronger 
influence on overall perceived risk than does disruption probability (Ellis et al., 2010).  
Supply chain disruption impact is the potential damage that a firm could incur due to a 
breakdown or stoppage in the production or distribution of materials within a supply 
chain or network (Wagner & Bode, 2006).  Supply chain disruptions negatively affect 
firm performance in several ways: lost revenues due to stock outs, loss of productivity 
due to plant shutdowns, loss of goodwill from customers, added freight costs due to 
expediting, and possible penalties from industrial customers (Bode et al., 2011).  Supply 
chain disruptions have also been found to have long term negative consequences related 
to market share and stock price (Ellis et al., 2010).  While supply chain disruptions create 
enormous operational costs, research finds that the long-term effects to brand image and 





2.3.3.1 Superior firm performance.  Superior performance implies that the firm’s 
resources surpass competitors in terms of relative costs, relative value, or both (Davis & 
Golicic, 2010).  Relative firm performance indicates the efficiency and effectiveness of 
firm resources when compared to another firm, or other configuration of resources or 
firm boundaries (Hunt & Morgan, 1995).  In this study, superior operating performance 
represents the increase in operating efficiency of firms that reshore compared to those 
that do not, where efficiency is measured by return on investment (Hunt & Morgan, 
1995).  Likewise, superior financial performance represents the increase in profitability 
for firms that reshore compared to those that do not (Hunt & Morgan, 1995).  Firm 
valuations and net income margins are indicators of profitability (Sharma, 2005). 
2.3.4 Contingent Factors Influencing Reshoring Decisions 
2.3.4.1 Product innovativeness.  Product innovativeness describes the degree to 
which a product possesses new and unique attributes and features, relative to other 
products in the same market (Fu et al., 2008).  Product innovativeness indicates “the 
potential discontinuity a product can generate in the marketing process” (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002, p. 113).  Innovative products may be new to the developing firm, new 
to the market, or both (Danneels & Kleinschmidtb, 2001).  For intended consumers, 
product uniqueness may create discontinuity when new product offerings provide a 
superior product advantage over existing offerings (Danneels & Kleinschmidtb, 2001).  
By offering new functions that cannot be duplicated quickly, firms may gain first-mover 
advantages resulting in significant market share (Lau, Tang, & Yam, 2010).  Significant 




firms an opportunity to gain a foothold in competitive markets (Danneels & 
Kleinschmidtb, 2001).  Innovation also creates opportunities to differentiate existing 
products with technological product advantages (Lau et al., 2010).  
Distinctions among innovations occur along a continuum consisting of radical, 
incremental, and minor innovations (X. M. Song & Parry, 1999).  Existing typologies 
define six types of new products: new-to-the-world, new product lines, additions to 
existing product lines, revisions to existing products, repositioning, and cost reduction   
(Danneels & Kleinschmidtb, 2001; Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Lau et al., 2010; X. M. 
Song & Parry, 1999).  Highly innovative products are new to the world and new to the 
firm (Garcia & Calantone, 2002, p. 113).  These include radical innovations and 
breakthrough products that bring new value to the marketplace (X. M. Song & Parry, 
1999).  Moderately innovative products result from additions or improvements to existing 
product lines; these products offer technical novelty or newness to the firm and may be 
somewhat new to the marketplace (Danneels & Kleinschmidtb, 2001).  Moderate 
innovations also describe product lines which are new to the firm, but not new to the 
market (Garcia & Calantone, 2002, p. 113).  Finally, low innovation describes 
repositioning existing products to new markets and modifying products for cost 
reductions (Garcia & Calantone, 2002, p. 113).  Cost reduction products provide similar 
performance as existing products, but at a lower cost (Danneels & Kleinschmidtb, 2001). 
The capacity to introduce new processes, products, or ideas in the organization 
serves as a key component in the success of industrial firms (Hult et al., 2004).  New 
product development is the most obvious way to enhance firm performance (Lau et al., 




areas (Danneels & Kleinschmidtb, 2001).  Many innovative products provide as much as 
30% of firm revenues from sales and as much as 40% market share within the industry 
(Lau et al., 2010).  Successful innovations may provide more than 90% return on 
investment with payback periods of less than two years (Lau et al., 2010).   
While highly innovative products can be more profitable than incremental ones, 
they also carry significant risks (X. M. Song & Parry, 1999).  Successful new product 
development depends on the characteristics of the competitive environment in which the 
industrial firm operates (Hult et al., 2004).  Research states that innovative products 
utilize more firm resources and require a different development approach (Danneels & 
Kleinschmidtb, 2001).  Breakthrough products encounter difficulties because the firm’s 
experience base is often less relevant to product development than to product 
improvement or extension (X. M. Song & Parry, 1999).  Highly innovative product 
markets are also characterized as turbulent and volatile (van Hoek, 2001).  Market 
turbulence reflects rapidly changing buyer preferences across a wide range of needs and 
wants.  As buyers continuously enter and exit the marketplace, firms in turbulent markets 
must place a constant emphasis on offering new products (Hult et al., 2004).  
Accordingly, product life cycles shorten, product variety increases, and customer 
demands escalate (van Hoek, 2001).  Finally, additional risks arise from the threat of 
quick imitation.  This occurs when competitors attempt to economize on engineering and 
marketing costs by building on the investments and consumer sentiment of an innovative 
firm (X. M. Song & Parry, 1999). 
2.3.4.2 Offshore relationship value.  Offshore relationship value represents an 




producing offshore relative to any costs or sacrifices that the firm must make to continue 
the offshore relationship.  Ulaga and Chacour (2001, p. 530) define perceived 
relationship value as: 
“the trade-off between the multiple benefits and sacrifices of a supplier’s 
core offering, as perceived by key decision makers in the customer’s 
organization, and taking into consideration the available alternative 
suppliers’ offerings in a specific-use situation”  
Other definitions include specific items, like terms of the agreement: 
“Customer-perceived value can, therefore, be defined as the difference 
between benefits and the sacrifices (e.g. the total costs, both monetary and 
non-monetary) perceived by the customers in terms of their expectations, 
i.e. needs and wants.” (Lapierre, 2000, p. 123) 
A common theme among all definitions is that firms engaged in alliances or supply 
relationships are willing to sacrifice some expense and risk if the relationship provides 
benefits that exceed those available elsewhere (Scheer, Miao, & Garrett, 2010; Ulaga & 
Eggert, 2006).   
Sourcing literature finds that cost reduction is the primary reason for 
manufacturing in emerging countries (Ellram, 1993; Song et al., 2007).  Other companies 
engage in foreign relationships for strategic reasons, such as extending global reach in 
growing consumer segments (Harland et al., 2003).  Many firms outsource offshore to 
gain access to supplier capabilities or materials, while others simply lack manufacturing 
capacity locally (Ulaga & Chacour, 2001).  In these situations, firms gain benefits from 
offshore relationships or through partnerships that outweigh the benefits of producing 
domestically (Cheng & Sheu, 2012). For instance, partnership with offshore suppliers is 
often necessary in order to enter the consumer market in that region (N. Song et al., 




Some studies have shown, however, that where to source major components is 
less important than how to source them (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  Resource-based 
theory states that the economic rents provided by an attractive product market position 
cannot be evaluated independent of the kinds of resources and capabilities a firm used to 
create this position (Barney, 2014).  Extant literature presents relationship value as a 
second-order construct consisting of both costs and benefits (Ulaga & Eggert, 2005).  The 
ability to create valuable, mutually beneficial relationships in global markets represents a 
higher order capability that only certain firms possess (Hunt & Morgan, 1996).  
Relational resources provide a resource barrier position in the supply chain which may be 
critical to developing a competitive advantage (Scheer et al., 2010). 
2.4 Development of Hypotheses 
 
The final section of this chapter examines the linkages among the variables in the 
conceptual model.  Hypotheses are then developed to explain the conditions in which 
reshoring provides superior performance and creates a sustainable competitive advantage.  




Figure 2: Conceptual Model with Hypothesized Relationships 
 
 
2.4.1 Linking Reshoring to Firm Performance 
2.4.1.1 Factor market rivalry and firm performance.  Factor market rivalry creates 
a growing concern for firms seeking cost-based advantages in emerging markets (Tate et 
al., 2014). Research indicates that cost reduction is the primary reason firms pursue 
offshore markets (Gray et al., 2013).  While emerging markets offer location‐specific 
advantages stemming from factor endowments and low wages (Arlbjørn & Lüthje, 2012), 
competition over resource positions emerges when attractive resources are 
homogeneously distributed and mobile (Hunt & Morgan, 1995).  Resource-based logic 
states that “privileged positions in attractive industries will not produce economic rents if 
the full values of these positions were anticipated in the factor markets where the 




1986).  Thus, cost advantages based on resource positions in global factor markets are 
sustainable only if the tacit knowledge involved in building a strong resource position is 
ambiguous or socially complex (Barney, 2014).   
Factor market rivalry creates scarcity and competition over inputs that were once 
freely available (Barney, 1986).  The resulting competition introduces macroeconomic 
uncertainty, whereby cost advantages in the short term may decrease and finally 
disappear over time (Arlbjørn & Lüthje, 2012).  Location‐specific cost advantages are 
contingent upon the current economic conditions along with any potential future 
economic development within that particular location (Arlbjørn & Lüthje, 2012).  Since 
many emerging countries have limited natural resources, firms risk supply chain 
interruptions if they do not ensure a plentiful supply of water, fuel, and raw materials 
(Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013).  Global industrial activity raises the demand for finite 
natural resources while simultaneously reducing their availability (Tate, Ellram, & 
Kirchoff, 2010).  Access to semi-skilled labor, fuel, and natural resources are each critical 
to the success of offshore production.  As competition grows, the prices for these inputs 
rise (Ellram, Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013).   
As more companies pursue low-cost production locations, competition increases 
for the labor that these countries supply (Tate et al., 2014).  Labor costs may rise 
unexpectedly as demand increases for the labor in a particular market.  When other 
companies begin to source manufacturing in the same area, demand for the qualified 
labor pool exceeds supply (Ellram, Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013; Tate, 2014).  Due to the 
recession and the mass exodus of manufacturing jobs, U.S. wages have remained 




Meanwhile, Chinese wages continue to grow at a rate of 15% to 20% per year 
(Harrington, 2011).  In some areas of China, wages have more than doubled since the 
turn of the century.  From a total cost perspective, China is nearly even with Mexico, 
India, Russia, and even some low wage regions of the United States (Tate, 2014). 
Recruiting from nearby areas is not an option for most emerging markets.  Due to 
poor infrastructure, inland factories are only good if the area lies in close proximity to a 
strong demand market (Schmeisser, 2013).  For instance, hinterland transportation in 
Southeast Asia often costs more than shipping from China to most ports in Europe.  
Nearby countries usually lack the skills and training to compete in the market, so labor 
costs rise and the foreign currency strengthens (Liu, Li, Tao, & Wang, 2008). 
As traditionally low-cost economies strengthen, macroeconomic uncertainty 
creates less predictable exchange rates, which alters purchasing power (Manuj & 
Mentzer, 2008b; Miller, 1992).  While the currency in China strengthens, the U.S. 
currency continues to weaken (Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013).  When the U.S currency 
is weak relative to other countries, producing overseas is less attractive because the goods 
cost more in relative terms due to the exchange rate (Tate, 2014).  More importantly, as 
developing nations strengthen, they continue to drive the demand for fuel higher.  China 
is very dependent on imports for energy, and its costs have continued to rise due to 
shortages in energy supplies (Tate et al., 2014).   
As the balance of labor shifts, the U.S. continues to improve its level of 
manufacturing productivity (Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013).  Due to the decreasing price 
of robotics, many formerly labor-intensive jobs are becoming automated (Tate et al., 




nations (Moser, 2011).  Factoring in the currency valuation, and improved production 
rates in the U.S., net labor costs should converge by 2015 (Moser, 2012).  Because wage 
rates account for less than 30% of a product’s total cost, products manufactured in China 
will be only 15% lower than United States products before inventory and shipping costs 
are considered (Harrington, 2011).   
The price of energy and the push for green supply chains should both serve to 
make American production more attractive.  Energy represents a significant portion of 
manufacturing costs, and U.S. energy costs are lower than in many other parts of the 
world (Tate et al., 2014).  The U.S. has the lowest energy prices per megawatt in the 
world, along with the second lowest cost of natural gas and diesel fuel comparatively 
speaking (Tate, 2014).  Environmental concerns and the push for social corporate 
responsibility have ended the era of producing oversees to avoid regulations (Gray et al., 
2013).  New approaches to corporate social responsibility are emerging in response to 
stakeholder demands, more government regulations, and increasing competitive pressure 
(Cavusgil & Cavusgil, 2012).  Companies are aware of the strong link between corporate 
social responsibilities and consumer preferences, and consumers are demanding that 
companies use manufacturing processes that are less harmful to the environment and to 
communities (Tate et al., 2010).   
Factor market rivalry, like any competition, significantly reduces profitability 
(Barney, 1991; Porter, 2008).  Increasing demand leads to tighter supply markets and 
correspondingly higher prices, reducing the attractiveness of a given supply market (Tate 




global financial markets, offshore factor market rivalry is expected to create cost 
advantages for firms that repatriate manufacturing to the United States.  
H1: As factor market rivalry increases in offshore markets, firms that 
reshore will achieve (a) superior operating efficiency and (b) superior 
firm performance compared to firms that continue to produce overseas. 
2.4.1.2 Total logistics costs and firm performance.  Global supply chains create 
additional challenges with the efficient and timely distribution of goods that flow across 
supply chains (Gereffi & Lee, 2012).  Many of these challenges result from the increased 
geographical and cultural distance involved with global sourcing (Handley & W. C., 
Benton, 2013).  The greater physical distance along with the cultural differences also 
serve to extend the lead-times, thereby introducing more uncertainty to global networks 
(Min et al., 1994).  Cost reduction is one of the main reasons that companies produce 
offshore, yet the additional complexity and uncertainty involved in extended supply 
chains creates hidden costs (Min et al., 1994; Song et al., 2007).  The further the distance 
between the host country and the outsourcer, the more uncertainties and risk are present 
(Gray, Roth, & Leiblein, 2011).  The resulting unexpected costs along with the increase 
in transportation costs could offset any gains derived from cheaper labor (Song et al., 
2007).  
First, the increased geographical distance increases the direct transport costs 
involved in shipping products across the world (Bygballe et al., 2012).  Longer shipping 
routes also create more opportunities for freight to be lost or damaged, thereby increasing 
scrap and rework costs (Zeng & Rossetti, 2003).  Firms also tend to underestimate the 




produce offshore, additional transportations costs arise from the resulting trade 
imbalance.  From 2005 to 2008, 60% of all containers on Pacific routes from Asia to 
North America, and 41% of all European containers returned to Asia empty (Fransoo & 
Lee, 2013).  Buyers absorb these additional transport costs through increased rates on 
heavy lanes for one-way trips or return mileage for empty containers on dedicated 
voyages (D. P. Song & Dong, 2013). 
Cultural distance is a second factor driving hidden costs in global supply chains.  
These costs arise from the additional inventory necessary to buffer changes in demand, 
unexpected coordination costs of managing an international supply chain, quality 
concerns, and unexpected costs incurred with process changes (Platts & Song, 2010).  
Costs of coordination and governance increase drastically for global supply chains 
(Handley & W. C., Benton, 2013).  Communication difficulties create operational 
concerns because of language barriers and limitations in telecommunications capabilities 
(Kotabe & Murray, 2004).   These costs are exacerbated when the supply chain is 
interdependent (Baldwin & Venables, 2013).  Interpretive uncertainty also creates 
problems when cultural differences create unintentional performance issues or 
misalignment of goals (Weber & Mayer, 2014).  Differences in payment terms may also 
generate unexpected financial costs by negatively affecting the firm’s cash-to-cash cycle 
time (Spekman & Davis, 2004).  Many Asian firms, for example, require a significant 
payment before production with final payment terms as little as 5-15 days (N. Song et al., 
2007).   
The temporal distance involved in global sourcing is possibly the greatest source 




keep more inventory on hand to buffer the extended lead time (Tate et al., 2014).  
Deliveries with longer lead-times must work with extended planning times and use 
forecast data further into the future (Brandon‐Jones, Squire, Autry, & Petersen, 2014).  
As the distance between production and demand lengthens, the ability to pursue a pull 
strategy erodes (Kannan & Tan, 2005).  This limits the ability of forecasters to hedge 
purchasing and manufacturing decisions and places the firm at risk due to demand 
uncertainty (Christopher et al., 2011).  For example, a sudden drop in demand resulting 
from the dot-com bubble forced Cisco to write off over $2.5 billion in inventory in 2001 
(Manuj, Esper, & Stank, 2014; Spekman & Davis, 2004).  Firms must also consider the 
financial costs of inventory, especially with purchase agreements that extend all the way 
to raw materials (Gunasekaran et al., 2001).  Hummels (2007) estimates average 
inventory carrying costs for ocean freight to be 0.8% per day, which is equivalent to an 
additional 16% tariff rate (Nordås, Pinali, & Grosso, 2006).     
These hidden costs became more evident with the onset of stow steam carriers in 
2009, because ships now take 20% to 30% longer to reach port for a normal trip (Tate, 
2014).  Slow steaming reduces the ship’s average speeds from between 23-25 knots to as 
low as 20 knots (Fransoo & Lee, 2013).  For longer routes, carriers may engage in extra 
slow steaming at 17 knots to further reduce emissions and fuel usage (Lee, Lee, & Zhang, 
2015).  New ships are currently being built to optimize performance at slow-steaming 
speeds; therefore, this method will likely continue regardless of fuel prices because cargo 
ships take many years to build (Tate, 2014).  While carriers originally introduced slow 
steaming practices as a way to reduce fuel costs, early empirical research shows that fuel 




& Cariou, 2013).  Since each additional nautical mile per hour changes the ship’s 
capacity by over 6%, carriers also use slow steaming to inflate shipping demand 
artificially (Knowler, 2014).  Thus, the practice of slow steaming significantly increases 
lead-time and requires manufacturers to keep much more inventory both on-hand and in-
transit  (Tate, 2014).  To provide perspective, ocean carriers consistently hold more 
inventory between China and its next export location than all major U.S. retailers 
combined use in an entire year (Fransoo & Lee, 2013). 
In addition to delivery speed, delivery dependability also plays an important role 
in determining the costs of an extended supply chain (Luo, Fan, & Liu, 2009).  Many 
shippers suggest that the variance in shipping times is far more costly that the extended 
lead times (Bygballe et al., 2012).  While transport time is relatively consistent once the 
cargo is seaborne, differences in port efficiency leads to considerable time variation 
among countries with similar shipping distances (Nordås et al., 2006).  Poor 
infrastructure in many countries creates added concerns over transportation stability and 
availability, thereby creating additional costs for already strained logistics budgets 
(Clarke, 1997).  As ships and ports become more crowded, the variation in processing 
and sail times increases, especially in emerging countries with poor infrastructure 
(Kannan & Tan, 2005).  In some countries, the customs clearance time alone is lengthy 
enough to preclude a contract with any lean manufacturing customer (Nordås et al., 
2006).  Many foreign nations create a small portion of the added value of a product 
(Gereffi & Lee, 2012; Nordås et al., 2006).  Thus, costs and variance increase 
exponentially for each part or sub-assembly that must clear customs more than once in 




As these costs and uncertainty continue to rise, the benefits of offshore 
manufacturing steadily decline (Bode et al., 2011).  Proponents of reshoring proclaim that 
the resulting shorter supply chains should provide superior performance by increasing 
corporate flexibility and customer responsiveness (Arlbjørn & Lüthje, 2012; Harrington, 
2011; Moser, 2011; Tate, 2014).  The ability to reduce lead-time enables a firm to control 
costs while enacting firm strategies that provide customer value (van Hoek, 2001).  
Reshoring eliminates many of the costs and delays of global sourcing.  As the physical 
distance shortens, many of the hidden costs are eliminated along with some of the direct 
costs (Min et al., 1994).  Eliminating cultural differences also reduces inefficiencies 
resulting from the challenges of monitoring global supply chains (Handley & W. C., 
Benton, 2013).  The resulting reduction in temporal distance, in turn, decreases additional 
inventory carrying costs (Bygballe et al., 2012).  A reduction in lead-time also reduces 
the supply chain response time, which directly influences customer satisfaction, increases 
responsiveness, and makes the firm more flexible (Gunasekaran et al., 2001).  Therefore, 
the total logistics costs involved in offshore manufacturing should encourage reshoring 
and lead to superior firm performance.   
H2: Firms that relocate manufacturing to the U.S. will reduce total 
logistics costs, thereby leading to (a) superior operating efficiency and (b) 
superior firm profitability when compared to firms that continue to 
produce overseas. 
2.4.1.3 Strategic risk exposure and firm performance.  In addition to operational 
costs, firms must also consider the long-term implications of increased exposure to 




exposes strategic resources to unexpected risks arising from cultural, procedural, and 
behavioral uncertainty (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a).  As firms face increasing levels of 
opportunism, they risk erosion of the strategic resources and capabilities that allow them 
to compete (Handley & Benton, 2009).  In particular, brand image and brand position 
represent firm-specific resources that may not be easily duplicated or obtained in open 
markets (Barney, 2014; Fahy & Smithee, 1999; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988).  The 
complexity of global production, along with the potential for opportunism, could reduce 
the effectiveness of these rent-producing assets (Ritter & Walter, 2012).   
A brand image is a socially complex resource that could provide a sustained 
competitive advantage (Fahy & Smithee, 1999).  A brand name represents a relationship 
between a firm and its customers (Barney, 2014).  Although brand image cannot be easily 
duplicated, the value of any intangible asset is subject to erosion over time (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988).  Research shows that poor product quality from offshore manufacturing 
locations significantly reduces consumer perceptions about the ability of a firm to provide 
customer value (Kinkel & Maloca, 2009).   
Quality risk is the likelihood that a product shipped from a given establishment 
will not perform as intended due to manufacturing-related issues (Gray et al., 2011).  
Poor quality results from upstream supply uncertainty, which is much more common in 
global sourcing due to the complexity which results from the extended geographic and 
cultural distance (Handley & W. C., Benton, 2013).  Cultural distance creates 
communication problems, which might impede supplier selection and training (Min et al., 
1994).  Often, quality issues emerge if the focal firm has difficulty codifying production 




European firms have been practicing quality control procedures for years, so there will be 
a substantial learning curve in foreign lands (Song et al., 2007). 
Gray et al. (2011) find that even when knowledge is codified and clearly 
communicated, quality concerns increase as the geographic distance increases.  They 
determine that this is partly due to a loss of familiarity with personnel from the focal firm 
and partly due to the decreased visibility (Gray et al., 2011).  Many firms in emerging 
countries might not have the qualified personnel necessary for zero-defect manufacturing 
philosophies (Tate et al., 2014).  The lack of visibility may also create information 
impactednesss, which allows foreign firms to exaggerate capabilities during negotiations 
(Brandon‐Jones et al., 2014).  Firms may be able to create a prototype, yet lack the 
capabilities necessary to mass produce (Song et al., 2007).  The inability to measure 
performance in complex exchanges increases the risk of shirking by opportunistic 
suppliers (G. Walker & Weber, 1987).  This introduces behavioral uncertainty and allows 
quality issues to arise from opportunism (Williamson, 1985).  
Opportunistic suppliers may create liability risks which lead to recalls, warranty 
claims, and bad publicity (Spekman & Davis, 2004).  Liability uncertainties are 
associated with harmful effects resulting from the production or consumption of a 
company's product (Miller, 1992).  Product liability uncertainty relates to unanticipated 
negative effects associated with the use of a product that can result in legal actions 
against the producer (Harland et al., 2003).  For example, Mattel Inc. was forced to recall 
over 9 million Chinese-made toys from the market because they contained high levels of 
lead-based paint on the surface (Christopher et al., 2011).  Firms may also be held legally 




environment, even if suppliers are to blame (Miller, 1992).  Evidence of this is seen with 
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Anon, 2013).  Although BP only acknowledged 
partial responsibility, the disaster will likely cost the firm over $46 billion in damages 
and reparations (Barrett, 2014).  This also holds true for serious quality situations, such as 
Ford’s quality issues with Firestone Tires, in which people were seriously injured or 
killed (Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter, & Cavinato, 2004). 
Foreign production creates other risks, as well.  For firms that are capable of 
codifying and transferring strategic knowledge, the issue of appropriability arises (Fahy 
& Smithee, 1999).  Appropriability refers to the extent to which an innovating firm is 
able to capture economic rents or value associated with innovation before competitors 
can overcome their initial competitive disadvantage (Kotabe, 1990).  Outsourcing 
production facilitates the transfer of knowledge and technical capabilities (Shook et al., 
2009).  Since legal redress is often very weak in overseas locations, the inability to 
protect intellectual property can threaten the rarity and inimitability of these resources 
(Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  
When firms choose suppliers with overlapping, rather than complementary 
capabilities, they risk creating potential competitors through the transfer of proprietary 
knowledge (Shook et al., 2009).  Ellram and Maltz (1995) provide as an example the 
history of Intel and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD).  In the late 1980’s, Intel 
outsourced much of its microprocessor technology to AMD, yet failed to establish 
contractual governance to prevent intellectual property loss.  AMD soon began selling 
computer chips built with Intel technology, thus acting as a direct competitor to Intel 




and Samsung (Brutti, 2015).  Because of the increased risk involved with global sourcing, 
instances like these are much harder to detect and avoid overseas.     
Other forms of opportunistic behavior also pose threats to sustainable competitive 
advantage when operating offshore.  Counterfeit products, gray marketing attempts, and 
product dumping are often more difficult to detect in offshore locations (Bertrand & Mol, 
2013; Min et al., 1994; Poppo & Zenger, 1998).  Increasing reports of intellectual 
property infringement in offshore markets suggest that risks to strategic assets might be 
growing (Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013).  Outsourcing to offshore markets eventually 
creates specialization within industries whereby competitors must use the same suppliers 
(Sanders et al., 2007).  In this situation, competitors may be able to derive certain cues, 
which may diminish causal ambiguity, thereby exposing tacit capabilities (Ritter & 
Walter, 2012).  
An over-reliance on global sourcing may create erosion of the focal firm’s core 
capabilities (Spekman & Davis, 2004).  When firms purchase strategic inputs through 
arm’s length relationships, they face the risk becoming dependent on independent 
suppliers (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  As firms become more dependent on offshore 
suppliers, host firms and corporations gain more bargaining power (Handley & Benton, 
2009).  The resulting higher switching costs in offshore locations may expose firms to 
government corruption as well as opportunistic suppliers (Klein et al., 1990).  In many 
cases, foreign governments may even dictate which suppliers may or may not be used (N. 
Song et al., 2007).  As direct involvement in the production process decreases, the tacit 




erosion of these resources could threaten the firm’s strategic position and longevity 
(Ritter & Walter, 2012).   
This could create the danger of capability erosion, which over time could limit the 
absorptive capacity, and ultimately diminish the firm’s customer responsiveness (Kotabe 
& Murray, 2004).  As much as 70% of a firm’s market value may be derived from the 
intangible resources and capabilities that global production places at risk (Kozlenkova et 
al., 2014).  It is therefore expected that as firms face higher levels of strategic risk, they 
will be more likely to repatriate manufacturing.   
H3: As the risk to strategic resources in offshore markets increases, the 
likelihood that firms who relocate production to the U.S. will achieve (a) 
superior operating efficiency and (b) superior firm profitability over those 
that do not increases. 
2.4.1.4 Supply chain disruption risk and firm performance.  Supply chain 
disruptions and related issues represent one of the most pressing concerns facing firms 
competing in today's global marketplace (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  Yet, despite the 
increased focus on supply chain risk management, supply chains have become more 
vulnerable while the severity and frequency of supply chain disruptions continues to 
increase (Brandon‐Jones et al., 2014).  The increased likelihood of disruptions may 
partially result form more occurrences of natural disasters beyond managerial control, 
however, the greater impact of disruptions is due to more complex supply chain designs 
(Wagner & Bode, 2006).  While tighter coupling, reduced inventory levels, and faster 
throughput have reduced costs in supply chains, the greater geographic dispersion and 




Since accidents become recurrent in rapid, tightly coupled technological systems, 
research indicates that supply chain disruptions are much more common in complex 
global supply chains (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).   
Supply chain disruptions may be caused by result from may occur as a result of 
natural disasters, resource shortages, or large-scale industrial accidents (Christopher et 
al., 2011).  Disruptions may also have socio-economic origins, like relational hazards or 
geopolitical uncertainty (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  As supply chains become longer and 
more complex, they are also more exposed to different and higher risk levels (Van den 
Bossche, 2014).  When supply chains expand overseas, different tiers and sub-tiers may 
be exposed to different types of disruption risks simultaneously (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  
Thus, it is necessary to assess the probability and potential impact for each type of 
disruption by country, because both natural and man-made disasters cause immense 
financial and reputational damage to global supply chains (Van den Bossche, 2014).   
Natural disruptions often follow large-scale natural disasters such as hurricanes, 
earthquakes, or severe floods (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  As global networks are more 
closely intertwined, major disasters have the capability to halt production completely 
across the globe, as seen by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that crippled Japan in 
2011 (Brandon‐Jones et al., 2014).  Because Japan is a global leader in automotive 
technology, most automakers across the globe were forced to halt production for several 
days following the event (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  Low inventory levels left Toyota 
particularly vulnerable as the tsunami simultaneously disrupted its offshore and 




General Motors to regain enough market share to surpass Toyota as the world’s largest 
automotive company.   
Natural disasters may create disruptions without directly striking a factory or 
supplier.  In 2010, a volcanic eruption in Iceland shutdown air traffic between Northern 
Europe and the North America (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  With increased globalization, 
disruptions may also result from biological and physiological epidemics as well as 
weather-related disasters.  For example, the onset of Foot and Mouth disease in 2001 
created economic turmoil for the British agricultural sector, although medical pandemics 
usually occur in less advanced countries (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  The SARS virus 
served to limit travel to Asian countries in 2002, just months after China’s entry into the 
World Trade Organization (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a).  More recently, the Ebola virus 
has limited efforts to build a sustainable economic infrastructure in African countries.  
Other natural occurrences are less dramatic, although equally as disruptive.  
World population growth and increased consumption are depleting a number of natural 
resources such as oil, coal, and precious metals on a global scale (Bell, Autry, 
Mollenkopf, & Thornton, 2012).  The rapid depletion of necessary resources along with 
droughts and other severe weather created by climate change may create disruption risks 
in both emerging and current economies (Bell et al., 2012).  This is particularly true for 
many agricultural and chemical operations.  For instance, 23 U.S. chemical plants issued 
force majeure in 2014, many of which were due to disruptions in utilities and feedstock 
supplies (Kelley, 2014a, 2014b).  LyondellBasell issued 14 of 23 total force majeures, 
and the company estimates that disruptions in the first quarter of 2014 alone cost the 




from weather-related phenomena affecting raw material costs and availability (Kelley, 
2014a).  The impact of such shortages has been even greater in Europe, where chemical 
plants have issued over 40 force majeures in the first four months of 2015 (“40 Force 
Majeure cases,” 2015).  This is partly because the aging factories and equipment in 
Europe are inefficient and more prone to breakdowns, but the main reason for the 
unprecedented number of European shutdowns concerns prices and availability of 
feedstocks (Weddle, 2015).   
As global consumption continues to grow, firms must consider resource 
availability when choosing manufacturing locations (L. Chen et al., 2013).  In addition to 
oil and precious metals, water supplies and food sources are also growing scarce (Bell et 
al., 2012).  Wasteful usage and accelerates the depletion of existing natural resources, 
while unnecessary pollution contributes to climate change and increases the likelihood of 
future natural disasters (Hassini, Surti, & Searcy, 2012).  China is often criticized for 
prioritizing economic development while ignoring social responsibility issues (Thornton, 
Autry, Gligor, & Brik, 2013).  Hence, Southern Asia shows the highest probability for 
geological and weather-related supply chain disruptions (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  
In addition to disruptions with natural causes, firms must assess the possibility of 
man-made disasters (Macdonald & Corsi, 2013).  Many disruptions result from large-
scale industrial accidents (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  Such accidents may be caused by 
faulty equipment or human error.  The lack of government oversight and building 
standards in emerging economies may serve to increase the risk of a disaster (Seuring & 
Müller, 2008).  For instance, a fire in at a textile factory in Bangladesh caused the 




had faulty wiring and inadequate fire escapes (H. Walker, Huq, Stevenson, & Zorzini, 
2014).  Another example involves a significant number of suicide attempts at a 
Taiwanese factory that supplies semiconductors to Apple, Dell, and Hewlett Packard 
(Thornton et al., 2013).  The high number of industrial accidents in Asian countries 
highlights the need to consider corporate social responsibility when selecting suppliers 
(H. Walker et al., 2014).   
Supply chain disruptions may also stem from socio-economic causes such as 
relational hazards, financial risks, and geopolitical threats (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  
Financial and relational hazards are additional types of business risks, which come from 
within the supply chain (Zsidisin, Panelli, & Upton, 2000).  One type of relational hazard 
is contention risk, which addresses the limitations of suppliers concerning volume and 
process changes (Sanders et al., 2007).  Business risk is often created by economic 
uncertainty (Zsidisin et al., 2000).   
Firms must therefore consider the financial stability of potential suppliers and 
host governments, especially in emerging countries (Bode, Hübner, & Wagner, 2014). 
Financial distress is becoming more common amid uncertain global markets (Sheffi & 
Rice Jr, 2005).  Even traditional powerhouses like Visteon have had trouble securing 
funds to increase or complete projects (Bode et al., 2014).  For instance, Land Rover 
faced an immediate disruption due to the insolvency of its primary chassis supplier, UPF-
Thompson (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  Because Thompson had not notified Land Rover 
of financial distress, creditors appeared without notice and demanded immediate payment 
from Land Rover of $40 million (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  Land Rover was able to 




however, the incident nearly caused over1400 workers to be laid off (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 
2005).  
Supply chain disruptions may also be derivative of planned events, triggered by 
changes in the geopolitical environment (Macdonald & Corsi, 2013).  Geopolitical 
uncertainty often results from major changes in political regimes, which may create 
political instability or social unrest (Spekman & Davis, 2004).  Political instability may 
result in war, revolution, or coup d’état (Miller, 1992).  This type political turmoil has 
plagued the Middle East in recent years.  In 2011, many companies were forced to shutter 
factories or evacuate during Arab Spring, which orchestrated the overthrow of political 
leaders in many countries including Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Palestine (Elzarka, 2013).  
Terrorism and political instability is most likely to occur in emerging economies, and 
extant literature suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest probability of 
disruption due to political instability (Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013; Revilla & Sáenz, 
2014).  This may be wholly due to constant terrorist acts committed by pirates off the 
coast of Somalia (Tummala & Schoenherr, 2011).  Militant behavior is not limited to the 
host country, however.  For instance, the bombing of the World Trade Center and U.S. 
Pentagon in 2001 was a terrorist act that stopped all U.S. air traffic for several days 
costing over $33 billion and 3000 lives (Autry & Bobbitt, 2008).   
Democratic changes in governments or heads of state may create political 
uncertainty regarding laws and government policies that impact the business community 
(Miller, 1992).  Policies concerning natural or human resources may reduce production 
output or disrupt the throughput of feedstock supplies (Harland et al., 2003).  For 




needed to build electronic components.  Since China refines 90% of the global supply of 
these elements, many firms were left searching for other supply sources (Ramzy, 2013).  
Other types of government policy uncertainties are price controls, changes in trade 
barriers, threats of nationalization, and changes in government regulation (Fahy & 
Smithee, 1999; Miller, 1992; Teece, 1986).  
Multinational firms may also face government policy uncertainties in their home 
country as well as in host countries (Miller, 1992).  For instance, public companies in the 
U.S. must now comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Conflict 
Minerals filing requirements for products containing tantalum, tin, tungsten, or gold 
(Harris, de Carbonnel, & Bauman, 2014).  These four so-called “conflict minerals” are 
primary sources of funding for armed groups involved in human rights violations in many 
African locations (Gianopoulos, 2015).  However, these materials are essential to the 
production of countless products: electronics, plastics, glass, jewelry, zippers, buttons, 
drill bits, and even and golf clubs (Harris et al., 2014).  To provide transparency into 
corporate practices, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act now requires firms to disclose 
the source and chain of custody for any of these minerals.  While the requirement has 
only been in effect for one year, many firms are finding that tracing the origin of these 
minerals is extremely costly, if not impossible (Gianopoulos, 2015).   
The physical and cultural distance involved with global supply chains magnifies 
the impact as well as the probability of supply chain disruptions (Christopher & Peck, 
2004).  Global supply chains create complexity and uncertainty, which reduces the ability 
of firms to restart production following a disruption (Bode et al., 2011).  The longer 




(Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003).  Existing empirical studies show that supply chain disruptions 
reduce market share and operating performance (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 2005a, 
2005b).  Hendricks and Singhal (2005b) find that in the year following a supply chain 
disruption, firms experience industry-adjusted changes in operating income, return on 
sales, and return on assets are  -107%, -114%, and -92%, respectively.  Their study also 
finds that these firms experienced a 6.92% decline in sales, while costs and inventories 
both increased by 10.66% and 13.88%, respectively (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005b).  
However, disruptions cost firms much more than lost revenue and market share 
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2003).  Research indicates that investors view lengthy disruptions 
as an indication of inefficiency and poor management, which has a significant negative 
impact on shareholder value (Wagner & Bode, 2006).  For example, in the year following 
a disruption, average shareholder wealth decreased by 10% (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003), 
while the two year abnormal stock return rate decreased by 40% (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2005a).  
As these risks continue to increase, many firms strive to mitigate the threats of 
disruptions by creating agile supply chains that are resilient and robust (Brandon‐Jones et 
al., 2014).  Resilience describes the ability of a supply chain to recover fully within an 
acceptable period of time following a disturbance (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  
Robustness concerns the ability of a firm to continue operations without disrupting 
production despite the occurrence of a disaster or threat (Brandon‐Jones et al., 2014).  
Supply chain agility requires increased flexibility and visibility; thus, local networks with 
shorter lead times tend to be more robust and resilient to failure (Brandon‐Jones et al., 




and financial risks, firms with higher supply chain disruption risk should be more likely 
to repatriate manufacturing to the U.S. (Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013).  
H4: As the risk of a supply chain disruption in offshore markets increases, 
firms who relocate production to the U.S. will achieve (a) superior 
operating efficiency and (b) superior firm profitability compared to firms 
that continue to manufacture products overseas. 
2.4.2 Assessing the Impact of Downstream Markets on Reshoring Success 
2.4.2.1 Product innovativeness and factor market rivalry.  As labor becomes 
scarce in emerging economies, foreign governments have less incentive to invest in 
operations with high asset specificity and increased quality demands (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988).  Host countries also have no incentive to invest in the human resource 
training and skilled labor necessary to create customized products when the demand for 
semi-skilled labor is high (Shelanski & Klein, 1995).  To boost other aspects of foreign 
economies, governments often institute counter-trade agreements in exchange for the 
investments in education and job training required for highly technical production (Min et 
al., 1994).  These agreements require the supplier to purchase a certain percentage of 
goods from local suppliers, thereby limiting the purchasing power of the multi-national 
enterprise while strengthening the foreign economy (Min et al., 1994; N. Song et al., 
2007; Teece, 1986). 
In addition to the direct labor problems arising from the shortage of skilled 
workers and quality management, firms also incur additional costs from indirect labor 
relations (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Sydow & Frenkel, 2013).  These costs arise from 




and other non-government organizations (Schoenherr et al., 2008; Sydow & Frenkel, 
2013).  Along with the political uncertainty of potential government intervention, both 
the process uncertainty arising from potential labor disputes and the macro-uncertainty 
caused by unstable foreign exchange rates can nullify any price advantages offered by a 
foreign supplier (Min et al., 1994). 
Factor market rivalry creates thin markets, which reduces the incentives for 
foreign suppliers to invest in the specialized equipment and changing technology required 
to produce innovative products (Teece, 1986).  When firms must make these investments 
themselves, they leave themselves subject to expropriation risks (Joskow, 1988).  The 
rapid rate of change for innovative product markets leaves manufacturers at an even 
greater risk of ex-post price increases, especially when customized tools and machinery 
are required (G. Walker & Weber, 1984).   For instance, in automobile manufacturing, 
dies and other special tools have low salvage value, yet provide a quasi-rent stream that is 
highly dependent on the machinery and the skilled labor required for production (G. 
Walker & Weber, 1987).  Here, the greater the research and development expense for the 
product, the higher the expropriation risk from hold-up hazards (Joskow, 1988).  The 
resulting switching costs introduce behavioral uncertainty and the potential for 
opportunism (Mooi & Ghosh, 2010). 
Investment in non-fungible assets leads to small numbers bargaining and hold-up 
hazards (Williamson, 1985).  Without sufficient safeguards, either party could attempt to 
capitalize on the fact that the other cannot exit the arrangement without incurring great 
cost (Williamson, 1991).  The dynamism present in innovative markets precludes the 




Likewise, the rate of change in innovative markets introduces technical uncertainty, 
which limits the ability of firms to implement effective safeguards due to the potential 
lock-in hazard (Klein et al., 1990).  These transaction hazards may be costly in terms of 
possible delays and disruptions due to shirking, labor shortage, and opportunistic 
behavior (G. Walker & Weber, 1987).  The potential for market competition to safeguard 
buyers and sellers is limited to the extent that efficient production requires specialized or 
dedicated assets  (Williamson, 1981).  Thus, markets competition cannot effectively 
govern transactions subject to a high degree of uncertainty and consisting of long-term 
exchanges of complex and heterogeneous products between a comparatively small 
number of traders (Teece, 1986).  
Internalization can only neutralize these threats when host governments offer the 
same protections and incentives to both local and foreign investors (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988; Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 1990).  Thus, foreign direct investment, 
whether it is vertical or horizontal, replaces some of the disadvantages encountered in 
foreign markets with a direct interface between the subsidiary and the host government 
(Teece, 1986).  If host governments treat multinational enterprises differently from 
indigenous entities, the foreign firm may have circumvented one hold-up hazard through 
direct investment only to encounter another from nationalization (Gatignon & Anderson, 
1988; Teece, 1986).  Thus, location rather than ownership should be the best strategy to 
protecting assets in tight markets with innovative product (Peng, 2001).  Hence, for firms 
in highly innovative product markets, the increasing competition in offshore factor 




H5: As product innovativeness increases (decreases), the effect that factor 
market rivalry has on (a) superior operating efficiency and (b) superior 
firm profitability increases (decreases). 
2.4.2.2 Product innovativeness and total logistics costs.  Product market 
characteristics may significantly increase logistics expenditures as well as factor market 
costs (Ancarani et al., 2015).  When determining manufacturing locations, firms must 
consider the impact that the expected product life cycle has on total logistics costs (Mol, 
Pauwels, Matthyssens, & Quintens, 2004).  Innovative product markets are characterized 
as volatile and dynamic, thus the expected life cycle for innovative products is usually 
short (Mol, van Tulder, & Beije, 2005).  Market dynamism defines the rate of change in 
customer preferences and competitor actions (Homburg, Fürst, & Kuehnl, 2012), whereas 
volatility describes the extent to which the environment changes rapidly without notice 
(Klein et al., 1990).  This type of market turbulence introduces technical uncertainty and 
process uncertainty in upstream markets as well as demand uncertainty from downstream 
markets (Zsidisin et al., 2000).  This level of uncertainty coupled with the specificity of 
highly technical products increases production costs, total landed costs, and inventory 
carrying costs for innovative products produced abroad (Platts & Song, 2010). 
First, the rate of technological change within an industry often dictates the level of 
process uncertainty, which consequently raises production costs (Bertrand & Mol, 2013).  
Task complexity arises because highly innovative production targets emerging or 
potential markets in which product requirements are unarticulated and no dominant 
design exists (X. M. Song & Parry, 1999).  This also increases quality related costs of 




Many times engineers must remain onsite for additional inspection because the rapid 
technological change creates quality issues due to the constant learning curve involved 
(Mol et al., 2004).  Excessive product modification and proliferation reduces production 
efficiency, thereby creating additional manufacturing costs (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  
Innovative products often require additional oversight from the focal firm due to the 
frequent retooling and changeover costs (Bhatnagar & Sohal, 2005).  Expatriation costs 
of long-term engineering visits are also substantial and typically unexpected (Platts & 
Song, 2010).    Moreover, due to the novelty of innovative projects, firms typically lacks 
relevant experience to simplify the task and process complexity (X. M. Song & Parry, 
1999). 
The level of product innovation also increases the total grounded costs for 
globally sourced products (Boute & Van Mieghem, 2015).  The longer geographic 
distance increases the transport costs required (Smith, 1999).  Increased task complexity 
inhibits coordination and communication, which increases the likelihood of expediting 
costs (Baldwin & Venables, 2013).  A high rate of technical change requires idiosyncratic 
technical assets while the products often require inputs that are more expensive (Platts & 
Song, 2010).  Thus, the financial costs of inventory is much greater in highly innovative 
markets, thereby increasing the impact of longer cash-to-cash cycle times (Gunasekaran 
et al., 2001).  The higher demand for innovative products leads to higher retail pricing, 
which increases the impact of in-transit damages and shrinkage; therefore, firms must 
carry additional transportation insurance at a higher rate (Min et al., 1994).  The 
difference in product price may also affect the tariff rate for imported materials and parts 




Thus, product innovativeness should drastically increase inventory carrying costs, tariffs 
and duties, as well as insurance costs for overseas transport (Smith, 1999). 
Innovative products also incur additional downstream costs due to greater demand 
uncertainty, higher product values, and shorter product life cycles (Mol et al., 2005).  
Innovative firms suffer higher inventory carrying costs due to reinvention and subsequent 
obsolescence (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  Companies in high clock-speed industries are 
less likely to recoup losses by refurbishing or reselling product returns.  Additionally, 
breakthrough projects target latent consumer needs, which limit the ability to forecast 
accurately (X. M. Song & Parry, 1999).  For instance, Nintendo lost valuable market 
share to PlayStation and other competitors in 2007 when it underestimated seasonal 
demand for its Wii gaming console creating Christmas shortages.  The planned 
obsolescence inherent to electronics and other highly technical products involves constant 
redesign to provide wider arrays of customer offerings and customizations (van Hoek, 
2001).   As industry competition strengthens, customer demands escalate and product 
variety increases (Homburg et al., 2012).   
This continuous redesign creates volatile markets as heightened industry demand 
changes rapidly and becomes less predictable (Mol et al., 2005).  The resultant shorter 
life cycles reduce the window of opportunity for successful new product development.  
For profitable growth through new products, firms need to move these products to market 
faster because of shrinking product life cycles and the rapid obsolescence of established 
products on the market (Wagner, 2010).  However, as windows of opportunity become 
smaller, research indicates that product timing may be even more important than product 




launch delays may lead to lost sales revenue and lower market share (Calantone & Di 
Benedetto, 2012).  Conversely, faster cycle times may allow firms to adopt a pioneer role 
within the industry providing first mover advantages (Wagner, 2010).  Shorter supply 
chains allow more time for market sensing before investing in production, finished goods 
inventory (van Hoek, 2001).  For maximum returns from the product, the order-to-
completion cycle time should be as short as possible (Bygballe et al., 2012).  Considering 
the additional operational costs globalization creates for innovative products, the level of 
product innovativeness should strengthen the effect of total logistics costs on reshoring.   
 H6: As product innovativeness increases (decreases), the effect that total 
logistics costs has on (a) superior operating efficiency and (b) superior 
firm profitability increases (decreases). 
2.4.2.3 Product innovativeness and strategic risk exposure.  Globalization exposes 
innovative companies to greater strategic risks as the reduced visibility in dynamic 
industries creates quality concerns and increases the potential for capability erosion.  
First, quality risk is greater for innovative products due to novelty of the product and the 
rapid rate of change inherent to dynamic markets (Paladino, 2007).  The continuous 
redesign increases both product and task complexity, which thereby induces process 
uncertainty (Handley & W. C., Benton, 2013).  Radical innovations are also highly 
technical, requiring ongoing research and development (R&D) support (Platts & Song, 
2010).  The use of external R&D to manage ongoing changes reduces visibility for the 
focal firm and may be disruptive to the success of new product development (Bertrand & 
Mol, 2013).  For instance, Boeing’s effort to speed the development cycle time for its 787 




over two years, cost billions of dollars in lost sales, and created post-launch problems that 
remain to this day (C. S. Tang et al., 2009).     
Successful global sourcing strategies require close coordination among R&D, 
manufacturing, and marketing activities across national boundaries (Kotabe & Murray, 
2004).  Close relationships between buyers and suppliers enhance the success of new 
product launches (Prior, 2012).  Collaboration increases trust, information transparency, 
and cooperation with strategic partners and suppliers, thereby facilitating the 
development of new products while mitigating potential risks (Christopher et al., 2011).  
Frequent interaction also increases the probability that relevant processes and systems are 
integrated between buyers and suppliers (Chang, Cheng, & Wu, 2012).    However, 
partnerships are extremely resource-intensive, and a buyer can only be highly involved 
with a limited number of offshore suppliers.  Thus, global sourcing is often managed at 
arm’s length despite the increased risk (Pereira, Sellitto, Borchardt, & Geiger, 2011). 
Along with the potential losses resulting from a failed product launch, an over-
reliance on outsourced manufacturing can also lead to an unintended loss of operational-
level knowledge and capabilities (Sanders et al., 2007).  To free up valuable resources 
and focus on core capabilities, many companies design products domestically and 
manufacture them offshore (Kotabe, 1990).  While global sourcing reduces the required 
investment in manufacturing facilities and lowers the breakeven point for new 
developments, the separation causes the design team to lose direct contact with 
manufacturing on a daily basis (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  As firms adopt this designer 
role in manufacturing, they eventually lose an inherent understanding of how production 




departments struggle to keep abreast of changes in machinery and technology (Kotabe, 
1990).  Over time, these designer firms risk losing the ability to determine the how best to 
manufacture the products they conceive (Denning, 2013a).   
Past research shows that when manufacturing operations are sent overseas, some 
innovative ability is lost in the long run (Denning, 2013a, 2013b).  Innovative capability 
represents the ability of a firm relative to its competitors to develop new approaches, 
techniques and ideas to solve identified problems and to put these into practice (Prior, 
2012).  This loss of absorptive capacity reduces strategic capabilities by limiting a firm’s 
market sensing capabilities and likely creates other downstream risks, as well (Bertrand 
& Mol, 2013).  As firms depend more heavily on independent suppliers at an arm’s-
length basis, they also lose sight of how to incorporate emerging technologies and 
expertise into the development of new products (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  The loss of 
production and innovation capabilities also reduces the firm’s ability to provide technical 
support to customers when problems arise (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014).  Thus, an 
overdependence on foreign production may induce a long-term loss of manufacturing 
capabilities, and consequently, a loss of global competitiveness (Kotabe, 1990).  
Global sourcing adds considerable risk to manufacturing, whether outsourced or 
internalized, because firms must manage not only the supplying partner, but also its 
supply chain or supporting network (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  Extant literature suggests 
that most firms producing overseas lack visibility past their second tier suppliers, thereby 
negating the ability to develop the close relationships necessary for innovative production 
(Brandon-Jones et al., 2014).  Since innovative products are highly technical and require 




commoditized products (Danneels & Kleinschmidtb, 2001; Song & Parry, 1999).  The 
greater the distance between design and production, the greater the likelihood that focal 
firms will lose valuable manufacturing capabilities (Kotabe & Murray, 2004).  Thus, 
companies that compete in innovative markets should be more susceptible to strategic 
risks and more likely to repatriate production (Smith, 1999). 
H7: As product innovativeness increases (decreases), the effect that 
strategic risk has on (a) superior operating efficiency and (b) superior 
firm profitability increases (decreases). 
2.4.2.4 Product innovativeness and supply chain disruption risk.  Several factors 
increase the impact of a supply chain disruption for innovative markets.  First, the highly 
customized product offerings create thin factor markets, which reduce the robustness of 
global supply chains (Wagner & Bode, 2006).  Item customization refers to the level of 
specificity involved in the manufacturing process or the level of customization involved 
in the final product (Duray, Ward, Milligan, & Berry, 2000).  Customized products 
require greater asset specificity and often carry higher prices, therefore more risk is 
involved (Geyskens et al., 2006).  The level of specialization involved in innovative 
design requires highly technical skills, which create switching costs.  The high 
changeover and retooling costs involved in innovative production further limits the 
number of alternative suppliers available for the particular component or product 
(Bertrand & Mol, 2013).  Fewer potential suppliers bring more risk because companies 
cannot fulfill demand elsewhere in the event of a disruption (Ellis et al., 2010).  Thin 
upstream market conditions negatively affect the robustness in a global supply chain, 




The item importance and cost structure of breakthrough products serve to reduce 
the firm resilience in the aftermath of a supply chain disruption.  Item importance 
represents the level of importance that the particular good or component has on the 
buyer’s entire portfolio (Ellis et al., 2010).  Breakthrough products may represent up to 
30% of a firm’s sales revenue and may account for up to 90% of a firm’s total return on 
investments, and as much as 40% of the industry market share (Lau et al., 2010).  Supply 
chain disruptions are very costly for firms in innovative markets because most new 
products have a limited shelf life coupled with high R&D costs  (van Hoek, 2001; 
Wagner, 2010).  With shorter life cycles planned, manufacturers have a limited number 
of days to sell the product (Wagner, 2010).  Since innovative markets are volatile and 
extremely competitive, disruptions create the potential for much larger loss of market 
share due leading to negative long-term outcomes (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a; Hult et 
al., 2004).  Supply chain disruptions in innovative products also lead to revenue loss for 
accessories and possibly future product upgrades (Foss & Foss, 2005).  Product 
innovativeness should therefore strengthen the relationship between supply chain 
disruption risk and reshoring success. 
H8: As product innovativeness increases (decreases), the effect that 
supplies chain disruption risk has on (a) superior operating efficiency and 
(b) superior firm profitability increases (decreases). 
2.4.3 Moderating Effects of Offshore Networks on Reshoring Success 
2.4.3.1 Offshore relationship value and factor market rivalry.  Firms with valuable 
relationships in offshore markets may be able to minimize or eliminate the ability of 




competence provides sustainability because relationship value differs from product value 
(Prior, 2012).  Relationship value includes the additional potential benefits and sacrifices 
arising from interactions between customers and suppliers (Ritter & Walter, 2012).  
These value-based relationships develop trust between firms, which creates socially 
complex resources that are difficult to imitate (Barney, 2014).   
One way suppliers actively benefit customers is by establishing contacts with 
potential exchange partners or influential people.  These contacts can be with potential 
buyers or with other vendors (Scheer et al., 2010).  Greater supplier access reduces 
switching costs and prevents thin markets (G. Walker & Weber, 1987).  Strategic 
outsourcing also allows firms to decrease production costs, improve quality, enhance new 
product development, and reduce time to market (Huang & Chu, 2010).  Thus, widening 
the provider base improves quality and reduces costs, while providing a safeguard against 
expropriation risks associated with factor market rivalry (Pereira et al., 2011). 
The perceived relationship value resulting from this access function depends on 
the value of the new relationships (Walter, Müller, Helfert, & Ritter, 2003).  The 
allocation of a larger purchase volume to selected suppliers allows customers to influence 
suppliers, to ensure the consistency of their supplies, and to reduce communication costs 
(Ritter & Walter, 2012).  This purchasing power may act as a resource position barrier to 
deter upstream competition (Wernerfelt, 1984).  For instance, Japanese auto 
manufacturers, whether domestic or abroad, will not allow first or second tier suppliers to 
produce parts for other auto manufacturers within the same plants.  The resulting ability 




other firms into a given factor market should limit the effect of offshore factor market 
rivalry on firm performance.   
H9: As offshore relational value increases (decreases), the effect that 
offshore factor market rivalry has on (a) superior operating efficiency and 
(b) superior firm profitability decreases (increases). 
2.4.3.2 Offshore relationship value and total logistics costs.  While the primary 
reason for offshore manufacturing is cost-reduction, many firms use foreign production to 
implement global expansion strategies (Hult, 2012).  Global reach defines a firm’s 
presence on the international scale.  As firms increase global market share and strengthen 
global brand image, they develop strategic advantages (Cavusgil & Cavusgil, 2012).  
Global reach increases strategic and logistical flexibility, which should alleviate many of 
the hidden costs incurred with offshore production (Fawcett et al., 1996).  Successful 
implementation of globalization strategies requires the capability to build valuable 
offshore relationships and global networks (Elg, Deligonul, Ghauri, Danis, & 
Tarnovskaya, 2012).   
Global reach describes a firm’s ability to identify and penetrate profitable global 
markets (Fawcett et al., 1996).  The expansion of manufacturing in emerging economies 
led to a rise in disposable domestic income in these areas, thereby creating attractive 
emerging markets (Cavusgil & Cavusgil, 2012).  For example, consumer expenditures 
have more than doubled in India and portions of China since the turn of the century, and  
China is now the third largest consumer market (Feng, Sun, & Zhang, 2010).  Expansion 
into these emerging markets carries risks, and market entry is insufficient for a 




are vital to overcome the liability of foreignness that firms face a when operating or 
competing in foreign markets (Cavusgil & Cavusgil, 2012).  Consumers prefer products 
that are local or produced in culturally similar locations (Rugman, Oh, & Lim, 2012).  
Partnerships with local suppliers and retailers are often useful in creating a local or global 
brand image (Nath, Nachiappan, & Ramanathan, 2010).   
The liability of foreignness extends beyond retail sales, however (Teece, 1986).  
Foreign firms incur higher operating costs, which prevent them from conducting business 
activities as effectively as local firms (Cavusgil & Cavusgil, 2012).  Familiarity with 
local customs, market trends, supplier capabilities, and business reputations provides 
local business a distinct advantage in both upstream and downstream markets (Barney, 
Wright, & Ketchen, 2001).  Many of the hidden costs of offshore manufacturing occur as 
pre-transaction costs: prospecting, screening, negotiating, and establishing business 
relationships with potential suppliers (Ellram, 1993).  Firms may also use valuable 
offshore relationships to reduce or eliminate many of the hidden costs and strategic risks 
incurred in offshore production(Pagano, 2009).  Suppliers may provide an access 
function by helping firms establish new relationships with potential exchange customers, 
other suppliers, or government entities (Ritter & Walter, 2012; Walter et al., 2003).  For 
instance, U.S. firms benefit by creating purchasing centers in Taiwan because Taiwanese 
suppliers provide valuable roles as intermediaries to bridge the cultural distance between 
China and western nations (Chang et al., 2012).  Taiwan also provides a strategic 
locational advantage for importing and exporting supplies and finished goods throughout 




Other benefits of global reach stem from increased market share and access to 
supplier capabilities (Ulaga & Eggert, 2005).  Often host firms may be assist in lowering 
logistics costs by providing valuable marketing capabilities and insights in to local 
consumer customs and preferences, which in turn improves demand forecasting.  As 
firms extend their global reach, the increased geographic dispersion creates complexity, 
requiring firms to manage many dissimilar consumer trends and demands across a variety 
of environments (Klein et al., 1990).  Global partners with extensive marketing 
capabilities may be able to simplify much of the complexity and reduce many of the 
hidden costs of globalization (Homburg et al., 2012).  Focal firms may also benefit from 
access to existing distribution channels.  Host suppliers have valuable experience within 
their respective country or region, and independent channel members within the foreign 
market are often more efficient than heterogeneous multi-national corporations (Klein et 
al., 1990).  Because these suppliers serve other customers within the same industries, they 
may also be able to provide information about local markets and downstream trends in 
global markets (Ritter & Walter, 2012). 
Closer relationships allow greater visibility and coordination.  This may allow 
firms to adjust production rates more seamlessly, thus minimizing the need for much of 
the safety stock that drives hidden costs (Bygballe et al., 2012).  As firms expand 
globally, the larger market share marginalizes forecasting errors and allows for longer 
production runs, therefore production efficiency increases with global market share due 
to economies of scale (Cavusgil & Cavusgil, 2012).  This proximity to foreign demand 
would serve to hedge the increase in transportation costs domestic logistics costs by 




Thus, the impact of total logistics costs on reshoring should be less for firms with 
valuable offshore relationships.   
H10: As offshore relational value increases (decreases), the effect that 
total logistics cost has on (a) superior operating efficiency and (b) 
superior firm profitability decreases (increases). 
2.4.3.3 Offshore relationship value and strategic risk exposure.  Other aspects of 
globalization may serve to reduce many of the strategic risks encountered in foreign 
production.  As firms extend global reach, the larger global market share provides greater 
purchasing power (Sichtmann & Diamantopoulos, 2013).  Larger purchase volumes from 
fewer strategic suppliers shorten the learning curve, thereby reducing some of the 
potential product quality risks (Eggert & Ulaga, 2010).  The increased frequency of 
interaction should also improve communication (Andersen & Christensen, 2005).  The 
increased purchasing power may also reduce the potential for opportunism or shirking, 
while allowing focal firms to dictate quality standards, purchasing terms, or delivery 
schedules (Liu, Su, Li, & Liu, 2010).   
Also, innovative capacity increases with entry into foreign markets because 
collaboration with suppliers often increases market sensing capabilities (Li, Wei, & Liu, 
2010).  Suppliers can serve as a gateway to technical, exchange, or market-related 
information (Walter et al., 2003).  Specialization allows suppliers to develop highly 
technical knowledge and process capabilities, which focal firms may not possess (Scheer 
et al., 2010).  Suppliers may also contribute to new product development by providing 
innovative ideas, supplying innovative components and production facilities, or engaging 




resources can speed development times and free up resources to invest into other 
innovations or global markets (Wagner, 2010).  
Firms with valuable offshore relationships may gain access to critical information 
faster than the competition and may eventually be able to decrease market research costs 
(Ritter & Walter, 2012).  They may also provide insights into competitor intentions since 
they supply other firms in the same markets (Sanders et al., 2007).  Global production 
also allows for faster diffusion of information, products, and ideas into emerging markets 
(Li et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2010).  The creation of connections between customers and 
suppliers and their respective activities and resources creates socially complex 
interdependent relationships that are difficult to imitate (Bygballe et al., 2012).  The 
bilateral dependency created by these relationships also serves to reduce the potential for 
opportunism (Williamson, 1991).  Since few firms possess the capability to create a 
valuable offshore network, firms with valuable offshore supplier relationships should be 
less susceptible to strategic risk in global markets.   
H11: As offshore relational value increases (decreases), the effect that 
strategic risk has on (a) superior operating efficiency and (b) superior 
firm profitability decreases (increases). 
2.4.3.4 Offshore relationship value and supply chain disruption risk.  Higher 
offshore relationship value should also reduce supply chain disruption risk.  Often, 
offshore relational exchanges serve as a mode of entry into global consumer markets 
(Fawcett et al., 1996).  When offshore suppliers fulfill this access function, entry into 
foreign consumer markets creates proximity to demand for offshore production (Bygballe 




risk of disruption and recovery time in case of disruption (Ellis et al., 2010; Wagner & 
Bode, 2006).  The shorter lead times for host markets serves to make the supply chain 
more resilient.  An increase in global market share also reduces the impact of a disruption 
by adding diversity to the total market interests (Bode et al., 2011). 
The ability to develop a network of flexible suppliers is another source of value 
because it allows firms to change order volumes at short notice (Ritter & Walter, 2012).  
The presence of such a network reduces distribution costs and inventory levels, and 
creates a reserve supply pool to decrease their dependency on other suppliers (Scheer et 
al., 2010).  Suppliers fulfilling these safeguard and volume functions increase visibility, 
making the supply chain more resilient (Brandon‐Jones et al., 2014).  For example, Cisco 
was able to communicate with over 300 suppliers to assess the impact of the 2011 
tsunami with 12 hours.  This added visibility reduced uncertainty and created options 
which minimized downtime and avoided additional losses (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  
Thus, valuable offshore relationships should reduce the impact and subsequently the 
long-term operational and financial risk associated with supply chain disruptions.  
H12: As offshore relational value increases (decreases), the effect that 
supply chain disruption risk has on (a) superior operating efficiency and 






CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Design 
This dissertation will utilize a longitudinal event study to assess the impact of 
reshoring on firm performance.  This study will compare financial data for firms that 
have relocated manufacturing to the United States against data for matched portfolios, 
which serve as industry control groups (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a).  These industry 
benchmark groups will be created by using different combinations of the following 
matching criteria: pre-event return on assets (ROA), company size, and industry type 
(Barber & Lyon, 1996; Jacobs, Swink, & Linderman, 2015; Kinney & Wempe, 2002; 
Swink & Jacobs, 2012).  The archival data for the study will be obtained using the S&P 
Capital IQ financial software tools.  Event studies commonly include three steps: 
defining the parameters of the event, computing the forecast errors within those 
parameters, and finally, regressing cross-sectional abnormal performance on the factors 
assumed to influence the impact of the event (Serra, 2004).  Due to the nature of this 
topic, this dissertation will use path model estimation to determine which factors 
influence abnormal returns.   
The remainder of Chapter 3 is divided into four additional sections, which address 
the three steps presented in the previous paragraph along with a final section discussing 
the steps taken to reduce endogeneity.  First, section 3.2 discusses the proposed sample 
characteristics, indicates the proposed methods for identifying the target sample, and 




explains event study methodology, provides the benefits of event studies relative to other 
methods, defines the parameters used to calculate abnormal performance, and discusses 
the analytical techniques used to provide statistical support for the study.  Next, Section 
3.4 discusses the regression analysis used to determine significant factors driving the 
reshoring phenomenon.  Here, the proposed statistical technique, potential measures, and 
software programs are presented.  Finally, Section 3.5 explains the specific measures 
taken throughout the study to reduce endogeneity and other unobserved heterogeneity. 
3.2 Sample Characteristics 
The sample for this study consists of publicly traded firms currently listed on 
major stock exchanges.  The target sample includes firms that have relocated 
manufacturing to the U.S. from any other country.  While customer service and logistics 
centers comprise a substantial portion of the reshoring phenomenon, activities not 
directly related to manufacturing are outside the scope of this study.  For matching 
purposes, all companies retained in the final sample have financial data available for the 
five years prior to reshoring as well as the two years following the event.  Thus, to 
provide a full two-year period following the reshoring event, the sample is limited to 
firms that began domestic production on or before the end of the 2013 fiscal year.  The 
matching technique is discussed further in the following section.     
Several tools are used to identify firms that have reshored operations to the U.S.  
First, an event search was conducted using Capital IQ.  The search was conducted for all 
events, announcements, and key developments classified as “Business Expansion,” 
“Business Reorganization,” and “SEC Announcements.”  To further supplement the 




instances of reshoring in trade journals.  Search terms such as “reshoring,” 
“homeshoring,” “onshoring,” “insourcing,”, and “nearshoring” were utilized in this 
search engine.  Finally, government commerce data and non-government trade groups 
was used to identify repatriation events.  For each noted event, verification had to be 
available that the product was previously manufactured outside the United States because 
the previous country of origin is necessary for regression analysis.  
While the exact number of reshoring companies is not readily available, an 
estimation can be made based on reporting statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
international trade associations such as OECD, and other non-government organizations.  
For example, using information from OECD and NSF, the Reshoring Initiative indicates 
that 585 companies relocated manufacturing jobs to the United States from abroad 
between 2011 and 2014 (“Reshoring Initiative Data Report,” 2015).  Many other 
companies have moved work to the U.S. from countries not monitored by OECD, while 
many instances of reshoring occurred outside of years 2011-2014.  The actual population 
of reshoring companies is likely between 750 and 1000 total firms, although financial 
information will not be readily available from all companies.  The expected sample size 
was estimated to be 100-200 individual cases.  This should provide a sample that is 
representative of the population.  
3.3 Event Study Methodology 
3.3.1 Overview 
Event studies employ econometric techniques to estimate the impact of a 
particular event on firm performance (Serra, 2004).  Events of interest may include 




to existing laws (Rabinovich & Cheon, 2011).  This methodology is also useful in 
examining performance changes following corporate events in which firms experience 
the same type event across industries and times (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005b).  Examples 
of corporate events in existing event studies include changes in ownership, changes in 
quality control measures (Jacobs et al., 2015; Sharma, 2005; Swink & Jacobs, 2012), the 
introduction of new operating or logistical procedures (Kinney & Wempe, 2002), and 
supply chain disruptions (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 2005a, 2005b).  The use of event 
studies provides researchers the ability to identify abnormalities in dependent construct 
measures resulting from a specific event (Rabinovich & Cheon, 2011).   
The primary focus of event studies concerns the concept of abnormal returns 
(Serra, 2004).  Abnormal performance represents the difference between performance 
measures for focal firms and the same performance measures for appropriate 
benchmarks, assuming the benchmarks control for external factors known to affect firm 
performance (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a).  In principle, long-term event studies are 
performed by first identifying a sample of firms that have experienced the same event, 
and then testing the null hypothesis that the ex post abnormal returns for those sample 
firms are equal to zero over a specified period (Rabinovich & Cheon, 2011).  The 
underlying assumption of event study methodology is that after controlling for all known 
external and industry-wide factors, the remaining unexplained variance may be attributed 
to the focal event (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a).  
To isolate the impact of the reshoring event from the effects of normal market 
conditions, the proposed method is designed to analyze the abnormal performance results 




changes in operating performance of reshoring firms to be compared against the 
estimated operating performance that the firm would have had if offshore production had 
continued (Barber & Lyon, 1996).  Moreover, the event study methodology provides a 
more robust analysis than a uniform comparison between the performance variance 
detected in reshoring firms and global manufacturing performance measures (Hendricks 
& Singhal, 2005b).  Thus, abnormal performance is the difference between the firm’s 
actual performance following the event and the expected performance had the event not 
occurred (Swink & Jacobs, 2012).  Given the subjective nature of superior performance, 
positive (negative) ex post abnormal returns provide the best proxy measure for superior 
(inferior) firm operating and financial performance resulting from an event. 
3.3.2 Defining Event Parameters 
The first task in conducting an event study is to define the focal event and the 
period over which the event occurred (Serra, 2004).  Many types of events occur over 
extended periods of time, rather than single, discrete instances (Rabinovich & Cheon, 
2011).  Moreover, the impact of events is often lagged over long periods of time 
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a).  Thus, effective event studies must accurately specify the 
occurrence of the event and provide relative parameters in order to isolate the effects of 
the focal event (Sharma, 2005).  The chosen parameters often depend upon the 
characteristics of the focal event and the measures used to determine the impact.  For 
existing event studies, the period of analysis spans from one year to 10 years (Hendricks 
& Singhal, 2005b). Although no standard guidelines exist for the length of time an event 
study should cover, most long-run studies examine a three to five year horizon 




In addition to isolating the events, the research design must also establish the 
dependent construct measure used to identify and determine the impact of the focal 
events (Rabinovich & Cheon, 2011).  Event studies compare firm performance before 
and after an event using some form of return on investment (ROI).  When measuring 
operating performance, long range accounting-based measures offer more statistical 
power than market-based measures such as earnings per share (Barber & Lyon, 1996).  
This is because investors are often slow to react to events affecting operations, 
outstanding shares are seldom held constant over time, and also because earnings radiate 
from all capabilities, not just operations efficiency (Barber & Lyon, 1996; Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2005a; Sharma, 2005). 
Barber and Lyon (1996) find that lagged return on assets (ROA) is the most 
significant predictor of future performance.  In their study on systematic and 
unsystematic risk, Miller and Bromiley (1990) find that lagged ROA attenuates the 
potential effect of omitted variable bias, and previous performance may accurately 
predict future performance for periods up to five years.  Aaker and Jacobson (1987) find 
that ROI lagged even one year explains more variance in firm performance than 28 
variables used in the Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies database. 
This dissertation examines performance for each sample firm for five total years.  
This period includes the two years prior to the reshoring event, the year that domestic 
production began, and the two years following the reshoring year.  Sharma (2005) 
employs a similar approach in his study of firm performance after ISO 9000 certification.  
This range allows the initial impact of reshoring to be realized, while also capturing some 




manufacturing location decisions, performance changes leading to reshoring likely appear 
many months before the event (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005b; Kinney & Wempe, 2002).  
Thus, the two-year pre-event period reduces selection bias by allowing preexisting trends 
and performance to be examined (Sharma, 2005).  This reduces the possibility that ex 
post abnormal performance is not a continuation of prior firm performance, thereby 
ensuring that statistical significance is not an artifact of the event study methodology 
(Kinney & Wempe, 2002; Sharma, 2005). 
To allow the data to pool over time, the fiscal years are transformed into event 
years with the fiscal year of the reshoring event designated as year 0 (Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2005b).  The previous year is designated as year -1, while the subsequent year is 
designated year +1.  This pattern continues for all years, with the extreme years 
designated as year -2 and year +2.  Because year -2 is the first year of analysis, year -3 
will be lag year used for benchmark matching.  Identifying fiscal years in relation to the 
focal event allows the study to examine performance changes from year to year as well as 
aggregate changes over multiple years (Swink & Jacobs, 2012). 
3.3.3 Industry Control Groups 
Creating the model for calculating expected performance is the most important 
step in conducting an event study(Barber & Lyon, 1996).  Selection bias may occur if the 
abnormal performance is simply a continuation of previous success (Sharma, 2005).  
Under conditions of perfect competition, the impact of a change in manufacturing 
operations could be measured by simply comparing the pre- and post-event performance 
(Shafer & Moeller, 2012).  However, such a naive approach is not possible because all 




unrelated to reshoring (Serra, 2004).  To isolate the event, the research design must 
control for such external factors (Barber & Lyon, 1996).  Thus, the selection of 
appropriate benchmarks is critical to the successful implementation of event study 
methodology (Serra, 2004).    
Simulation results indicate that using matched portfolios as industry control 
groups yields test results that are well specified and statistically significant when the 
proper matching criteria are applied (Barber & Lyon, 1996).  When establishing expected 
operating performance, measures should be taken to use firms as similar as possible to 
the sample firms (Jacobs et al., 2015).  The design for this study utilizes different 
combinations of industry classifications, performance, and size as matching criteria to 
create three distinct matching groups, which will serve as industry control groups.  The 
filters for each of these three industry control groups are adapted from existing studies 
that achieved statistically significant results (Jacobs et al., 2015; Swink & Jacobs, 2012).  
3.3.3.1 Performance and industry (PI) matching group.  The first industry-
matching group, Performance Industry Matching (PI), controls for the effect of industry 
and firm performance.  For each sample firm, all firms within the same two-digit SIC 
code, whose ROA falls within the range of 90% and 110% of the sample firm’s ROA in 
for the fiscal year -3 are included.  In a simulation study, Barber and Lyon (1996) found 
the 90%-110% filter yields test statistics that are well specified for samples, including 
those with very high or very low historical performance.  Subsequent studies also indicate 
that this measure provides a tight grouping for all firms in the benchmark group (Jacobs 




Criterion 1: Firms must be in the same industry as designated by the first two-
digits of the standardized industrial classification (SIC) code. 
Criterion 2: Financial data for the matching firm must be accessible for all years 
from year -3 through year +2 for the sample firm.   
Criterion 3: Matching firms will have an ROA in year -3 that falls within the 
range of 90% and 110% of the sample firm ROA in the same fiscal year.  
3.3.3.2 Median performance and industry (MPI) matching group.  Criteria for the 
second industry-matching group include an additional constraint to control for 
measurement error present in accounting-based performance measures (Swink & Jacobs, 
2012).  Financial performance data is prone to outliers due to cross sectional dependency 
and mean reversion (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a).  Put differently, any firm may show 
uncharacteristic performance in a given year due to overlapping periods and the recency 
of sales or purchases.  However, as the data pools over time, the firm’s high or low 
abnormal performance will revert back toward the mean under of normal operating 
conditions (Barber & Lyon, 1996).  To reduce this type error, Kinney and Wempe (2002) 
define pre-event performance as the median value of performance over the three years 
prior to the event. 
Using measures adapted from Swink and Jacobs (2012), the second industry 
matching group further controls for endogeneity and mean reversion by matching ROA 
based on the median returns over three fiscal years: -5, -4, and -3.  For each sample firm, 
Median Performance and Industry Matching (MPI) consists of all firms within the same 
two-digit SIC code whose median ROA in years -3, -4, and -5 lies within the range of 




Criterion 1: Firms must be in the same industry as designated by the first two-
digits of the standardized industrial classification (SIC) code. 
Criterion 2: Financial data for the matching firm must be accessible for all years 
from year -5 through year +2 for the sample firm.   
Criterion 3: The median ROA in years -3, -4, and -5 for each matching firm must 
be within the range of 90% and 110% of the median ROA for the sample firm in the same 
fiscal years.  
3.3.3.3 Median performance, industry, and size (MPIS) matching group.  The 
final and most stringent group uses the same conditions as MPI matching group with the 
added criterion that selected firms are also closely matched with sample firms in terms of 
size.  While matching on the basis of performance and industry provides well-specified 
test statistics for all groups, simulation results indicate that this method is 
anticonservative for small sample firms with high performance (Barber & Lyon, 1996).  
Thus, matching firms on the basis of industry, performance, and size provides more 
statistical power if sufficient benchmark firms exist.  The filter for group three is adapted 
from existing studies that employ performance, industry, and size matching techniques 
(Jacobs et al., 2015; Swink & Jacobs, 2012).  Median Performance, Industry, and Size 
Matching (MPIS) matches all firms with the same two-digit SIC, whose median ROA in 
years -3, -4, and -5 are within 10%, and whose median total assets are within a factor of 
25 of the sample firm’s median total assets for that same three years.  
Criterion 1: Firms must be in the same industry as designated by the first two-




Criterion 2: Financial data for the matching firm must be accessible for all years 
from year -5 through year +2 for the sample firm.   
Criterion 3: The median ROA in years -3, -4, and -5 for each matching firm must 
be within the range of 90% and 110% of the median ROA for the sample firm in the same 
fiscal years.  
Criterion 4: For each matching firm, the median value of Total Assets for years -
3, -4, and -5 must be within a factor of 25 of the median value of Total Assets for the 
sample firm for the same fiscal period.  
3.3.4 Analytical Techniques 
Upon creating the industrial control groups, appropriate benchmarks can be 
established to determine the expected performance of sample firms relative to each 
control group.  Expected performance, then estimates the performance that a sample firm 
would have achieved had reshoring not occurred (Swink & Jacobs, 2012).  Thus, 
expected performance modeling allows researchers to isolate the effect of reshoring.  
Event study methodology assumes that the difference between a sample firm’s actual ex 
post performance and its expected performance is an abnormality attributable to the event 
(Rabinovich & Cheon, 2011).  Thus, if the difference is significantly different from zero, 
the abnormal performance for this study estimates the impact that reshoring has on firm 
performance.   
In their simulation-based research, Barber and Lyon (1996) find that test statistics 
for the change in operating performance relative to an appropriate benchmark are more 
powerful than the relative comparison of a sample firm to a benchmark in the same 




performance measures, nonparametric techniques based on the median change in the 
benchmark firms have more predictive power than parametric tests that use the mean 
change (Barber & Lyon, 1996; Kinney & Wempe, 2002).  Thus, the expected operating 
performance of a sample firm relative to each matching group is equal to the sum of the 
sample firm’s actual operating performance in the preceding or lag period and the median 
change in operating performance for the respective matching group (Swink & Jacobs, 
2012).  For example, for each 1% change in median ROA for the industry-matching 
group, the sample firm is expected to have 1% change in ROA during the same period.  
Equation 1 presents the formula for calculating expected performance.  
Equation 1: Expected Performance of Sample Firms 
𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 ∆ 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑗
,  j =1, 3.     
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡represents the performance of firm 𝑖 in fiscal year 𝑡,  
and j represents industry matching groups 1 − 3.   
 
The abnormal performance is then calculated by subtracting the sample firm’s 
expected performance for the period from the sample firm’s actual operating performance 
for the same period.  This formula appears in Equation 2.  When abnormal operating 
performance is calculated for each reshoring firm in all years for each group, statistical 
testing can be used to determine if the impact of reshoring on operating performance is 
significant (Swink & Jacobs, 2012).   
Equation 2: Abnormal Performance of Sample Firms 
𝐴𝑏(𝑃it) = Pit − 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝑃it),         





Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests were used to determine if the median abnormal 
performance of any group is significantly different from zero (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2005b).  This nonparametric test determines significance based on the assumptions that 
both the sign and magnitude are important (Wilcoxon, 1945).  Parametric tests are not 
well specified for abnormal returns (Barber & Lyon, 1996), since previous studies have 
shown that abnormal returns distributions are right-skewed (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2005b).  Parametric tests reject too often when testing for positive abnormal performance 
and too seldom when testing for negative abnormal performance (Serra, 2004).  Thus, 
nonparametric Wilcoxon test statistics are more powerful than parametric t-statistics 
when analyzing abnormal returns (Barber & Lyon, 1996).    
3.4 Path Model Estimation  
3.4.1 Overview 
To determine which variables influence the performance, partial least squares 
structural equations modeling (PLS-SEM) was employed to estimate the structural 
equations for superior operating and financial performance.  The calculations of abnormal 
returns in the longitudinal event study are representative of superior firm performance.  
Thus abnormal ROA and abnormal ROS for each control group serve as the dependent 
variable in separate structural models.  Proxy measures for the independent variables are 
discussed in the following section.  Latent interaction variables are modeled and 
empirically tested to determine the significance of hypothesized moderating effects.  
Separate structural models are necessary to identify the determinants of superior 




abnormal ROS as dependent variables, respectively.  The analyses were also performed 
for each control group to ensure reliability.  
3.4.2 Measurement Items 
3.4.2.1 Economic indicators.  The economic drivers of reshoring are 
macroeconomic factors in which the primary vehicles for variance in the dependent 
variable are the competitiveness and global reach of previous countries of origin (Mann, 
2012).  To measure the impact of offshore factor market rivalry on the probability and 
success of reshoring events, variance in the price of inputs before the event must first be 
measured (Lall, 2001).  Since the focus of this dissertation concerns reasons for moving 
manufacturing back to the United States, the measure must also be scaled so that the costs 
can be analyzed relative to manufacturing costs in the U.S over time. 
Each year, the World Economic Forum compiles an index of data that ranks over 
160 countries on the ability to compete in global commerce (Arvis, Mustra, Ojala, 
Shepherd, & Saslavsky, 2012).  This index, called the Global Competitiveness Report, 
uses national wealth along with survey data to measure the macroeconomic, social, and 
political policies that might affect competitiveness (Porter, Delgado, Ketels, & Stern, 
2008).  Examples of the measures used to compile the index include national gross 
domestic product, purchasing parity, productivity, labor costs, education levels, 
technological advancements, access to medical care, and poverty rates (Schwab, 2012).  
Thus, as a measure for factor market rivalry, this study uses the Global Competitiveness 
Report country competitiveness measure of the previous country of origin at the time of 




Similarly, to isolate the variance in the dependent variable resulting from changes 
in total logistics costs due to reshoring, the measure must compare the logistics 
proficiency, rather than factor prices.  The World Bank periodically compiles a publicly 
available data set that ranks countries on the basis of domestic and international 
infrastructure and logistical capabilities previously found to influence bilateral trade 
(Mann, 2012).  The Logistics Performance Index, found in the World Bank Data 
archives, provides detailed country-level data based on the time and monetary costs of 
importing or exporting a twenty foot container between the nation’s largest port and its 
most industrious city (Hausman, Lee, & Subramanian, 2013).  Among the measures 
included are average export processing time, average import processing time, average 
cost to import, average cost to export, infrastructure, information technology 
infrastructure, and on time delivery performance (Nordås et al., 2006).  Hence, the proxy 
measure for ex ante total logistics costs is the global Logistics Performance Index rating 
of the previous country of origin at the time of reshoring. 
3.4.2.2 Risk measures.  Strategic risk exposure and supply chain disruption risk 
indicate the level of unsystematic and systematic risk, respectively (Aaker & Jacobson, 
1987).  Strategic risk exposure is a company-specific measure derived from the amount 
of intangible assets that a company possesses (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  While risk is 
a function of both probability and impact, strategic risk exposure is unsystematic and 
bounded by the current and future value of the strategic resources exposed to a potential 
threat (Ritchie & Brindley, 2007).  Thus, the value of a firm’s capabilities and intangible 
assets should correlate with the variance in reshoring performance specific to strategic 




duplicated, and not readily mobile are also not easily measured (Hunt & Morgan, 1995, 
1996).  Falkenberg (1996) calculated the value of such non-tradable assets by using the 
ratio of market price to book value.  This measure is a proxy for a firm’s brand equity, 
intellectual property, and other capabilities that allow a firm to charge a price premium 
(Nath et al., 2010).  Market to book value also indicates firm growth potential (Hendricks 
& Singhal, 2003, 2005a).  Thus, market to book value is the measure for strategic risk 
exposure in this study. 
Conversely, the impact of a supply chain disruption for any given product or 
component is the same for any location, while the probability of a disruption differs 
substantially across regions and nations (Christopher & Peck, 2004).  Thus, country risk 
is the primary vehicle for variance in the dependent variable relative to supply chain 
disruption risk.  Much like the macroeconomic drivers of reshoring, a scaled measure of 
risk for the previous country of origin is used to isolate the impact of supply chain 
disruption risk on manufacturing location decisions.  Miller (1992) suggests that since 
firms can only transfer or share systematic risk, average insurance rates for a particular 
area or region provide a proxy measure for environmental risk factors. 
Factory Mutual Insurance Company (FM Global) compiles a yearly assessment of 
supply chain risk factors for each region and for most developed countries (Elkins, 
Handfield, Blackhurst, & Craighead, 2005).  Similar to the Logistics Performance Index, 
the FM Global Resilience Index uses multivariate analysis to rank 130 countries and 
regions by resilience to supply chain disruption (FM Global Resilience Index, 2015).  The 
index uses three measures to determine the country risk level: socio-economic risk; 




Thus, the measure for supply chain disruption risk is the FM Global Resilience Index 
factor for the previous country of origin at the time of reshoring. 
3.4.2.3 Intervening measures.  Firm-specific accounting measures are also used as 
proxy measures for each of the moderating variables.  Product innovativeness indicates 
the complexity and value of the products for each firm as well as the level of turbulence 
and the dynamic nature of the markets in which each firm competes.  One of the most 
widely used indicators of innovativeness is R&D intensity, which is measured by 
dividing the amount of research and development expenditures by net profits (Kinney & 
Wempe, 2002).  Thus, the measure for product innovativeness in this study is R&D 
intensity. 
Offshore relationship value represents the firm-specific capabilities that allow 
firms to compete in offshore markets (Nath et al., 2010).  Research suggests that these 
capabilities develop over time with increasing experience in offshore markets (Cavusgil 
& Cavusgil, 2012; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Sichtmann & Diamantopoulos, 2013).  
Thus, while globalization has created many multinational firms, only a small percentage 
of multinationals possess the capabilities to create true global reach (Rugman et al., 
2012).  The ultimate test to assess whether firms are truly global is the actual penetration 
in foreign markets, especially those outside their home triad (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004).  
The percentage of foreign revenue is the most commonly used measure of 
internationalization in extant international business literature (Marshall, 2012).  Thus, this 





3.4.2.4 Control variables.  Three additional measures are included to reduce the 
possibility of omitted variable bias (endogeneity).  First, firm size may inadvertently 
affect operating performance (Sharma, 2005).  Larger firms are more likely to have 
implementation resources and access to the capital necessary to relocate globally (Barber 
& Lyon, 1996).  Conversely, smaller firms tend to be more focused and agile, making 
relocation less demanding.  In addition, the relative impact of any event designed to 
improve performance is likely to be greater in small firms (Swink & Jacobs, 2012).  To 
control for issues related to firm size, measures such as the natural log of total firm 
employees, the natural log of firm value, and the natural log of total firm assets are 
commonly used in archival studies (Barber & Lyon, 1996; Kinney & Wempe, 2002).  For 
reshoring, market value provides a suitable measure of size, due to the fact that the 
number of employees and the value of tangible assets differs with the labor productivity 
and level of automation used across nations and cultures.  Thus, the natural log of firm 
market value at the end of year -3 is operationalized to control for the effects of firm size 
(Swink & Jacobs, 2012). 
The remaining two control measures address the possibility that firms with 
historically higher and lower than normal performance might bias the results (Swink & 
Jacobs, 2012).  To examine the effect of past performance, the industry-adjusted ROA for 
each sample firm is computed as the difference between its ROA in year -3 and the 
median ROA in year -3 for all firms with the same three digit SIC code (Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2008).  Thus, industry-adjusted performance is a paired difference (Shafer & 
Moeller, 2012).  From this calculation, Swink and Jacob (2012) create two different 




performance (NFP).  For prior positive performance (PFP), industry-adjusted ROA is 
used for all positive values, and all negative values are replaced with zero.  For prior 
negative performance (NPF), the industry-adjusted performance is used for negative 
values, while all positive values are replaced with zero.  Table 6 summarizes the proxy 
measures for the theoretical model and control variables.   
Table 4: Proposed Measures 
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Moderator R&D Intensity Company 10K 
using Capital IQ 
Offshore 
Relationship Value 




using Capital IQ 
Superior Operating 
Value 




Dependent Variable Abnormal ROS Section 3.3 
Calculations 
Firm Size Control Measure Natural log of firm 
market value at 
year -3 
Company 10K 
using Capital IQ 
Prior Firm 
Performance 
Control Dummy variable 
designed to indicate 
positive or negative 
performance 
compared to the 
three-digit SIC code 






3.4.3 Analytical Techniques 
Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) is used to test 
hypothesized relationships among constructs using the SmartPLS 3.0 software (cite).  
PLS-SEM is a second generation variance-based method used to estimate structural 
equation models (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2012).  Often called path modeling, PLS-SEM 
offers several advantages over first-generation multiple linear regression techniques 
(Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, & Ringle, 2012).  For instance, technological advances in PLS 
software now provide the ability to empirically test hierarchical component models, 
analyze moderating effects, and examine non-linear functions for interactions between 
latent variables (Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Mena, 2012).  
PLS-SEM maximizes the explained variance in dependent variables, and provides 
a viable alternative to covariance-based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM) for 
models that violate the assumptions imposed by maximum likelihood methods (Hair, 
Sarstedt, Ringle, et al., 2012).  Thus, PLS-SEM is well suited for analyzing predictive, 
complex models with a large number of variables and relationships (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2016).  The complex model in this research design uses moderation, and 
contains both single-item and categorical dummy variables.  If alternate measures are 
required, some factors may use formative multiple item measures.  Partial least squares 
path modeling produces acceptable results when using single-item, reflective, and 
formative measures (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013).  It may also be used with scaled, 
ordinal, or categorical data.  However, the ultimate endogenous variable must not be 
categorical data and cannot violate any of the underlying assumptions of ordinary least 




The PLS-SEM approach is also capable of producing robust results with both 
large and small sample sizes (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011).  Considering the recency 
of the reshoring phenomenon, the sample size is likely to be low, while the data are 
expected to be non-normally distributed.  While PLS-SEM can produce reliable results 
for sample sizes as low as 20 (Davis & Golicic, 2010), the expected sample size should 
be at least 10 times the maximum number of structural paths leading to a single construct 
(Hair et al., 2011).  However, these figures are only estimates, and traditional measures of 
statistical power are needed to determine the necessary sample size (Cohen, 1992).   
Like any statistical method, PLS-SEM relies on the assumption that the sample 
provides a true representation of the target population (Hair et al., 2011).  Partial least 
squares uses nonparametric bootstrapping to obtain the standard errors for testing 
hypotheses, and therefore makes no assumption regarding normality (Hair, Sarstedt, 
Ringle, et al., 2012). 
This method was also selected due to the exploratory nature of this study as well 
as the complexity of the structural model.  Variance based path modeling is preferred in 
exploratory studies because it focuses on prediction rather than confirmation of structural 
relationships (Hair et al., 2011).  In addition to bootstrapping, PLS-SEM also applies a 
blindfolding technique to endogenous variables to assess the predictive validity of the 
structural model (Hair et al., 2016).  PLS-SEM also allows for the modeling and 
empirical assessment of latent interaction variables used in moderated multiple regression 
(Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 2003).  Moderation violates maximum likelihood 
assumptions because covariance-based methods assume that error terms for all exogenous 




must have correlated error terms (Eggert & Ulaga, 2010).  However, latent interactions 
may enhance the validity of PLS models by explaining a greater portion of the 
unobserved heterogeneity (Hair et al., 2011).  The models used to measure the main 
antecedents of reshoring on superior operating performance and superior financial 
performance appear in Equation 4 and Equation 5, respectively.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Equation 3: Superior Operating Efficiency Regression Equation 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝛽0  
                     + 𝛽1 × 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑦    
                       + 𝛽2 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠                        
       + 𝛽3 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
       + 𝛽4 × 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
                    + 𝛽5 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
                    + 𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑦 
                    + 𝛽7 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
                    + 𝛽8 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
                          + 𝛽9 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
                      + 𝛽10 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
       + 𝛽11 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑦 
       + 𝛽12 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
       + 𝛽13 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
       + 𝛽14 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  
       + 𝛽15 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
       + 𝛽16 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
       + 𝛽17 × 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
       + 𝜎𝑢𝑖 + 𝜎𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where σui is the firm-specific error term (unobserved heterogeneity) and σeit is the model 
error, with the i and t subscripts referring to the individual firms and the two 




















Equation 4: Superior Firm Profitability Regression Equation 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑂𝑆 = 𝛽0 
                 + 𝛽1 × 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑦  
                   + 𝛽2 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
                    + 𝛽3 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
                   + 𝛽4 × 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
                   + 𝛽5 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
                   + 𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑦 
                   + 𝛽7 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
                   + 𝛽8 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
                   + 𝛽9 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
      + 𝛽10 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
      + 𝛽11 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑦 
       + 𝛽12 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
                      + 𝛽13 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
      + 𝛽14 × 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  
      + 𝛽15 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
      + 𝛽16 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
      + 𝛽17 × 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
      +  𝜎𝑢𝑖 + 𝜎𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
 
where σui is the firm-specific error term (unobserved heterogeneity) and σeit is the 
model error, with the i and t subscripts referring to the individual firms and the two 








CHAPTER FOUR: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the quantitative results of the long-run 
event studies that serve as a basis for the dissertation along with the results of the 
methods used to test the hypothesized relationships.  Chapter 4 contains five sections.  
The first section provides the characteristics of the study sample.  Section 2 details the 
procedures of the event study methodology and presents the results of the long-run event 
study.  The third section outlines the results of path modeling used to link reshoring 
events to positive abnormal returns.  This is followed by the fourth section, which 
summarizes the quantitative results.  The final section provides a post-hoc analysis to 
further explain unexpected results. 
4.1 Sample Characteristics 
The sample for this study consists of firms incorporated in the United States that 
have relocated some or all manufacturing operations to the United States from any 
foreign country since the global recession occurred in 2007.  To be included in the 
sample, firms must have publicly available financial reports, which means the majority of 
the sample are firms publicly traded within the United States.  To reduce the possibility 
that transplants or startups might alter the results, both the product or product type and 
the previous country of origin were identified for all firms in the sample.   
To identify the sample used in this study, an event search was conducted using the 
company screening function of the S&P Capital IQ software. The initial parameters of the 




expansion, downsizing, or discontinued operations made between the years 2005 and 
2015.  To screen primarily for manufacturing operations, results were also filtered to 
include firms traded on major exchanges, including subsidiaries, with SIC codes 
beginning with either two or three.  This initial screen returned 98,330 key development 
announcements.  The search was then filtered to include only firms or subsidiaries 
incorporated in the United States.  This filter limited the results to 21,363 events, which 
yielded the data set used for the study.  While the sample firms used in the study were 
identified from this data set, the previous set of 98,330 events also proved to be useful 
and necessary to verify the actual movement of manufacturing to the United States from 
outside domestic borders.   
From the set of 21,363 events, over 11,000 were discarded because the actions 
occurred solely beyond U.S. borders.  In these events, manufacturing operations were 
either expanded overseas, offshored from the U.S., or moved from one foreign country to 
a different offshore location.  Conversely, nearly 2000 events were classified as domestic 
realignments or downsizing operations, and thus eliminated from consideration.  In these 
type events, manufacturing operations were opened in the U.S., but the expansion came 
primarily from layoffs or closures at other U.S. locations.  Over 200 more events were 
either identified as start-ups or eliminated due to difficulty in identifying the previous 
country of origin.   
Many other announcements were purged because the event was outside the 
parameters of reshoring as defined for this dissertation.  Many of these could be easily 
recognized and eliminated.  For instance, over 1,200 announcements came from 




classified as maintenance or and technical support.  Over 500 key developments were 
directly concerned with mining and exploration, although classified as chemical 
manufacturing.  Several of these were also primarily related to utilities, rather than 
electrical equipment production.   
The remaining data were used to identify the sample firms for this dissertation.  
Each of the roughly 5,000 key development announcements remaining were carefully 
analyzed in an attempt to identify as many reshoring events as possible. Care was also 
taken to ensure that each firm chosen fit the parameters of the event study.  For example, 
around 300 announcements regarding research and development were purged to focus 
primarily on manufacturing, while many research and development announcements 
specifically stated an increase in manufacturing capacity for prototypes or final 
production.   All firms under bankruptcy protection during the period of study were 
eliminated from the sample.  Many other firms had no financial data listed for crucial 
measures or fiscal years.   
The remaining searchable events yielded 137 firms with reshoring activity which 
constituted the beginning sample in the early stages of the quantitative study.  However, 
not all of the initial sample could be retained throughout the study.  A number of these 
firms were eliminated during the process of matching and calculating abnormal returns.  
For instance, 22 were excluded when attempts to find all needed financial information 
failed.  Three firms were purchased or delisted from a stock exchange during the span of 
interest.  Seven more firms were eliminated because no previous country of origin could 
be identified.  Finally, nine firms were eliminated due to delays in the reshoring process.  




production did not commence until 2014 or later. This process left a total of 96 reshoring 
events for the final sample.  Descriptive statistics for firms in the final sample are 
presented in Table 5.  
As shown in Table 5, the most significant year for reshoring activity for this 
sample is 2011.  For some reason, reshoring appears to occur more in odd-numbered 
years.  Ellram et al. (2013) suggest that this trend is likely due to even-year election 
cycles in the U.S.  Other reasons could be the unusually large number of global supply 
chain disruptions that occurred globally in 2011 (Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  Studies 
conducted by the Boston Consulting Group find similar trends during the same period of 
time (“U.S. Executives Remain Bullish on American Manufacturing,” 2014).  
Table 5: Frequency of Reshoring Occurrences by Year and Industrial Classification 
N=96  Count Percentage   Count Percentage 
Reshoring 
Year 
2007 1 1.00% 2-Digit 
SIC Code 
2600 3 3.13% 
2008 4 5.00% 2800 22 22.92% 
2009 18 23.00% 3000 4 4.17% 
2010 12 35.00% 3300 5 5.21% 
2011 24 59.00% 3500 12 12.50% 
2012 14 73.00% 3600 17 17.71% 
2013 23 96.00% 3700 22 22.92% 
   3800 2 2.08% 
   3900 2 2.08% 
   Other 7 7.29% 
 Total 96 100.0%  Total 96 100.0% 
 
Industry classification also appears to influence reshoring decisions, as well.  The 
reshoring trend is somewhat contained to a few specific industries.  Firms with SIC codes 
beginning with 2800 and 3700 comprise the most populous segments with 22% of the 
sample each.  The 2800 classification is given to all firms that produce chemicals and 




Available data from reshorenow.org also finds these to be the largest segments of 
reshoring firms (“Reshoring Initiative Data Report,” 2015).  The U.S. government 
currently keeps no data to quantify reshoring activity.   
4.2 Longitudinal Event Study Methodology 
4.2.1 Industry Control Groups 
Once the sample firms have been identified, it is necessary to determine the 
change in performance specific to the reshoring event.  Thus, the next step in the event 
study methodology involves the creation of industry-controlled matching groups, which 
will provide the baseline used to measure abnormal changes in performance.  Matching 
group creation follows the guidelines set forth by Barber and Lyon (1996).  The format 
for this section closely resembles those adopted in previous long-run event studies 
(Jacobs et al., 2015; Kinney & Wempe, 2002; Swink & Jacobs, 2012).   
This study uses three different matching groups based on the three most 
statistically significant matching methods identified by Barber and Lyon (1996) in their 
simulation study on determining abnormal performance.  These three techniques match 
firms on the basis of performance, size, and industry classification.  Prior performance is 
by far the most significant predictor, while industry classification has the lowest effect of 
these three.  Barber and Lyon (1996) also found that a sample with sufficient size and 
generalizability to the its population has more statistical and theoretical relevance than 
industry classification.  Thus, to dilute the effect of potential outliers and reduce the 
possibility of sample firms being discarded, filters for industry classification are adjusted 




The first method involves matching firms on the basis of matching year firm 
performance and industry classification.  Performance matching includes all firms whose 
ROA is within 10% of the sample firm, while industry matching includes firms with the 
same 2-digit SIC code.  The matching year is the lag year preceding the first year of 
analysis.  This study uses the two years prior to reshoring as a comparison, so the lag or 
matching year is Y-3 where Y0 is the year in which reshored production begins.  Thus, 
the performance and industry (PI) matching group consists of all firms with in the same 
2-digit SIC codes and matching year ROA within 10% of the sample firm.  The PI 
matching screen produced 2,733 total matches to be used to create performance baselines 
for firms in the target sample.  For firms with insufficient matches, a second screen was 
applied which included all firms with the same 4-digit SIC code, and ROA within 10% of 
the sample firm.  This second step produced an additional 70 matches, totaling 2,803 
matches firms for 96 sample firms.  Median group size for the PI matching group is 24, 
with only three sample firms matched with only one firm.   
The second industry group matches firms on the basis of industry classification 
and median performance levels for the three fiscal years prior to analysis.  Thus, median 
performance and industry (MPI) matching group includes all firms with the same 2-digit 
SIC code whose median ROA for the fiscal years Y-5, Y-4, and Y-3 are with 10% of the 
median ROA for the sample firm over the same three fiscal years.  Screening for the MPI 
matching group yielded 2,815 total firm matches.  The second step provided an additional 
64 firms, totaling 2,879 matched firms.  The median size for the MPI matching group is 




The final and most stringent matching group adds the additional requirement that 
matched firms should have median value of total assets within a factor of 25 of sample 
firm median total assets for years -5, -4, and -3.  Thus, this group is essentially a subset of 
the MPI matching group.  This initial screen returned 1,710 initial firm matches, while 
step two yielded eight more matches.  This resulted in 1,718 total matched firms for the 
96 reshoring events in the study sample.  Median group size for the MPIS matching 
group is 12, with only two firms matched against single firms.  


















Step 1 Matches 2733 2815 1710 
Step 2 Matches 70 64 8 
Total Matched Firms 2803 2879 1718 
Median Group Size 24 22.5 12.0 
Mean Group Size 29.19 29.98 17.89 
Maximum Group Size 75 67 60 
Single-Firm Groups 3 2 2 
 
The results of the matching process appear in Table 6, while Table 7 provides 
descriptive statistics for each of the three matching groups.  To distinguish between 
reshoring and non-reshoring firms, all firms used in the study sample were purged from 
the matching groups.  To further dilute the possibility that domestic firms within 
matching groups might have reshored upstream activities that cannot be identified, as 
many suitable matches as possible were needed in each matching group for each firm.  As 




matching groups. A maximum of three firms are compared to only one firm for any 
group, and the most stringent method (MPIS) only contains two firms with single-firm 
groups.  Table 7 shows the wide variance in size, market share, and wealth for both the 
sample and matching group firms.  This further supports the generalizability of the 
sample and matched firms to the population of reshoring firms in all manufacturing 
industries. 

















Count 90.00 90.00 96.00 96.00 96.00 87 
Median                    4442.10 8782.10 7778.40 670.15 25540 
Mean 37954.13 23096.99 43588.80 30949.13 2500.38 62639 
Standard Deviation 86915.26 48547.01 99163.40 50705.30 4490.59 83925 
Minimum 46.00 56.30 42.20 6.65 -557.00 42 
Maximum 649438.20 376410.60 718189.00 229212.40 33790.00 348877 
Performance and Industry (PI) Matching Group 
Count 1649 1650 1712 1712 1712 1324 
Median 331.20 302.00 548.00 493.85 32.60 2368 
Mean 3722.18 3122.00 4337.57 3664.52 346.81 11372 
Standard Deviation 14493.03 12443.47 16038.41 15527.47 1585.70 29895 
Minimum -887.30 0.18 0.38 0.00 -1658.10 4 
Maximum 254053.60 233083.60 337474.00 470171.00 43764.00 460000 
Median Performance and Industry (MPI) Matching Group 
Count 1778.00 1781.00 1831.00 1833.00 1833.00 1438 
Median 408.95 354.20 637.30 569.40 36.10 2638 
Mean 4835.19 4067.89 5451.32 4527.19 458.16 13200 
Standard Deviation 20072.23 17574.05 21918.03 19299.51 2118.29 37161 
Minimum -887.30 0.18 1.32 0.00 -2250.10 18 
Maximum 350458.60 376410.60 359840.30 470171.00 43764.00 552810 
Median Performance, Size, and Industry (MPIS) Matching Group 
Count 1219.00 1240.00 1258.00 1257.00 1260.00 1055 
Median 877.60 760.85 1305.10 1140.70 85.30 4090 
Mean 6995.88 5678.26 16395.88 6146.37 647.58 17049 
Standard Deviation 29166.44 20469.77 119219.11 19106.06 2309.79 43033 
Minimum -887.30 4.92 10.60 1.60 -2250.10 10 






4.2.2 Calculations and Treatment of Outliers 
Changes in abnormal return on assets (ROA) were calculated using the difference 
between the changes in a sample firm’s actual and expected performance for a given 
period.  Several steps are involved in this calculation.  First, the ROA for each period of 
analysis is computed for each firm.  Then, changes in ROA are calculated by subtracting 
the returns from the lag year, or year prior to the period of analysis.  The median value of 
changes in ROA for the firms matched with each sample firm provides the expected 
returns for sample firms relative to each matching group.  Finally, the expected change in 
ROA for each matching group is subtracted from the actual change in sample firm ROA 
for each year and multi-year period of analysis.   
Statistical significance of the changes in abnormal ROA were examined using 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests.  This nonparametric test is used to determine if the median 
value of a sample is significantly different from zero (Wilcoxon, 1945).  Since the 
premise of this study assumes positive changes in abnormal returns, a one-tailed 
Wilcoxon test is used.  Similar to a paired t-test, this method is used to determine if the 
difference between actual and expected returns is significantly greater than zero.  To 
control for the possibility of extreme outliers commonly found in financial data, the 
results are trimmed at 2.5% for each tail for every calculation.    
For robustness, two additional measures were also used.  Binomial Sign tests are 
used to determine if the percentage of positive changes in abnormal returns were 
significantly greater than 50.  In addition to these tests which use the median value, 
paired t-tests were also executed to determine if the mean value of changes in abnormal 




SPSS 24.  This process was then repeated using the same control groups to calculate 
changes in abnormal return on sales (ROS).   
Under normal circumstances, operating efficiency and firm profitability should be 
highly correlated.  Thus, to provide greater breadth to the study, and to help control for 
potential endogeneity, this study also considers the changes in abnormal return on sales 
(ROS) over the same periods (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a; Sharma, 2005).  To allow for 
comparison within and across firms, the same matching groups are used to calculate both 
abnormal ROA and abnormal ROS.  As stated in the previous section, comparing 
changes in returns offers more statistical power than comparing actual returns for a given 
period (Barber & Lyon, 1996).  Thus, this section analyzes the significance of changes in 
abnormal ROS over the same years and multi-year periods before and after reshoring.  
The quantitative results of the changes in abnormal returns and each of the empirical tests 
appear in Table 8 and Table 9 for changes in abnormal ROA and abnormal ROS, 
respectively.     
4.2.3 Abnormal Return on Assets 
The first and perhaps most obvious observation is the noticeable change from 
negative returns before reshoring to positive returns during and after the reshoring event.  
As expected, changes in abnormal ROA were positive and significant across all three 
matching groups for the multi-year periods following reshoring.  For each matching 
group, abnormal returns increased roughly 0.5 percent for the two-year period following 
the reshoring year.  Abnormal returns rose more than a full percentage point relative to all 




the same period, around 66% of firms showed positive changes in abnormal ROA across 
all three matching groups.   













Panel A: Performance Industry Matching Group 
-3 to -2 90 -0.0031      -.563 -0.0012     -.149 50.00%  .000 
-2 to -1 90  0.0025       .219 -0.0021     -.432 55.56%  .949 
 -1 to 0  90  0.0023     1.092  0.0034      .822 55.56%  .949 
 0 to +1 93 -0.0001       .098 -0.0012     -.292 49.46%  .000 
+1 to +2 93  0.0002       .795  0.0045    1.080 53.93%  .207 
-3 to 0  89  0.0025 .404  0.0035      .593 53.93%  .746 
0 to +2 91  0.0068  1.860**  0.0045      .982 62.64% 2.306*** 
-1 to +2 93  0.0108 2.604***  0.0110  2.680*** 65.59% 2.903*** 
Panel B: Median Performance Industry Matching 
-3 to -2 91 -0.0027   -1.464* -0.0159 -1.882** 42.86%    -1.258 
-2 to -1 94 -0.0052     -.681 -0.0079   -1.033 50.00%  .000 
-1 to 0 90  0.0036    2.042**  0.0083  1.969** 58.89%  1.581* 
0 to +1 93  0.0055    1.063  0.0010 .229 55.91% 1.037 
+1 to +2 93 -0.0005      .661  0.0036 .834 49.46%  .000 
-3 to 0 90 -0.0030     -.871 -0.0054     -.836 47.78% -.316 
0 to +2 91  0.0057    1.872**  0.0060    1.266 59.34%   1.677** 
-1 to +2 92  0.0133 3.275***  0.0132 3.428*** 66.30% 3.023*** 
Panel C: Median Performance Size and Industry  
-3 to -2 90    -0.0047   -1.125 -0.0139   -1.685** 41.11% -1.581* 
-2 to -1 94    -0.0023     -.669 -0.0071     -.908 48.94% -.103 
-1 to 0 90    0.0059   2.444***  0.0098  2.408*** 62.22%   2.214** 
0 to +1 93    0.0035      .347 -0.0003     -.065 55.91%     1.037 
+1 to +2 93    0.0021    1.312*  0.0060    1.330* 54.84% .830 
-3 to 0 90    -0.0041   -1.032 -0.0060     -.874 47.78%     -.316 
0 to +2 91    0.0058    1.583*  0.0024 .494 57.14%     1.258 
-1 to +2 92    0.0133 3.232***  0.0129  3.309*** 65.22% 2.815*** 
   a Z-Statistics for medians are obtained using Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests. 
   b Z-Statistics for % positive are obtained using Binomial Sign tests. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05. 





Both the magnitude and statistical significance of the changes in 
abnormal ROA increased with the rigor of the matching techniques used to 
identify industry matching groups.  For instance, the most stringent matching 
group (MPIS) showed significant and positive changes in annual abnormal ROA 
in two different years as well as for both multi-year periods after the reshoring 
event.  The most significant increase occurred for the three-year period during 
and after reshoring, which had a median change of +1.33% with a z-score of 
3.232.  By comparison, the least conservative matching group (PI) produced no 
significant results for single-year periods.  While both multiple-year periods 
following reshoring were significant, the highest z-score or the PI matching 
group was 2.604 with a three-year median increase of 1.08%.   
While significant differences do exist across the three matching groups, 
the results are similar for all groups in all periods of analysis.  A noticeable trend 
emerges when consecutive annual results are viewed over time.  Sample firms 
outpaced firms in all three matching groups during the reshoring year, 
generating median changes in abnormal ROA from year -1 to year zero of 
+0.23%, +0.36, and +0.59%.  Abnormal returns were still positive, yet much less 
pronounced in the following two years, possibly due additional costs in closing 
operations abroad.  Compared to the most closely matched MPIS group, 
abnormal returns were more evenly dispersed with each year showing nearly 
55% positive abnormal returns and significant (p<.1) growth in the second year 
(+1 to +2).  Changes in abnormal ROA were also positive and significant for 




well as those that do not.  Thus, abnormal gains are not solely driven by local 
incentive programs or borrowing power.  The changes in abnormal ROA are 
also similar and significant for mean-based t-tests as well, suggesting that the 
results are robust.   
4.2.4 Abnormal Return on Sales  
Changes in abnormal ROS closely resembled the results for abnormal ROA.  All 
groups show negative changes that are not significant in the years leading up to 
reshoring.  Again, the largest single year change occurred during the reshoring year, and 
changes in abnormal returns were positive for each year following reshoring.  Returns 
were also positive and significant (p<.05) for each multiple-year period following the 
reshoring event.   
One notable difference should be mentioned, though.  Changes in abnormal ROA 
are slightly larger with more predictive power than changes in abnormal ROS.  Median 
changes in abnormal ROS for the three-year period during and after reshoring were 
+0.96%, +0.67, and +0.97% for the PI, MPI, and MPIS groups, respectively.  Binomial 
sign tests showed that roughly 63% of firms posted positive changes in abnormal ROS 
over this same period, while z-scores from Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests were significant 









Table 9: Annual changes in abnormal ROS for year -2 through year +2 
From 
Year 
N Median % 
Z-
Statistica 
Mean % t-Statistic %Positive 
Z-
Statisticb 
Panel A: Performance Industry Matching Group 
-3 to -2 90    -0.0024   -.986  -0.0055     -.533 42.22%     -1.173 
-2 to -1 89 0.0030    .820 0.0010      .158 56.18%      1.060 
-1 to 0 93 0.0038    .416  -0.0008     -.114 52.69%        .415 
0 to +1 93 0.0013    .962 0.0040 .669 53.76%        .730 
+1 to +2 93     0.0003    .518 0.0228    1.157 52.75%        .104 
-3 to 0 91     0.0014    .493 0.0073 .801 52.75%        .527 
0 to +2 93 0.0044 1.741** 0.0112   1.673** 62.37% 2.398*** 
-1 to +2 94 0.0097 2.355*** 0.0070    1.108 62.77% 2.372*** 
Panel B: Median Performance Industry Matching 
-3 to -2 95 -0.0020   -.442 0.0060      .310 46.32%       -.616 
-2 to -1 95 0.0032    .223  -0.0022     -.249 51.58%        .205 
 -1 to 0  94 0.0035  1.669** 0.0173    1.514* 57.45% 1.452* 
 0 to +1 93 0.0035  1.508* 0.0037      .623 58.06% 1.452* 
+1 to +2 96 -0.0001    .515 0.0469    1.424* 50.00%        .000 
-3 to 0  93 0.0002   -.312  -0.0091     -.946 50.54%        .000 
 0 to +2 94 0.0043  1.914** 0.0146 1.797** 57.45% 1.341* 
 -1 to +2 93 0.0069  2.822*** 0.0140   1.866** 63.44%   2.489*** 
Panel C: Median Performance Size and Industry  
-3 to -2 95 -0.0030   -.505 0.0038      .199 45.26%      -.821 
-2 to -1 95 -0.0006   -.100  -0.0011     -.117 48.42%      -.205 
-1 to 0 92 0.0041  1.604* 0.0070      .923 57.61%     1.355* 
0 to +1 94 0.0012    .782  -0.0002     -.032 51.06%       .103 
+1 to +2 94 0.0004    .764 0.0118    1.507* 53.19%       .516 
-3 to 0 93 0.0015   -.228  -0.0084     -.846 53.76%       .622 
0 to +2 94 0.0041  1.789** 0.0136    1.557* 56.38%     1.135 
-1 to +2 93 0.0096  2.925*** 0.0141  1.815** 62.37%   2.281*** 
  a Z-Statistics for medians are obtained using Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests. 
  b Z-Statistics for % positive are obtained using Binomial Sign tests. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 






4.3 Linking Reshoring to Superior Firm Performance 
4.3.1 Study Characteristics 
4.3.1.1 Control variables.  Several measures are used to control for potential 
selection bias in the sample.  Firm size is an obvious source of potential bias in many 
cases.  This is because the possibility exists that only larger firms have access to the 
capital necessary to relocate production to a different hemisphere (Sharma, 2005).  Thus, 
larger firms are more likely to be successful with reshoring events in certain industries.  
This study controls for firm size by using the natural log of total enterprise value for the 
fiscal year in which reshoring took place (Y0) (Jacobs et al., 2015).  Because relocation is 
a capital-intensive activity that affects certain industries more than others, this study also 
controls for the percentage of revenues devoted to capital expenditures in each of the 
three years following reshoring.   This also helps to control for the uneven distribution of 
government incentives to relocate to the United States.   
To control for the possibility that abnormal returns might be a continuation of 
previous firm performance, two additional measures are included as control variables.  
These prior performance control variables are created using the methodology found in the 
event study performed by Swink and Jacobs (2012).  To create the control terms for prior 
performance, Dunn and Bradstreet industry performance measures for each 3-digit SIC 
code in the matching year (Y-3) provide generic baselines for each sample firm.  To 
control for prior positive performance, a variable is created by assigning the industry-
adjusted performance as the value for all firms with positive results and zero as the value 
for all firms with performance below the industry baseline.  Conversely, a negative prior 




for all firms with performance below the baseline, and zero for all firms that 
outperformed the industry (Jacobs et al., 2015).   
4.3.1.2 Exogenous variables.  This study utilizes single-item measures for the four 
variables of interest and both moderating variables.  The proxy measures used for the 
independent variables were each taken from multi-item measures created for this study.  
Results were similar for models using multiple- and single-item measures.  Models with 
multiple measurement items failed to produce noticeable improvements in explained 
variance, effect sizes, or statistical power, so results for the more parsimonious model are 
presented and discussed in this study.  Appendix F provides the measurement items and 
results for the alternative models.   
Factor market rivalry was measured using the global competitive index scores for 
the previous country of origin for the product being reshored.  This yearly index uses 
global respondents from multi-national firms to answer survey questions on the perceived 
economic competitiveness of 160 countries.  Items are scored using a 7-point scale, with 
1 indicating extremely non-competitive countries and 7 indicating extremely completive 
countries.  Since factor market rivalry increases costs and decreases competitiveness, this 
item was reverse-scored.  Geographic distance between countries provides the proxy 
measure for logistics costs.  This measure was obtained using Google Maps, and 
represents the aerial miles between the center of the previous country of origin and the 
U.S.  Strategic Risk Exposure was also measured at the country level using the previous 
country of origin measure for Control of Corruption from the World Governance 
Indicators index.  This yearly index scores international governments using a 5-point 




(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009).  Since eliminating corruption reduces long-term 
risk, this item was reverse-scored by taking the negative value of the item.  Finally, the 
country risk measure of the previous country of origin.  Adopted from the FM Global 
Resilience Index, this measure assigns scores ranging from 1 to 100 to countries on the 
potential of a supply chain disruption due to faulty structures and machinery, probability 
of natural disasters, and natural resource shortage (FM Global Resilience Index, 2015).   
Both moderating variables were measured using single-item measures.  For all 
models, research and development (R&D) intensity was used to indicate the level of 
product innovativeness, while the percentage of revenues generated outside the U.S. 
provides the proxy measure for offshore relationship value.  These items provided 
continuous measures at the firm level, which were used to determine if the direct effects 
were contingent upon firm-specific and industry-specific activities.   
4.3.1.3 Endogenous variables.  Superior operating efficiency and superior firm 
profitability both exist as ultimate outcomes in the conceptualization of reshoring 
success.  To provide more descriptive information, the sensitivity analysis is conducted 
using the same structural models for both endogenous variables.  Return on sales is a 
scaled measure of a firm’s profit margin.  Therefore, positive (negative) changes in 
abnormal ROS provide relevant measures for superior (inferior) firm profitability 
(Sharma, 2005).  Likewise, positive changes in abnormal return on assets represent 
improvements in the efficient use of firm assets (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987).  Thus, 
abnormal changes in ROA serve as proxy measures for superior operating efficiency.   
When using changes in abnormal returns as an endogenous variable, results must 




(Swink & Jacobs, 2012).  The strongest change for all groups occurs over the three-year 
period after reshoring, which includes the year that domestic production began.  This 
period also offers the most statistical power.  Thus, the changes in abnormal returns from 
year -1 to year +2 were used as single-item indicators of the endogenous variables.  This 
longer period also reduces the potential of outliers resulting from cross-sectional 
dependency and mean reversion (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a).  To further reduce the 
possibility that outliers might alter the results, the sample is winsorized at 2.5% for each 
tail.   
4.3.1.4 Distribution of data.  This section discusses the availability and 
distribution of the data that were used to determine the significant factors leading to 
reshoring success.  Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest appear in Table 10.  
The final testable sample size for this study was 96.  Missing data did not pose a major 
threat to reliability.  A total of 18 items were missing in six cases.  However, measures 
for the independent, dependent, and contingent variables in this sample contained no 
missing data items. The missing items were in the measures of firm size and capital 
expenditures that were used as control items.  While still important, the percentage of 
missing items was relatively small for each measure and for the entire data set.   
The distribution of data for the model was a primary factor in determining the 
statistical technique to use for empirical testing, because nonparametric data violates the 
assumptions of many regression-based techniques.  Data distribution was especially 
important for the endogenous variables, because literature suggests that abnormal returns 
generally form nonparametric distribution patterns (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003).  




measure, the absolute value should be below 1 for normal distributions (Hair et al., 2016).  
The statistics for skewness and kurtosis shown in Table 10 suggest that both endogenous 
terms have peaked distributions which are negatively skewed.  Four of eight variables 
shown have skewness statistics with absolute values greater than one, while half of the 
kurtosis statistics also fall outside the range of -1 and +1.   
Table 10: Measures of Central Tendency and Distribution of Data 
 FMR TLC SRE SCD
R 
PI ORV SOEa SFPb 
Valid N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Mean 1.913 4948.7 -1.05 32.96 3.68 61.71 .0150 .0297 
Median 1.690 4882.0 -1.56 27.40 2.86 66.15 .0133 .0104 
Mode 1.60 6303.0 -1.65 8.40 .00 77.00 .1794 .5101 
Minimum 1.02 1192.0 -2.45 4.50 .00 .00 -.1126 -.3024 
Maximum 2.92 9495.0 .60 87.50 31.85 95.20 .1794 .5101 
Std. Dev. .4312 2236.4 1.05 23.37 4.65 23.24 .0493 .1139 
Skewness .789 -.419 .560 1.156 3.77 -.840 1.001 2.359 
 -Std. Error .246 .246 .246 .246 .246 .246 .246 .246 
Kurtosis -.419 -.711 -1.39 .470 18.18 .059 2.946 9.955 
 -Std. Error .488 .488 .488 .488 .488 .488 .488 .488 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test .000
c,d .000c,d .000c,d .000c,d .000c,d .002c,d .000c,d .000c,d 
FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk 
Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, and 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value. 
a. Superior Operating Performance represents the abnormal return on assets for the MPIS 
matching group, Winsorized at 2.5% for each tail.  
b. Superior Firm Profitability represents the abnormal return on sales for the MPIS 
matching group, Winsorized at 2.5% for each tail.  
c. Test distribution is normal. 
d. Lilliefors Significance Correction.  
 
To provide additional analysis, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was 
performed to determine if the data are normally distributed.  As Table 10 shows, the 
results for all variables were highly significant (p<.01) to reject the null hypothesis that 




statistics for skewness and kurtosis, provide strong evidence that the data are not 
normally distributed. Hence, non-parametric statistical techniques were used for further 
analyses. 
4.3.1.5 Analytical approach.  Since the data do not form a normal distribution 
pattern, nonparametric analytical techniques are employed to empirically test the 
hypothesized relationships between the antecedents and outcomes of reshoring events.  
Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) is therefore used to model 
and empirically test the hypothesized relationships affecting reshoring decisions.  This 
variance-based method makes no assumptions regarding normality or sample size.  
However, the sample must be generalizable to the population and the sample size must be 
sufficient to achieve the desired statistical power (Hair et al., 2011).  Using the G*Power 
3 application (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), the largest model in this study 
requires a sample size of 74 to achieve 95% power for a moderate effect size with critical 
t-value of 1.66.  Path modeling in this dissertation is performed using the SmartPLS 
software package, version 3.2.4 (Ringle, Wende, & Becker, 2015).   
For each endogenous term, three different structural models were tested.  First, 
the effects of hypothesized variables and control measures were examined.  Then, 
separate structural models were tested to analyze the moderating effects of the 
contingency variables.  Thus, Structural Model 1 estimates the path coefficients for the 
four direct relationships hypothesized in the conceptual model.  This model also includes 
a formative index variable comprised of the six control measures for firm size, prior 




included in Structural Model 1 to reduce the likelihood omitted variable bias and to allow 
changes in explained variance to be examined in the other models.   
Structural Model 2 is used to analyze the moderating effect of product 
innovativeness on the drivers of reshoring success.  Using SmartPLS 3.2.4, moderation is 
analyzed by creating latent interaction terms between the moderating variable, product 
innovativeness, and each of the four exogenous variables: factor market rivalry, total 
logistics costs, strategic rick exposure, and supply chain disruption risk (Chin et al., 2003; 
Rigdon, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2010).  For each endogenous term, Structural Model 2 
estimates the path coefficients of the direct effects, while the latent interaction terms are 
added separately.  This same process is then repeated to create latent interaction terms for 
the third model, which analyzes moderating effect of offshore relationship value.  Thus, 
Structural Model 3 estimates the path coefficients of the control variable, the moderating 
variables, all four hypothesized direct effects, and the four latent interaction terms for the 
moderating variable, offshore relationship value, and each of the four exogenous 
variables.   
Each calculation is performed using both endogenous terms for all three matching 
groups for breadth and rigor.  However, abnormal changes in returns for firms matched 
according to median performance, size, and industry classification (MPIS matching 
group) offer the most statistical power across all years for ROA and ROS.  Thus, for 
brevity and clarity, only the results from analyses based on MPIS calculations are 
presented for the remainder of this dissertation.  The quantitative results of calculations 
for each of the three matching groups, along with all figures and tables, are provided in 




4.3.2 Estimating Superior Operating Efficiency 
4.3.2.1 Structural Model 1 – direct effects. 
4.3.2.1.1 Estimating the model.  Partial Least Squares Simultaneous Equations 
Modeling (PLS-SEM) was employed to estimate and empirically test the structural model 
used to explain the variance in Superior Operating Efficiency.  Using the SmartPLS 3.2.4 
statistical software, the PLS algorithm was chosen to estimate the structural model 
(Ringle et al., 2015).  Since missing items for all measures are below the 5% 
recommended threshold for using PLS-SEM, any of the algorithms for missing data are 
sufficient (Hair et al., 2017).  Due to the relatively low sample size (n=96), pairwise 
deletion was selected as the treatment for missing data to maximize the use of available 
information.  The path weighting scheme was selected, using default settings of 300 
maximum iterations, a stop criterion of 7, and initial values equal to 1.   
The model converged on the second iteration, explaining 22.8% of the variance in 
superior operating efficiency.  However, both strategic rick exposure and supply chain 
disruption risk have negative, rather than positive valences.  The magnitude and valence 
of the path coefficients reflect the proposed relationships for all other variables.  The path 
coefficients and explained variance (R2 = .228) for Structural Model 1 are presented in 




Figure 3: Path Coefficients and R2 for Structural Model 1 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, and 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value.  
 
4.3.2.1.2 Assessing the results.  After the PLS algorithm converges, it is necessary 
to assess the results of the path model estimation.  As with any statistical method, validity 
and reliability of the constructs and the model must be confirmed.  Since no reflective 
constructs exist in this model, traditional measures of internal consistency and convergent 
validity are not appropriate and thus not performed (Hair et al., 2017).  Single-item 
measures rely upon face validity as an indication of construct quality, therefore practical 
and theoretical justifications are more important for models utilizing proxy measures.   
Traditional methods for assessing discriminant validity such as the Fornell-
Larcker Criterion or cross-loadings are also invalid for single-item and formative 




is statistically different from any other.  Thus, the heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio 
was used along with the inner variance inflation factors (VIF) to assess discriminant 
validity and collinearity for each model.  The HTMT is the ratio of between trait 
correlations to the ratio of within-trait correlations, thereby estimating the true correlation 
between perfectly measured variables (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2015).  If all HTMT 
ratios are below 1.0, then each item is more highly correlated with its own construct than 
with any other and discriminant validity has been established (Hair et al., 2017).  To 
eliminate the possibility of measurement errors, a more conservative threshold of .90 is 
recommended of conceptually similar constructs and .85 for dissimilar constructs 
(Henseler et al., 2015).  As seen in Table 11, the largest figure in the chart was 0.8315 
indicating that discriminant validity has been met.   
In addition to the HTMT numbers, the VIF figures were used to ensure that 
multicollinearity was not an issue.  As an inverse function of tolerance, the variance 
inflation factor represents the squared value of an increase in standard error resulting 
from collinearity (Hair et al., 2011).  Any VIF value above 1.0 indicates that some 
multicollinearity exists, while a VIF value above 10 indicates that extreme 
multicollinearity is present.  When using PLS-SEM, adjustments to the model should be 
considered for any value of 5.0 or higher (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009).  With no 
reflective measures in the structural model, outer VIF numbers were of no concern.   As 
shown in Table 11, VIF values were well below the critical threshold of five for all inner 
VIF values.  Thus, it was determined that multicollinearity was not a significant factor in 




Table 11: Measures of Discriminant Validity and Collinearity for Structural Model 1  
Item Inner VIF Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) 
 SOE FMR TLC SRE SCDR PI ORV 
Control 1.043       
FMR 3.908       
TLC 1.839 0.076      
SRE 4.364 0.832 0.328     
SCDR 1.432 0.093 0.508 0.077    
PI 1.128 0.050 0.278 0.021 0.084   
ORV 1.124 0.047 0.206 0.030 0.242 0.160  
SOE - 0.022 0.079 0.136 0.091 0.272 0.023 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
 
In addition to construct validity, it is also necessary to assess the reliability of the 
inner model.  The primary objective of PLS-SEM is to maximize the amount of explained 
variance for endogenous constructs.  Because PLS is a prediction-based technique, it 
provides no global measure of fit (Hair et al., 2017).  Thus, the predictive capabilities of 
the structural model are used to indicate the quality of the model.  The primary measure 
of model quality is the coefficient of determination (R2) of endogenous constructs, 
although path coefficients (β) and individual effect sizes (f2) are also necessary to assess 
model quality (Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, et al., 2012).  The statistical significance for each 
of these measures is determined by using bootstrapping.  This nonparametric resampling 
procedure randomly selects a predetermined number of subsamples, which it uses to 
estimate the model parameters as well as the standard error, t-values, and p-values for the 
results (Hair et al., 2017).  Assuming the number of subsamples is large enough to satisfy 
the central limit theorem, bootstrapping can return reliable estimates without imposing 




To perform the analysis, all previous settings were retained from the model 
estimation, and pairwise deletion was again selected as the treatment for missing data.  
Complete bootstrapping was used because this method returns t-values, p-values, and 
confidence intervals for all quality measures of the model, unlike basic bootstrapping that 
only analyzes path coefficients and indicator weights (Ringle et al., 2015).  Because 
relationships within the model were hypothesized as directional, one-tailed results were 
returned with bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals and normalized data 
distribution.  To ensure conditions of the central limits theorem were met, a large sample 
size of 5000 subsamples was selected, with item-level sign changes permitted.  Results of 
bootstrapping for Structural Model 1 are presented in Table 12, while full tables with 
confidence intervals are provided in the respective appendix for each endogenous 
measure.  
When assessing the results of bootstrapping, the reliability of the coefficient of 
determination must be considered.  Results in Table 12 suggest that Structural Model 1 
adequately explains the variance in superior operating efficiency for this sample with R2 
of .228 (p=.013) and adjusted R2 of .167 (p=.067).  Two of the control variables were 
also significant. Both firm size and prior positive performance had strong negative effects 
on operating efficiency.  Both contingency variables were in the expected direction, but 
only product innovativeness was significant (β=.251, p=.018).  Offshore relationship 




















Explained Variance (R2) for Endogenous Variable Superior Operating Efficiency 
R2 0.228 0.334 0.103 2.215 .013** 
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.281 0.111 1.499 .067* 
Statistical Significance of Path Coefficients (β) 
Control Factors  SOE -0.262 -0.344 0.120 2.190 .014** 
PI  SOE 0.251 0.223 0.119 2.098 .018** 
ORV  SOE -0.036 -0.094 0.071 0.509 .301 
FMR  SOE 0.337 0.306 0.183 1.844 .029** 
TLC  SOE 0.228 0.195 0.113 2.020 .023** 
SRE  SOE -0.472 -0.417 0.223 2.111 .016** 
SCDR  SOE -0.136 -0.134 0.074 1.839 .034** 
Calculated Effect Size (f2) of Variables for Specified Paths 
Control Factors  SOE 0.085 0.180 0.140 0.607 .272 
PI  SOE 0.072 0.084 0.077 0.933 .175 
ORV  SOE 0.001 0.017 0.025 0.06 .476 
FMR  SOE 0.038 0.048 0.054 0.703 .241 
TLC  SOE 0.037 0.039 0.042 0.873 .191 
SRE  SOE 0.066 0.078 0.080 0.823 .205 
SCDR  SOE 0.017 0.024 0.024 0.705 .240 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
To determine the drivers of reshoring success, the path coefficients for the 
proposed relationships were examined next.  The path coefficients and p-values for each 
structural path are presented in Figure 4 in addition to Table 12.  Path coefficients were 
significant (p<.05) for each of the hypothesized direct effects.  However, only two of 
these effects moved in the proposed direction.  The direct path from factor market rivalry 




support for Hypothesis 1a.  Likewise, the total logistics costs were shown to have a 
positive and significant impact (β=.228, p=.022) on superior operating efficiency.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 2a is also supported.  Both measures of long-term risk move in the opposite 
direction of the hypothesized relationships.  Although strategic risk exposure was 
significant and produced the largest path coefficient in the model, the valence was 
negative (β=-.472, p=.016).  While supply chain disruption risk had a much smaller path 
coefficient, results indicate that it also significantly reduced superior operating efficiency 
(β=-.136, p=.034).  Therefore, neither Hypothesis 3a nor Hypothesis 4a were supported.   
Figure 4: Path Coefficients and p-Values for Structural Model 1  
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, and 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value. 
 
In addition to the statistical significance of the coefficient of determination and 




considered.  Smart PLS 3 calculates the effect sizes for each structural path using 
Cohen’s (1988) f2, which estimates the change in R2 that would occur if a structural path 
were omitted from the model.  Thus, calculated effect sizes were also examined for each 
of the structural paths, following Cohen’s guidelines for interpreting f2 values: .02 
indicates a weak effect, .15 a moderate effect, and .35 a large effect (Cohen, 1992).   
As shown in Table 12, two structural paths are below .02 and have no substantial 
effect, while all other paths were characterized as having small effect sizes.  The two 
smallest effects on superior operating performance come from offshore relationship value 
(f2=.001) and supply chain disruption risk (f2=.017), both of which were too small to be 
considered relevant.  Not surprisingly, the largest effect (f2=.085) was derived from the 
control index, which contains six formative measures.  This was followed by the direct 
path from product innovativeness to superior operating performance (f2=.072).  The final 
three direct paths to superior operating efficiency were also between .02 and .15, 
indicating small effect sizes: factor market rivalry (f2=.038), total logistics costs 
(f2=.037), and strategic risk exposure (f2=.066).  Thus, each of these proposed 
relationships was shown to be relevant to the model, yet no single variable substantially 
changes the level of operating efficiency.                                 
4.3.2.1.3 Determining predictive validity.  The final step in evaluating the results 
of PLS-SEM involves assessing the predictive validity of the structural model.  
SmartPLS 3 uses a technique called blindfolding to estimate Stone-Geisser’s Q2, which is 
a measure of external validity or predictive relevance of the structural model results 




omits certain data, predicts the omitted data points, then uses the prediction error to cross-
validate the model estimates (Tenenhaus, Vinzi, Chatelin, & Lauro, 2005).     
Blindfolding is conducted by selecting an omission distance (D), which instructs 
the algorithm to omit every dth data point for d number of cases beginning with the 
subsequent data point for each case (Henseler et al., 2009).  Thus for an omission 
distance with the default value of seven, SmartPLS 3 creates seven cases.  Case 1 would 
start from the beginning and omit every seventh data point, while case 2 would start at 
the second data point and delete every seventh case.  This pattern continues until all 
possible combinations are achieved (Hair et al., 2017).  The algorithm then uses the 
model estimates to predict the omitted terms, and calculates cross validated redundancy 
using the sum of squared prediction error (SSE) and the sum of squares of the 
observation (SSO) for each of the seven cases.  The ratio of SSE divided by SSO is then 
subtracted from 1 to generate the value of Q2.  The structural model of any endogenous 
latent variable with a Q2 greater than zero provides predictive relevance (Henseler et al., 
2009). 
Since blindfolding can only be applied to endogenous latent variables with 
reflective measurement items (Henseler et al., 2009), valid results cannot be produced for 
Structural Model 1, which employs a single-item endogenous term.  To circumvent this 
problem, a new endogenous variable was created using the three-year changes in 
abnormal ROA (-1 to +2) for each of the three matching groups as reflective indicators of 
superior operating value.  This measure satisfied the requirement of reflective indicators, 
allowing the blindfolding procedure to validate the individual measures of superior 




same settings from the previous steps, the default value of seven was used as the 
omission distance for Structural Model 1.  Table 13 shows that the model has external 
validity with a Q2 of .141.  As expected, the cross-validated redundancy increases with 
the stringency of each matching group with Q2 values of .164 for the MPIS group, .139 
for the MPI group, and .118 for the PI matching group.  This suggests that Structural 
Model 1 adequately predicts superior operating efficiency.   
Table 13: Predictive Validity of Structural Model 1  
 
SSO SSE 
Q²                   
(1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-Validated Redundancy 
SOE 288 247.485 0.141 
Indicator Cross-Validated Redundancy 
AbROA MPIS Matching Group 96 80.215 0.164 
AbROA MPI Matching Group 96 82.639 0.139 
AbROA PI Matching Group 96 84.631 0.118 
Where SSO = Sum of Squared Observations, SSE = Sum of Squared Prediction Errors, 
SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency, and AbROA = Abnormal Return on Assets 
 
4.3.2.2 Structural Model 2 - interactions with product innovativeness. 
4.3.2.2.1 Estimating the model.  Building upon Structural Model 1, the second 
model uses path modeling to determine if the direct effects between the independent 
variables and superior operating efficiency are contingent upon the innovativeness of the 
product being manufactured.  Moderation was tested by using PLS-SEM to estimate the 
amount of variance explained by interactions between product innovativeness and the 
other exogenous variables (Hair et al., 2017).  Moderating effects were examined by 
creating latent variables to measure the interactions between product innovativeness and 
each of the four independent variables for the endogenous variable superior operating 




created using the two stage calculation method with standardized product term generation 
(Ringle et al., 2015).  The PLS algorithm was then employed to estimate the structural 
path between each interaction variable and the endogenous term superior operating 
efficiency, followed by bootstrapping to determine the statistical significance of the 
effects.   
Because PLS-SEM aims to reduce unexplained variance in the endogenous 
variable, only moderating effects that explain additional variance should be included in 
the structural model.  Path modeling was performed separately for each interaction 
variable to determine the change in explained variance attributable to each moderating 
effect.  Different combinations of moderating effects were also examined to identify the 
structural equation that maximizes explained variance in superior operating efficiency.   
The PLS algorithm was used to estimate the structural paths and changes in R2, 
while bootstrapping was performed to determine the statistical significance of the 
changes. Since quality measures were not needed for this initial assessment, basic 
bootstrapping was performed using 5,000 subsamples with one-tailed test results.    
Results of this initial assessment indicate that only two of the four proposed 
moderating effects of product innovativeness are significant.  As expected, both 
economic drivers of reshoring have greater impacts on superior operating efficiency 
when product innovativeness increases.  The interaction between product innovativeness 
and total logistics costs produced the strongest effect, increasing the explained variance 
in superior operating efficiency from .228 in Structural Model 1 to .267.  Thus, the 
moderating effect of product innovativeness on total logistics costs is positive and 




operating efficiency.  The interaction between product innovativeness and factor market 
rivalry was also positive and significant, although the effect on superior operating 
performance was much smaller.  The moderating effect of product innovativeness on 
factor market rivalry increased the R2 for superior operating efficiency to .281, explaining 
an additional 1.5% of the variance for the endogenous term.    
Although product innovativeness significantly moderates both economic drivers 
of reshoring, virtually no interaction between product innovativeness and the strategic 
drivers of reshoring was detected for superior operating efficiency.  The interaction 
between product innovativeness and strategic risk had no significant effect on superior 
operating efficiency (β=-.008, p=.489, f2=.000).  Likewise, the interaction between 
product innovativeness and supply chain disruption risk was not found to be a significant 
predictor of superior operating efficiency (β=-.038, p=.390, f2=.001).  Neither of these 
interaction variables increased the explained variance of superior operating efficiency 
when added to the structural model.  Thus, both terms were excluded from the structural 
equation, leaving only two moderating effects to be examined in Structural Model 2.  The 
path coefficients and p-values of the final model are shown in Figure 5. 
4.3.2.2.2 Assessing the results.  Structural Model 2 uses PLS-SEM to estimate the 
moderating effect of product innovativeness on factor market rivalry and total logistics 
costs for the endogenous term superior operating efficiency.  The PLS algorithm was 
used to estimate path coefficients, effect sizes, and the coefficient of determination of 
superior operating efficiency.  Pairwise deletion was selected as the treatment for missing 




values of one.  Using a stopping criterion of seven, the model converged on the second 
iteration.   
Figure 5: Path Coefficients and p-Values for Structural Model 2  
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, and 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value. 
 
Structural Model 2 mirrors the first model except for the addition of two latent 
interaction variables used to measure moderating effects.  As with single-item constructs, 
traditional measures of internal consistency and construct validity are invalid for latent 
interaction variables.  Thus, the HTMT ratio and inner VIF values are used to assess 
discriminant validity and collinearity for Structural Model 2 with results provided in 
Table 14.  All HTMT values were below .85, indicating that discriminant validity was 
achieved.  Likewise, multicollinearity did not appear to be a significant issue as all inner 




Table 14: Measures of Discriminant Validity and Collinearity for Structural Model 2  
Item Inner VIF Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) 
 
 





Control 1.072         
FMR 1.795         
TLC 1.118 0.076        
SRE 4.433 0.832 0.328       
SCDR 1.493 0.093 0.508 0.328      
PI 1.795 0.050 0.278 0.021 0.084     
ORV 1.118 0.047 0.206 0.030 0.242 0.160    
PI x FMR 1.129 0.000 0.009 0.049 0.098 0.000 0.046   
PI x TLC 1.804 0.121 0.062 0.156 0.123 0.598 0.079 0.224  
SOE - 0.044 0.077 0.145 0.089 0.258 0.010 0.064 0.341 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
To assess the quality of Structural Model 2, complete bootstrapping was 
performed to calculate the statistical significance of the path coefficients in the inner 
model, the calculated effect sizes of the exogenous terms, and the coefficient of 
determination for the superior operating efficiency.  Of particular concern to this model 
were the significance and effect sizes of the two moderating effects as well as the 
additional variance explained by moderation.  Complete bootstrapping was conducted by 
selecting 5,000 subsamples and allowing item-level sign changes.  Since positive 
moderation was hypothesized, one-tailed results were returned with bias corrected and 
accelerated confidence intervals and normalized data distribution.  Results of complete 




















Explained Variance (R2) for Endogenous Variable Superior Operating Efficiency 
R2 0.281 0.385 0.106 2.645 .004*** 
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.320 0.117 1.754 .039** 
Statistical Significance of Path Coefficients (β) 
Control Factors  SOE -0.238 -0.312 0.128 1.861 .031** 
PI  SOE 0.067 0.120 0.087 0.766 .222 
ORV  SOE -0.037 -0.090 0.068 0.534 .297 
FMR  SOE 0.353 0.315 0.190 1.858 .032** 
TLC  SOE 0.233 0.207 0.119 1.949 .026** 
SRE  SOE  -0.453 -0.405 0.225 2.010 .022** 
SCDR  SOE -0.100 -0.114 0.072 1.396 .081* 
PI x FMR  SOE 0.170 0.097 0.060 1.423 .072* 
PI x TLC  SOE  0.224 0.204 0.109 2.056 .017** 
Calculated Effect Size (f2) of Variables for Specified Paths 
Control Factors  SOE 0.073 0.152 0.127 0.574 .283 
PI  SOE 0.003 0.018 0.023 0.149 .441 
ORV  SOE 0.002 0.017 0.026 0.065 .474 
FMR  SOE 0.044 0.056 0.065 0.677 .249 
TLC  SOE 0.041 0.046 0.048 0.842 .200 
SRE  SOE  0.064 0.081 0.089 0.724 .235 
SCDR  SOE 0.009 0.018 0.020 0.463 .322 
PI x FMR  SOE 0.020 0.034 0.043 0.453 .325 
PI x TLC  SOE  0.069 0.055 0.054 1.268 .100* 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
 
The coefficient of determination for is the first measure used to assess the quality 
of Structural Model 2.  Results in Table 15 indicate that Structural Model 2 explains 




adjusted R2 of .206 (p=.039).  Thus, Structural Model 2 explains more variance in 
superior operating efficiency and has more statistical power than Structural Model 1, 
which explained 22.8% of the variance in superior operating efficiency with R2 of .228 
(p=.013) and adjusted R2 of .167 (p=.067).   Hence, Structural Model 2 is a better 
predictor of superior operating efficiency, suggesting that product innovativeness is a 
significant moderator of factor market rivalry and total logistics costs.    
Next, the path coefficients of the moderating effects must be evaluated along with 
the calculated effect sizes of the latent interaction terms (Hair et al., 2016).  Results in 
Table 15 show that the interaction between product innovativeness and total logistics 
costs has positive and significant effect on superior operating efficiency (β=.224, p=.017, 
f2=.069).  The moderating effect also produces the largest calculated effect size in the 
model for superior operating efficiency, providing support for Hypothesis 6a.   
The results show that the interaction between product innovativeness and factor 
market rivalry is positive, yet marginally significant with a very small calculated effect 
size (β=.170, p=.072, f2=.020).  However, .02 still falls within the acceptable range for 
small effects (Cohen, 1992), and the addition of the interaction increases the variance 
explained by the model.  Therefore, the results offer marginal support for Hypothesis 5a.  
Interactions with strategic risk exposure and supply chain disruption risk were excluded 
from the structural equation, offering no support for Hypothesis 7a or Hypothesis 8a. 
4.3.2.2.3 Determining predictive validity.  Blindfolding was performed to assess 
the predictive validity of Structural Model 2 for the endogenous term superior operating 
efficiency.  The omission distance was again set at seven, and changes in abnormal return 




operating efficiency.  As shown in Table 16, the results indicate that the model has 
predictive relevance with a Q2 of .182 for the endogenous construct.  Cross-validated 
redundancies for the reflective indicators were also positive with Q2 values of .135 for PI 
matching group, .194 for the MPI group, and .218 for the MPIS matching group results.  
Thus, results were consistent for all three matching groups whether examined in unison 
or independently, thereby substantiating the measures and providing external validity for 
the model. 
Table 16: Predictive Validity of Structural Model 2  
 
SSO SSE 
Q²                    
(1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-Validated Redundancy  
SOE 288.000 235.525 0.182 
Indicator Cross-Validated Redundancy  
AbROA MPIS Matching Group 96.000 75.077 0.218 
AbROA MPI Matching Group 96.000 77.401 0.194 
AbROA PI Matching Group 96.000 83.048 0.135 
Where SSO = Sum of Squared Observations, SSE = Sum of Squared Prediction Errors, 
SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency, and AbROA = Abnormal Return on Assets. 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Structural Model 3 -  interactions with offshore relationship value. 
4.3.2.3.1 Estimating the model.  Structural Model 3 uses PLS-SEM to determine 
if relationships between the independent variables and superior operating efficiency are 
contingent upon the value of offshore relationships for the reshoring firms (Hair et al., 
2016).  Moderation was again tested by creating four latent interaction variables to 
capture the moderating effects of offshore relationship value on and each of the four 
independent variables for the endogenous variable superior operating efficiency (Chin et 




stage calculation method with standardized product term generation (Ringle et al., 2015).  
The PLS algorithm was then employed to estimate the moderating effects and changes in 
explained variance for superior operating efficiency.  Bootstrapping was employed to 
identify the interaction variables to include in Structural Model 3.  For simplicity, basic 
bootstrapping was performed using 5,000 subsamples with one-tailed test results.    
Results of this initial assessment indicate that three of the four proposed 
moderating effects explain additional variance in superior operating efficiency.  The 
interaction between offshore relationship value and strategic risk exposure was 
significant (β = .491, p = .013, f2=.088), explaining roughly 3.2% of the variance in 
superior operating efficiency.  The moderating effect of offshore relationship value on 
factor market rivalry also appears to be significant for the endogenous term (β = -.526, p 
= .015, f2=.076), increasing R2 by another 3%.  These two interactions share similar 
effect sizes, and taken together increase R2 from .228 to .292.  Finally, the interaction 
between offshore relationship value and supply chain disruption risk explains an 
additional 1.7% of the variance in superior operating efficiency, increasing the value of 
R2 from .292 to .309.   
Total logistics cost was the only independent variable unaffected by the variance 
in offshore relationship value.  The interaction between total logistics costs and offshore 
relationship value was not a significant predictor of superior operating efficiency (β = 
.031, p = .339, f2=.001), and was therefore excluded from the structural equation.   Thus 
Structural Model 3 includes the endogenous variables from Structural Model 1 plus three 
latent variables used to calculate the moderating effect of offshore relationship value on 




endogenous term superior operating efficiency.  The path coefficients and p-values of the 
final model are shown in Figure 6.   
Figure 6: Path Coefficients and p-Values for Structural Model 3 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, and 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value. 
 
4.3.2.3.2 Assessing the results.  Structural Model 3 uses PLS-SEM to estimate the 
moderating effect of offshore relationship value on factor market rivalry, strategic risk 
exposure, and supply chain disruption risk for the endogenous term superior operating 
efficiency.  The PLS algorithm was used to estimate path coefficients, effect sizes, and 
the coefficient of determination of superior operating efficiency.  Pairwise deletion was 
selected as the treatment for missing values, and all calculations were performed using 
the path weighting scheme and initial values of one.  Using a stopping criterion of seven, 




As previously mentioned, traditional measures of internal consistency and 
construct validity are invalid for latent interaction variables and single-item constructs.  
Thus, the HTMT ratio and inner VIF values are used to assess discriminant validity and 
collinearity for Structural Model 3 with results provided in Table 17.  All HTMT values 
were below .85, indicating that discriminant validity was achieved.  Likewise, 
multicollinearity did not appear to be a significant issue as all inner VIF numbers were 
below the critical threshold of five.   




Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) 









Control 1.044          
FMR 4.075          
TLC 1.927 0.076         
SRE 4.494 0.832 0.328        
SCDR 1.730 0.093 0.508 0.077       
PI 1.148 0.050 0.278 0.021 0.084      
ORV 1.531 0.047 0.206 0.030 0.242 0.160     
ORV x FMR 4.359 0.011 0.183 0.087 0.268 0.148 0.266    
ORV x SRE 4.163 0.062 0.101 0.000 0.083 0.076 0.000 0.806   
ORV x SCDR 1.507 0.260 0.060 0.191 0.267 0.043 0.165 0.090 0.240  
SOE - 0.022 0.079 0.136 0.091 0.272 0.023 0.006 0.096 0.081 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
 
Complete bootstrapping was performed to calculate the statistical significance of 
the path coefficients in the inner model, the calculated effect sizes of the exogenous 
terms, and the coefficient of determination for the superior operating efficiency.  




interaction variables that represent the three moderating effects as well as the additional 
variance explained by moderation.  Complete bootstrapping was conducted using 5,000 
subsamples and allowing item-level sign changes.  Since negative moderation was 
hypothesized, one-tailed results were returned with bias corrected and accelerated 
confidence intervals and normalized data distribution.  Results of complete bootstrapping 
for Structural Model 3 are presented in Table 18.   
The coefficient of determination for is the first measure used to assess the quality 
of Structural Model 3.  Results in Table 18 indicate that Structural Model 3 explains 
30.9% of the variance in superior operating efficiency, with R2 of .309 (p=.002) and 
adjusted R2 of .227 (p=.025).  Thus, Structural Model 3 explains more variance in 
superior operating efficiency and has more statistical power than Structural Model 1, 
which explained 22.8% of the variance in superior operating efficiency with an R2 of .228 
(p=.013) and adjusted R2 of .167 (p=.067).   Hence, Structural Model 3 is a better 
predictor of superior operating efficiency, suggesting that the effects of factor market 
value, strategic risk exposure, and supply chain disruption risk on superior operating 
efficiency are contingent upon offshore relationship value.  
Next, the path coefficients of the moderating effects as well as the calculated 
effect sizes of the latent interaction terms must be evaluated (Hair et al., 2016).  Results 
in Table 18 show that each of the three moderating effects for Structural Model 3 are 
statistically significant.  However, two of the interactions are products of exogenous 
terms with unexpected valences, and the moderating effect of offshore relationship and 




statistical significance of the interaction terms must all be assessed to provide empirical 
support for moderation (Chin et al., 2003).   















Explained Variance (R2) for Endogenous Variable Superior Operating Efficiency 
R2 0.309 0.410 0.104 2.962 .002*** 
Adjusted R2 0.227 0.341 0.116 1.952 .025** 
Statistical Significance of Path Coefficients (β) 
Control Factors  SEO -0.258 -0.321 0.109 2.365 .009*** 
PI  SOE 0.226 0.211 0.116 1.947 .026** 
ORV  SOE -0.205 -0.192 0.137 1.495 .067* 
FMR  SOE 0.307 0.303 0.195 1.577 .057* 
TLC  SOE 0.254 0.218 0.117 2.180 .015** 
SRE  SOE -0.537 -0.477 0.236 2.271 .012** 
SCDR  SOE -0.159 -0.148 0.084 1.888 .030** 
ORV x FMR  SOE -0.602 -0.495 0.266 2.261 .012** 
ORV x SRE  SOE 0.025 0.021 0.010 2.367 .009*** 
ORV x SCDR  SOE -0.173 -0.162 0.108 1.604 .054* 
Calculated Effect Size (f2) of Variables for Specified Paths 
Control Factors  SEO 0.092 0.154 0.100 0.921 .179 
PI  SOE 0.034 0.052 0.063 0.529 .299 
ORV  SOE 0.049 0.051 0.051 0.951 .171 
FMR  SOE 0.093 0.106 0.105 0.885 .188 
TLC  SOE 0.021 0.026 0.027 0.768 .221 
SRE  SOE 0.064 0.078 0.073 0.888 .187 
SCDR  SOE 0.040 0.052 0.067 0.591 .277 
ORV x FMR  SOE 0.096 0.088 0.089 1.078 .141 
ORV x SRE  SOE 0.113 0.114 0.110 1.032 .151 
ORV x SCDR  SOE 0.024 0.031 0.037 0.656 .256 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 





First, the interaction between offshore relationship value and factor market rivalry 
has a significant and negative effect on superior operating efficiency (β=-.602, p=.012, 
f2=.096).  The inverse relationship was hypothesized and the calculated effect size of .096 
suggests that the interaction is responsible for much of the increase in explained variance.  
Thus, Hypothesis 9a is supported.  No interaction was found between total logistics costs 
and offshore relationship value. Therefore, the latent interaction term was excluded from 
the structural equation, offering no support for Hypothesis 10a.   
The interaction between offshore relationship value and strategic risk exposure 
also significantly impacts superior operating efficiency (β=.025, p=.009, f2=.113). 
However, the effect of the interaction is positive when negative moderation was 
proposed.  From a quantitative perspective, the interaction does weaken the relationship 
between strategic risk exposure and superior operating performance, thereby supporting 
Hypothesis 11a.  However, no argument has been made in this dissertation to support an 
increase in efficiency as offshore relationships strengthen.  The direction of these 
structural paths was not affected by the inclusion of the moderating effect, as the simple 
effect of strategic risk exposure was also negative.  Thus, no practical or theoretical 
justification exists to support the hypothesis.   
The final hypothesized moderating effect in this model concerns the moderation 
of supply chain disruption risk by offshore relationship value.  This interaction had a 
small, yet significant negative effect on superior operating efficiency (β=-.173, p=.054, 
f2=.024).  The calculated effect size and p-value of the moderating effect were both 
sufficient and path coefficient is negative, as hypothesized.  However, the expected 




effect actually strengthens the relationship between supply chain disruption risk and 
superior operating performance as the slope becomes steeper and inverted.  Thus, this 
study offers no support for Hypothesis 12a. 
4.3.2.3.3 Determining the predictive validity.  Blindfolding was performed to 
assess the predictive validity of Structural Model 3 for the endogenous term superior 
operating efficiency.  The omission distance was again set at seven, and changes in 
abnormal return on assets for all three matching groups were used as reflective indicators 
of superior operating efficiency.  As shown in Table 19, the results indicate that the 
model has predictive relevance with Q2 of .217 for the endogenous variable.  The cross-
validated redundancies for the reflective indicators were also positive with Q2 values of 
.192 for PI matching group, .220 for the MPI group, and .239 for the MPIS matching 
group results.  As expected, scores were similar for all matching groups and increased 
with the stringency of each matching technique, suggesting that the model adequately 
predicts superior operating efficiency.   
Table 19: Predictive Validity of Structural Model 3  
 
SSO SSE 
Q²                    
(1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-Validated Redundancy  
SOE 288.000 225.458 0.217 
Indicator Cross-Validated Redundancy  
AbROA MPIS Matching Group 96.000 73.087 0.239 
AbROA MPI Matching Group 96.000 74.833 0.220 
AbROA PI Matching Group 96.000 77.538 0.192 
Where SSO = Sum of Squared Observations, SSE = Sum of Squared Prediction Errors, 





4.3.3 Estimating Superior Firm Profitability 
4.3.3.1 Structural Model 4 - direct effects. 
4.3.3.1.1 Estimating the model.  Structural Model 4 exists to estimate and 
empirically test the structural model used to explain the variance in superior firm 
profitability.  The model uses the same exogenous variables and structural paths as 
Structural Model 1 to estimate the endogenous variable superior firm profitability.  As 
with Structural Model 1, the PLS algorithm was chosen to estimate the structural model, 
while pairwise deletion was selected as the treatment for missing data (Ringle et al., 
2015).  The path weighting scheme was selected, using default settings of 300 maximum 
iterations, a stop criterion of 7, and initial values equal to 1.  The model converged on the 
second iteration, explaining 34.0% of the variance in superior firm profitability.   
The results for superior firm profitability closely resemble those of superior 
operating efficiency in Structural Model 1.  However, the path coefficients and the 
coefficient of determination for superior firm profitability are slightly larger for this 
model than for Structural Model 1.  Also of importance, both strategic rick exposure and 
supply chain disruption risk have negative, rather than positive valences.  Thus, both 
long-term strategic variables negatively affect superior firm profitability in Structural 
Model 4, just as they did in Structural Model 1.  The magnitude and valance of the path 
coefficients reflect the proposed relationships for all other variables.  The path 
coefficients and explained variance (R2 = .340) for Structural Model 4 are provided in 




Figure 7: Path Coefficients and R2 for Structural Model 4 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, and 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value.  
 
4.3.3.1.2 Assessing the results.  Structural Model 4 uses the same exogenous 
constructs, measurement items, and structural paths as Structural Model 1 to estimate the 
path coefficients and explained variance for the endogenous variable superior firm 
performance.  Thus, the same statistical techniques are used to assess the validity of the 
model.  The HTMT ratio and inner VIF values are used to assess discriminant validity 
and collinearity for Structural Model 4 with results provided in Table 20.  All HTMT 
values were below .85, indicating that discriminant validity was achieved.  All inner VIF 
numbers were below the critical threshold of five, suggesting that multicollinearity did 




Table 20: Measures of Discriminant Validity and Collinearity for Structural Model 4  
Item Inner VIF Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) 
 SFP FMR ORV PI SCDR SRE SFP 
Control 1.140       
FMR 3.848       
ORV 1.210 0.047      
PI 1.142 0.050 0.160     
SCDR 1.432 0.093 0.242 0.084    
SRE 4.302 0.832 0.030 0.021 0.077   
SFP - 0.099 0.144 0.253 0.115 0.226  
TLC 1.855 0.076 0.206 0.278 0.508 0.328 0.011 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
In lieu of viable fit measures for PLS-SEM, the predictive capabilities of the 
structural model are used to indicate the quality of the model (Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, et 
al., 2012).  Thus, bootstrapping was performed to assess the statistical significance of the 
coefficient of determination (R2) of endogenous constructs, path coefficients (β) and 
calculated effect sizes (f2).   Complete bootstrapping was used to determine t-values, p-
values, and confidence intervals for all quality measures of the model (Ringle et al., 
2015).  The same settings were retained from the PLS algorithm, and pairwise deletion 
was selected as a treatment for missing data items.  To ensure a large enough sample size, 
5000 subsamples were selected, with item-level sign changes permitted.  Because 
relationships within the model were hypothesized, one-tailed results were returned with 
bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals and normalized data distribution.  
Results of bootstrapping for Structural Model 4 are presented in Table 21.   
The coefficient of determination for is the first measure used to assess the quality 
of Structural Model 4.  Results in Table 21 indicate that Structural Model 4 explains 




R2 of .288 (p=.031).  Both the coefficient of determination and the adjusted R2 for 
superior firm profitability were significant, suggesting that the model accurately predicts 
superior firm profitability.  The direct effects model also explains more variance for 
superior firm profitability in Structural Model 4 than for superior operating performance 
in Structural Model 1.   
To determine the drivers of reshoring success, the path coefficients for the 
proposed relationships between the independent variables and superior firm profitability 
were next examined (Hair et al., 2017) .  In addition to the statistical significance of the 
path coefficients, the calculated effect sizes much also be considered to determine the 
effect that each structural path has on the coefficient of determination of the exogenous 
variables  (Cohen, 1988).  The path coefficients and p-values for each structural path are 
presented in Figure 8 while the all three measures are shown in Table 21.   
The direct path from factor market rivalry to superior operating efficiency was 
positive and significant (β=.337, p=.033, f2=.053), providing support for Hypothesis 1b.  
Likewise, total logistics costs were shown to have a positive and significant impact 
(β=.263, p=.009, f2=.057) on superior operating efficiency.  Thus, Hypothesis 2b is also 
supported.  Both measures of long-term risk move in the opposite direction of the 
hypothesized relationships.  Although strategic risk exposure was significant and 
produced the largest path coefficient in the model, the valence was negative (β=-.600, 
p=.001, f2= .127).  Thus, Hypothesis 3b is not supported.  Although supply chain 
disruption risk had a much smaller path coefficient, results indicate that it also 
significantly reduced superior operating efficiency (β=-.117, p=.052, f2=.014). The 




chain disruption risk not a significant predictor of superior firm profitability.  Therefore, 
Hypotheses 4a was not supported.   
Figure 8: Path Coefficients and p-Values for Structural Model 4 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
Path coefficients were significant for each of the hypothesized direct effects, 
although two moved opposite the proposed direction.  Both of these long-term strategic 
predictors were also negative for superior operating performance.  Similarly, all effect 
sizes were above the lower bound for relevant small effects (Cohen, 1992) with the 
exception of two, which were both below .02 in Structural Model 1. This suggests that 




















Explained Variance (R2) for Endogenous Variable Superior Firm Profitability 
R2 0.340 0.481 0.143 2.374 .009*** 
Adjusted R2 0.288 0.439 0.155 1.860 .031** 
Statistical Significance of Path Coefficients (β) 
Control Factors  SFP -0.395 -0.485 0.171 2.313 .010*** 
PI  SFP 0.193 0.201 0.146 1.320 .093* 
ORV  SFP -0.076 -0.108 0.079 0.965 .167 
FMR  SFP 0.366 0.310 0.156 2.342 .010*** 
TLC  SFP 0.263 0.194 0.111 2.365 .009*** 
SRE  SFP -0.600 -0.494 0.188 3.186 .001*** 
SCDR  SFP -0.117 -0.115 0.072 1.628 .052* 
Calculated Effect Size (f2) of Variables for Specified Paths 
Control Factors  SFP 0.208 0.511 0.504 0.412 .340 
PI  SFP 0.050 0.101 0.133 0.373 .355 
ORV  SFP 0.007 0.028 0.038 0.194 .423 
FMR  SFP 0.053 0.058 0.051 1.043 .148 
TLC  SFP 0.057 0.049 0.048 1.175 .120 
SRE  SFP 0.127 0.124 0.089 1.431 .076* 
SCDR  SFP 0.014 0.025 0.027 0.532 .298 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
    *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
  **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
4.3.3.1.3 Determining the predictive validity.  Blindfolding was performed to 
assess the predictive validity of Structural Model 4 for the endogenous term superior firm 
profitability.  The omission distance was again set at seven, and changes in abnormal 
return on sales for all three matching groups were used as reflective indicators of superior 
operating efficiency.  As shown in Table 22, the results indicate that the model has 




redundancies for the reflective indicators were also positive with Q2 values of .145 for PI 
matching group, .238 for the MPI group, and .249 for the MPIS matching group results.  
The results were positive for the construct as well as for each matching group, suggesting 
that the model adequately predicts superior firm profitability.     
Table 22: Predictive Validity of Structural Model 4  
 
SSO SSE 
Q²                    
(1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-Validated Redundancy  
SFP 288.000 227.385 .210 
Indicator Cross-Validated Redundancy  
AbROS MPIS Matching Group 96.000 72.114 .249 
AbROS MPI Matching Group 96.000 73.150 .238 
AbROS PI Matching Group 96.000 82.121 .145 
Where SSO = Sum of Squared Observations, SSE = Sum of Squared Prediction Errors, 
SFP = Superior Firm Profitability and AbROS = Abnormal Return on Sales 
 
4.3.3.2 Structural Model 5 - interactions with product innovativeness 
4.3.3.2.1 Estimating Model 5.  Building upon the previous model, Structural 
Model 5 uses path modeling to determine if the relationships between the independent 
variables and superior firm profitability are contingent upon the innovativeness of the 
product being manufactured.  Moderation was tested by using PLS-SEM to estimate the 
variance in superior firm profitability  explained by interactions between product 
innovativeness and the other exogenous variables (Hair et al., 2016).  Moderating effects 
were examined using the four latent interaction variables that were created in Structural 
Model 2.  The PLS algorithm was then employed to estimate the structural path between 
each interaction variable and the endogenous term superior operating efficiency, followed 




The PLS algorithm was used to estimate the structural paths and changes in R2, 
while bootstrapping was performed to determine the statistical significance of the 
moderating effects. Since quality measures were not needed for this initial assessment, 
basic bootstrapping was performed using 5,000 subsamples with one-tailed test results.    
Results of this initial assessment indicate that only one of the four proposed 
moderating effects of product innovativeness are significant.  The interaction between 
product innovativeness and total logistics costs produced the only significant effect, 
increasing the explained variance in superior firm profitability from .340 in Structural 
Model 4 to .440.  Thus, the moderating effect of product innovativeness on total logistics 
costs is positive and significant (β=.306, p=.005), explaining an additional 10.0% of the 
variance in superior firm profitability. 
The interaction between product innovativeness and factor market rivalry was not 
significant (β=-.036, p=.406, f2=.001), and had no effect on the R2 of superior firm 
performance. Thus, the moderating effect of product innovativeness on factor market 
rivalry was not included in the model.  The interaction between product innovativeness 
and strategic risk had no significant effect on superior firm performance (β=-.122, 
p=.249, f2=.011).  Likewise, the interaction between product innovativeness and supply 
chain disruption risk was not found to be a significant predictor of superior firm 
performance (β=-.124, p=.216, f2=.015).  Neither of these interaction variables increased 
the explained variance of superior operating efficiency when added to the structural 
model.  Thus, both terms were excluded from the structural equation, leaving only one 
moderating effects to be examined in Structural Model 5.  The path coefficients and p-




Figure 9: Path Coefficients and p-Values for Structural Model 5 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
Structural Model 5 uses PLS-SEM to estimate the moderating effect of product 
innovativeness on total logistics costs for the endogenous term superior firm profitability.  
The PLS algorithm was used to estimate path coefficients, effect sizes, and the coefficient 
of determination of superior firm profitability.  Pairwise deletion was selected as the 
treatment for missing values, and all calculations were performed using the path 
weighting scheme and initial values of one.  Using a stopping criterion of seven, the 
model converged on the second iteration.   
Structural Model 5 uses the same exogenous constructs and measures as 




the discriminate validity of the model for the endogenous term superior firm profitability.  
The HTMT ratio and inner VIF values are used to assess discriminant validity and 
collinearity for Structural Model 5 with results provided in Table 23.  All HTMT values 
were below .85, indicating that discriminant validity was achieved.  Multicollinearity did 
not appear to be a significant issue as all inner VIF numbers were below the critical 
threshold of five.   
Table 23: Measures of Discriminant Validity and Collinearity of Structural Model 5  
Item Inner VIF Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) 
 SFP FMR ORV PI PI x TLC SCDR SRE SFP 
Control 1.141        
FMR 3.849        
ORV 1.210 0.047       
PI 1.750 0.050 0.160      
PI x TLC 1.682 0.121 0.079 0.598     
SCDR 1.486 0.093 0.242 0.084 0.123    
SRE 4.344 0.832 0.030 0.021 0.156 0.077   
SFP - 0.099 0.144 0.253 0.441 0.115 0.226  
TLC 1.856 0.076 0.206 0.278 0.062 0.508 0.328 0.011 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
4.3.3.2.2 Assessing the results.  To assess the quality of Structural Model 5, 
complete bootstrapping was performed to calculate the statistical significance of the path 
coefficients in the inner model, the calculated effect sizes of the exogenous terms, and the 
coefficient of determination for the superior firm profitability.  Of particular concern to 
this model is the significance and effect sizes of the moderating effect as well as the 
additional variance explained by moderation.  Complete bootstrapping was conducted by 
selecting 5,000 subsamples and allowing item-level sign changes.  Since positive 




accelerated confidence intervals and normalized data distribution.  Results of complete 
bootstrapping for Structural Model 5 are presented in Table 24.   
The coefficient of determination is the first measure used to assess the quality of 
Structural Model 5.  Results in Table 24 indicate that Structural Model 5 explains 44.0% 
of the variance in superior firm profitability, with R2 of .440 (p=.001) and adjusted R2 of 
.389 (p=.005).  Thus, Structural Model 5 explains more variance in superior firm 
profitability and has more statistical power than Structural Model 4, which explained 
34.0% of the variance in superior firm profitability, with R2 of .340 (p=.009) and adjusted 
R2 of .288 (p=.031).   Hence, Structural Model 5 is a better predictor of superior firm 
profitability, suggesting that product innovativeness is a significant moderator of total 
logistics costs.    
Next, the path coefficients of the moderating effects must be evaluated along with 
the calculated effect sizes of the latent interaction terms (Hair et al., 2017).  Results in 
Table 24 show that the interaction between product innovativeness and total logistics 
costs has positive and significant effect on superior firm profitability (β=.306, p=.005, 
f2=.178).  The moderating effect also produces the largest calculated effect size in the 
model for superior firm profitability, providing support for Hypothesis 6b.  Interactions 
with factor market rivalry, strategic risk exposure, and supply chain disruption risk were 
excluded from the structural equation, offering no support for Hypothesis 5b, Hypothesis 




















Explained Variance (R2) for Endogenous Variable Superior Firm Profitability 
R2 0.440 0.546 0.139 3.155 .001*** 
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.504 0.152 2.552 .005*** 
Statistical Significance of Path Coefficients (β) 
Control Factors  SFP -0.403 -0.473 0.179 2.257 .012** 
PI  SFP -0.053 -0.080 0.066 0.804 .211 
ORV  SFP -0.081 -0.107 0.079 1.022 .154 
FMR  SFP 0.357 0.302 0.156 2.290 .011** 
TLC  SFP 0.251 0.197 0.112 2.246 .012** 
SRE  SFP -0.535 -0.450 0.188 2.844 .002*** 
SCDR  SFP -0.043 -0.075 0.057 0.765 .222 
PI x TLC  SFP 0.306 0.266 0.119 2.563 .005*** 
Calculated Effect Size (f2) of Variables for Specified Paths  
Control Factors  SFP 0.254 0.548 0.530 0.479 .316 
PI  SFP 0.003 0.012 0.017 0.165 .435 
ORV  SFP 0.010 0.031 0.042 0.230 .409 
FMR  SFP 0.059 0.063 0.057 1.046 .148 
TLC  SFP 0.060 0.056 0.056 1.079 .140 
SRE  SFP 0.118 0.121 0.093 1.261 .104 
SCDR  SFP 0.002 0.013 0.018 0.129 .449 
PI x TLC  SFP 0.178 0.156 0.130 1.367 .086* 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
4.3.3.2.3 Determining the predictive validity.  Blindfolding was performed to 
assess the predictive validity of Structural Model 5 for the endogenous term superior firm 
profitability.  The omission distance was again set at seven, and changes in abnormal 
return on sales for all three matching groups were used as reflective indicators of superior 




predictive relevance with Q2 of .301 for the endogenous variable.  The cross-validated 
redundancies for the reflective indicators were also positive with Q2 values of .179 for PI 
matching group, .361 for the MPI group, and .362 for the MPIS matching group results.  
The results were positive for the construct as well as for each matching group, suggesting 
that the model adequately predicts superior firm profitability.   
Table 25: Predictive Validity of Structural Model 5  
 
SSO SSE 
Q²                    
(1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-Validated Redundancy  
SFP 288.000 201.453 .301 
Indicator Cross-Validated Redundancy  
AbROS MPIS Matching Group 96.000 61.226 .362 
AbROS MPI Matching Group 96.000 61.379 .361 
AbROS PI Matching Group 96.000 78.878 .179 
Where SSO = Sum of Squared Observations, SSE = Sum of Squared Prediction Errors, 
SFP = Superior Firm Profitability and AbROS = Abnormal Return on Sales 
 
4.3.3.3 Structural Model 6 - moderating effect of offshore relationship value.  
4.3.3.3.1 Estimating the model.  Structural Model 6 exists to determine if direct 
effects of superior firm profitability are contingent upon the value of offshore 
relationships for the reshoring firms (Hair et al., 2016).  This model uses the exogenous 
measures and structural paths from Structural Model 3 to determine the explained 
variance for the endogenous variable superior firm performance.  Moderation was tested 
using the same four latent interaction variables from Structural Equation 3 to capture the 
moderating effects of offshore relationship value on each of the four independent 




The PLS algorithm was employed to estimate the moderating effects and changes 
in explained variance for superior firm profitability.  To determine which interaction 
terms to include in the model, path modeling was performed separately for each 
interaction variable to identify the change in explained variance attributable to each 
moderating effect.  Different combinations of moderating effects were also examined to 
identify the structural equation that maximizes explained variance in superior firm 
profitability.  Bootstrapping was utilized to identify the interaction variables to include in 
Structural Model 6.  For simplicity, basic bootstrapping was performed using 5,000 
subsamples with one-tailed test results.    
Results of this initial assessment indicate that three of the four proposed 
moderating effects explain additional variance in superior operating efficiency.  Total 
logistics cost was the only independent variable in Structural Model 6 virtually 
unaffected by the variance in offshore relationship value.  The interaction between total 
logistics costs and offshore relationship value was not a significant predictor of superior 
operating efficiency (β = -.021, p = .380, f2=.002), and the interaction had no effect on 
the R2 for superior firm profitability.  Thus, the latent interaction variable was excluded 
from the structural equation, summarily rejecting Hypothesis 9b. The other three 
interactions were significant and increased the explained variance in the endogenous 
term.   
The interaction between offshore relationship value and supply chain disruption 
risk produces the smallest moderating effect in the model (β =-.149, p =.054, f2=.023), 
yet the interaction is significant.  The addition of this latent interaction term explains an 




from .340 to .355.  Next, interaction between offshore relationship value and strategic 
risk exposure was significant (β =.195, p =.056, f2=.051), explaining roughly 3.1% of the 
variance in superior operating efficiency.  The inclusion of the interaction between 
offshore relationship value and strategic risk exposure increased R2 from .355 to .386 for 
superior firm profitability.  Finally, the interaction between offshore relationship value 
and factor market rivalry was significant (β=-.528, p=.024, f2=.090), with the greatest 
effect on the endogenous term.  The addition of this moderating effect increased the value 
of R2 from .386 to .437, explaining an additional 4.1% of the variance in superior firm 
performance.  Thus, Structural Model 6 includes the endogenous variables from 
Structural Model 4 plus three latent variables used to calculate the moderating effect of 
offshore relationship value on factor market rivalry, strategic risk exposure, and supply 
chain disruption risk for the endogenous term superior operating efficiency.  The path 




Figure 10: Path Coefficients and p-Values for Structural Model 6 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
4.3.3.3.2 Assessing the results.  Structural Model 6 uses the same exogenous 
constructs and structural paths as Structural Model 3 to estimate the path coefficients and 
explained variance for the endogenous term superior firm profitability.  Therefore, the 
same statistical tests and techniques are also used to assess model and measurement 
quality.  As previously mentioned, traditional measures of internal consistency and 
construct validity are invalid for latent interaction variables and single-item constructs.  
Thus, the HTMT ratio and inner VIF values are used to assess discriminant validity and 
collinearity for Structural Model 6 with results provided in Table 26.  All HTMT values 




numbers were below the critical threshold of five, suggesting that multicollinearity was 
not factor in the results.   




Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) 








x SRE PI SCDR SRE SFP 
Control 1.165          
FMR 4.018          
ORV 1.653 0.047         
ORV x FMR 4.395 0.011 0.266        
ORV x SCDR 1.507 0.260 0.165 0.090       
ORV x SRE 4.232 0.062 0.000 0.806 0.240      
PI 1.162 0.050 0.160 0.148 0.043 0.076     
SCDR 1.730 0.093 0.242 0.268 0.267 0.083 0.084    
SRE 4.433 0.099 0.144 0.097 0.093 0.162 0.253 0.115   
SFP - 0.832 0.030 0.087 0.191 0.000 0.021 0.077 0.226  
TLC 1.937 0.076 0.206 0.183 0.060 0.101 0.278 0.508 0.011 0.328 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
Complete bootstrapping was performed to calculate the statistical significance of 
the path coefficients in the inner model, the calculated effect sizes of the exogenous 
terms, and the coefficient of determination for superior firm profitability.  Structural 
Model 6 primarily focuses on the significance and effect sizes of the latent interaction 
variables that represent the three moderating effects as well as the additional variance 
explained by moderation.  Complete bootstrapping was conducted using 5,000 
subsamples and allowing item-level sign changes.  Since negative moderation was 
hypothesized, one-tailed results were returned with bias corrected and accelerated 
confidence intervals and normalized data distribution.  Results of complete bootstrapping 



















Explained Variance (R2) for Endogenous Variable Superior Operating Efficiency 
R2 0.437 0.564 0.126 3.470 .000*** 
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.513 0.141 2.634 .004*** 
Statistical Significance of Path Coefficients (β) 
Control Factors  SFP -0.362 -0.439 0.161 2.252 .012** 
PI  SFP 0.182 0.197 0.140 1.306 .096* 
ORV  SFP -0.268 -0.226 0.165 1.618 .053* 
FMR  SFP 0.291 0.266 0.170 1.707 .044** 
TLC  SFP 0.256 0.191 0.110 2.320 .010*** 
SRE  SFP -0.637 -0.531 0.204 3.126 .001*** 
SCDR  SFP -0.080 -0.109 0.079 1.015 .155 
ORV x FMR  SFP -0.528 -0.417 0.268 1.971 .024** 
ORV x SRE  SFP 0.025 0.021 0.012 2.135 .016** 
ORV x SCDR  SFP -0.294 -0.255 0.141 2.094 .018** 
Calculated Effect Size (f2) of Variables for Specified Paths 
Control Factors  SFP 0.199 0.403 0.342 0.584 .280 
PI  SFP 0.051 0.107 0.135 0.377 .353 
ORV  SFP 0.077 0.093 0.124 0.622 .267 
FMR  SFP 0.037 0.051 0.059 0.635 .263 
TLC  SFP 0.060 0.052 0.054 1.102 .135 
SRE  SFP 0.162 0.157 0.112 1.446 .074* 
SCDR  SFP 0.007 0.021 0.028 0.237 .406 
ORV x FMR  SFP 0.090 0.089 0.103 0.877 .190 
ORV x SRE  SFP 0.143 0.153 0.167 0.856 .196 
ORV x SCDR  SFP 0.086 0.095 0.089 0.970 .166 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = Superior Firm Profitability. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
The coefficient of determination is the first measure used to assess the quality of 




of the variance in superior firm profitability, with R2 of .437 (p<.000) and adjusted R2 of 
.370 (p=.004).  Thus, Structural Model 6 explains more variance in superior firm 
profitability and has more statistical power than Structural Model 4, which explained 
34.0% of the variance in superior firm profitability with R2 of .340 (p=.013) and adjusted 
R2 of .288 (p=.031).   Hence, Structural Model 6 is a better predictor of superior firm 
profitability, suggesting that the effects of factor market value, strategic risk exposure, 
and supply chain disruption risk on superior firm profitability are contingent upon 
offshore relationship value.  
Next, the path coefficients of the moderating effects as well as the calculated 
effect sizes of the latent interaction terms must be evaluated (Hair et al., 2016).  Results 
in Table 27 show that each of the three moderating effects for Structural Model 6 are 
statistically significant.  However, two of the interactions are products of exogenous 
terms with unexpected valences, and the moderating effect of offshore relationship and 
strategic risk exposure is in the wrong direction.  Thus, the magnitude, direction, and 
statistical significance of the interaction terms must all be assessed to provide empirical 
support for moderation (Chin et al., 2003).   
First, the interaction between offshore relationship value and factor market rivalry 
has a significant and negative effect on superior firm profitability (β=-.528, p=.024, 
f2=.090).  Negative moderation was hypothesized, while the calculated effect size of .096 
suggests that the interaction is responsible for much of the increase in explained variance.  
Thus, Hypothesis 9b is supported.  No interaction was found between total logistics costs 
and offshore relationship value. Therefore, the latent interaction term was excluded from 




The interaction between offshore relationship value and strategic risk exposure 
also significantly impacts superior operating efficiency (β=.025, p=.016, f2=.143). 
However, the effect of the interaction is positive when negative moderation was 
proposed.  From a quantitative perspective, the interaction does weaken the relationship 
between strategic risk exposure and superior operating performance, thereby supporting 
Hypothesis 11b.  However, no argument has been made in this dissertation to support an 
increase in domestic efficiency as offshore relationships strengthen.  The direct 
relationship was not affected by the inclusion of the moderating effect, as the simple 
effect of strategic risk exposure was also negative.  Thus, no practical or theoretical 
justification exists to support the hypothesis without further analysis.   
The final hypothesized moderating effect in this model concerns the moderation 
of supply chain disruption risk by offshore relationship value.  This interaction had a 
small, yet significant negative effect on superior firm performance (β=-.294, p=.018, 
f2=.086).  The calculated effect size and p-value of the moderating effect were both 
sufficient, and path coefficient is negative, as hypothesized.  However, the expected 
valence for supply chain disruption risk was not as expected.  Therefore, the moderating 
effect actually strengthens the relationship between supply chain disruption risk and 
superior operating performance as the slope becomes steeper and inverted.  Thus, this 
study offers no support for Hypothesis 12a.  
4.3.3.3.3 Determining the predictive validity.  Blindfolding was performed to 
assess the predictive validity of Structural Model 6 for the endogenous term superior firm 
profitability.  The omission distance was set at seven, and changes in abnormal return on 




operating efficiency.  As shown in Table 28, the results indicate that the model has 
predictive relevance with Q2 of .274 for the endogenous variable.  The cross-validated 
redundancies for the reflective indicators were also positive with Q2 values of .196 for PI 
matching group, .309 for the MPI group, and .317 for the MPIS matching group results.  
The results were positive for the construct as well as for each matching group, suggesting 
that the model adequately predicts superior firm profitability.  
Table 28: Predictive Validity of Structural Model 6  
 
SSO SSE 
Q²                    
(1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-Validated Redundancy  
SFP 288.000 209.079 .274 
Indicator Cross-Validated Redundancy  
AbROS MPIS Matching Group 96.000 65.521 .317 
AbROS MPI Matching Group 96.000 66.356 .309 
AbROS PI Matching Group 96.000 77.202 .196 
Where SSO = Sum of Squared Observations, SSE = Sum of Squared Prediction Errors, 





















4.3.4 Summary of Results 
Table 29: Summary of Hypothesized Relationships and Quantitative Results 
 Path Dir Resultsa Conclusion 
H1a FMR  SOE (+) β = .337, p = .033 Supported  
H1b FMR  SFP (+) β = .366, p = .010 Supported 
H2a TLC   SOE (+) β = .228, p = .022 Supported  
H2b TLC   SFP (+) β = .263, p = .009 Supported 
H3a SRE  SOE (+) β = -.472, p = .017 Not Supported 
H3b SRE  SFP (+) β = -.600, p = .001 Not Supported 
H4a SCDR  SOE (+) β = -.136, p = .033 Not Supported 
H4b SCDR  SFP (+) β = -.117, p = .052 Not Supported 
H5a PI*FMR  SOE (+) β = .170, p = .070; Sig. at p <.1 
Marginal 
Support 
H5b PI*FMR  SFP (+) β = -.036, p = .406 Not Supported 
H6a PI*TLC  SOE (+) β = .224, p = .017  Supported 
H6b PI*TLC  SFP (+) β = .306, p = .005 Supported 
H7a PI*SRE  SOE (+) β = -.044, p = .368 Not Supported 
H7b PI*SRE  SFP (+) β = -.122, p = .249 Not Supported 
H8a PI*SCDR  SOE (+) β = -.031, p = .396 Not Supported 
H8b PI*SCDR  SFP (+) β = -.124, p = .216 Not Supported 
H9a ORV*FMR  SOE (-) β = -.602, p = .012 Supported 
H9b ORV*FMR  SFP (-) β = -.528, p = .024 Supported 
H10a ORV*TLC  SOE (-) β = .031, p = .339 Not Supported 
H10b ORV*TLC  SFP (-) β = .045, p = .359 Not Supported 
H11a ORV*SRE  SOE (-) β = .025, p = .009 Indeterminate 
H11b ORV*SRE  SFP (-) β = .025, p = .016 Indeterminate 
H12a ORV*SCDR  SOE (-) β = -.173, p = .054 Indeterminate 
H12b ORV*SCDR  SFP (-) β = -.294, p = .018 Indeterminate 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic 
Risk Exposure, SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, 
ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, SOE = Superior Operating Efficiency, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
a Path coefficients and p-values (β, p) derived from partial least squares structural 










CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
The final chapter of this dissertation serves to discuss and explain the results of 
the empirical analyses and to use the information presented in the first three chapters to 
derive insights that may guide business decisions and future academic research.  This 
chapter contains five sections.  The first section provides a detailed analysis of the 
quantitative results relative to the purpose of the dissertation.  Next, the second section 
outlines the academic contributions and managerial implications that may be derived 
from the study.  Third, the limitations of the archival study are presented and potential 
opportunities for future research are proposed.  The final section summarizes the 
dissertation and findings in the concluding remarks.   
5.1 Findings  
5.1.1 Event Study 
The results of the long-run event study offer strong support for the theory that 
American firms can significantly improve performance by relocating manufacturing 
operations from offshore locations to the United States.  Changes in abnormal returns 
were positive and statistically significant across all three matching groups for each 
multiple-year period following a reshoring event.  This was in stark contrast to the 
negative changes in abnormal returns in the years leading up to reshoring.  The changes 
in abnormal ROA were more powerful in all aspects than were the changes in abnormal 
ROS.  However, results were similar for both changes in abnormal ROA and changes in 




Similar patterns appear over the same time periods in all groups for both 
measures.  The strongest single-year change occurs during the year of reshoring.  The 
median change in Abnormal ROA from year -1 to year was +0 .59%, compared to the 
MPIS group.  The median change in ROS over the first year was .41%, relative to the 
MPIS group.  Changes in abnormal returns steadily declined for both groups over the 
three-year period after reshoring.  These changes must not be viewed as lost momentum, 
though.  This study considers changes in abnormal returns rather than actual abnormal 
returns, therefore these gains are cumulative.  In reality, abnormal ROA and abnormal 
ROS are both increasing at a decreasing rate in the three years following reshoring, which 
should provide a first-movers benefit that might create sustainable competitive 
advantages.  Allowing the growth to pool over time shows that cumulative abnormal 
changes over the three-year period were +1.33% for ROA and 0.96% for ROS, relative to 
the MPIS matching group.   
5.1.2 Path Modeling and Sensitivity Analysis 
To determine the most significant predictors of these gains, second generation 
structural equations modeling was used to estimate the structural path of the proposed 
conceptual framework.  The results of path modeling using PLS-SEM provided many 
interesting details about the reshoring decisions.  As with the event study results, path 
analysis provided similar estimates for changes in ROA and changes in ROS.  All path 
coefficient valences were the same for all models, while most variables have similar 
effect sizes across all models.  Results are also similar for the additional measures and 
technique which are appended to the dissertation, offering further evidence that the 




Both economic drivers of reshoring performed as expected.  Results were positive 
and significant for both factor market rivalry and total logistics costs.  This indicates the 
actual cost of ownership for goods produced offshore is much higher than the planned 
purchase price. The proposed interactions between product innovativeness and total 
logistics costs were supported.  Product innovativeness also increased the effect of factor 
market rivalry, but to a much smaller degree.  As expected, offshore relationship value 
was also found to attenuate the effect of factor market rivalry on foreign production costs, 
although no such effect was supported for total logistics costs.   
Although the economic variables mainly produced expected results, neither none 
of the hypothesized relationships involving the risk variables were supported.  Both 
strategic risk exposure and supply chain disruption risk were significant, but in the 
opposite direction.  While it seems counterintuitive that increasing the level of long-term 
risk would increase firm performance, the cost of decreasing such risk could possibly 
outweigh the returns.  While natural disasters and resource shortages have a huge impact 
on global firms, research indicates that these type threats are still viewed as truly random 
events (Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013; Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  Thus, the reshoring 
decision would mainly depend of the risk aversion of the firm executives.  Truly random 
events only become stochastic with increasing occurrences over a long enough timeline.  
Therefore, three years is quite possibly not long enough to capture the true outcomes 
relative to the entire industry.    
Also possible is the fact that financial losses might be economic gains in many 
situations. For instance, many reshoring companies had a business model of performing 




economies (Moser, 2011; Pisano & Shih, 2012).  Faced with counterfeiting, quality 
problems, or potential militant behavior, relocation to high-cost economies was necessary 
albeit costly.  For these type firms, reshoring decisions could have been based on threats 
to longevity, thus the costs involved in reshoring may also be categorized as necessary 
expenditures (Platts & Song, 2010; N. Song et al., 2007).  
A third possible explanation for the conflicting results emerges from the inability 
to obtain subjective reasons for reshoring using archival data.  Many companies in this 
sample, as well as in the population, suffered substantial losses in offshore markets 
before moving production to the United States.  For instance, The Boeing Company 
suffered huge losses due to problems before large portions of manufacturing were moved 
to North America (Denning, 2013a, 2013b).  Since these losses cannot be recouped, the 
financial impact negatively affects accounting-based performance measures for many 
years (Ellram, Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013; Ellram, Tate, & Petersen, 2013; Tate, 2014; Tate 
et al., 2014).  To provide a better understanding of these results, future studies should 
also distinguish between reshoring decisions made in anticipation of threats and those 
made in reaction to realized occurrences.   
5.2 Academic Contributions and Managerial Implications  
Although several of the proposed relationships in this study were not supported, 
the dissertation still contributes to the existing global supply chain management literature 
in many ways.  Perhaps the most important contribution is the fact that this is the first 
study to date empirically linking reshoring to firm performance.  In this way, the study 
provides evidence that reshoring is profitable in many situations.  By finding strong 




work based subjective survey responses (Ellram, Tate, & Feitzinger, 2013; Ellram, Tate, 
& Petersen, 2013; Tate, 2014; Tate et al., 2014).  
This dissertation also creates and empirically tests a conceptual framework for 
future manufacturing location decisions.  The path modeling used in the sensitivity 
analysis demonstrates that the structural models explain a significant portion of the 
variance in the superior operating efficiency and superior firm profitability that lead to 
reshoring success.  By using many of the same drivers of reshoring, the path analysis also 
serves to strengthen and extend the work current archival research existing in the 
literature (Ancarani et al., 2015; Fratocchi et al., 2014; Kinkel, 2014; Kinkel & Maloca, 
2009).    
5.2 Managerial Implications 
This study has immediate practical implications, especially considering the 
potential benefits to be gained while taking into account the number of American firms 
currently producing in offshore markets.  With the median change in abnormal ROA of 
1.33% over three years, many firms should reconsider the total cost of producing 
offshore.  To provide perspective, the median value of total assets for the sample firms in 
the study was $8,782.1M for sample firms in 2011.  Thus, a +1.33% change in abnormal 
ROA equates to a $116.80M increase in operating income compared to the rest of the 
industry over the three-year period.  Median operating income for sample firms in 2011 
was $670.15M, equating to $2010.45M over the same three-year period.  Thus, 
“Fictitious Median Company” could have reshored in 2011 and outperformed its industry 




fictitious company would have achieved these gains all why shouldering the costs of 
transferring production across the globe.   
However, care must be taken when interpreting these results.  It would be foolish 
to assume that every firm currently producing overseas will immediately benefit from 
reshoring.  In fact, many multi-nationals have experience in offshore markets, are highly 
successful globally, and have no intention of transferring production to high-cost 
economies.  While every possible measure was taken to control for selection bias, 
specialized studies such as this one require researchers to assess the results within the 
parameters of the targeted sample.   
In this study, the majority of firms studied had already made detailed assessments 
and came to the conclusion that they would indeed be successful in North America.  
These results cannot be generalized across all American firms producing products abroad, 
as the study provides confirmation that firms expecting to be successful in reshoring 
actually did succeed.  The study results are still quite useful, though.  Survey data from 
Boston Consulting Group and the Reshoring Institute find that nearly half of all firms 
producing in China are considering exiting the country.  More importantly, initial 
assessments indicate that at least 25% of firms manufacturing abroad would be more 
successful with American production.  Thus, the path modeling results should also prove 
useful to those making reshoring decisions.   
Firms most likely to immediately benefit are those with long costly supply chains.  
When all factors were considered, global logistics costs served as the strongest predictor 
of reshoring success.  This is especially true for highly technical or innovative products. 




due to end of season sell-offs.  Shorter transit time and closer echelons of research and 
production also allows for quicker updates and product changes.  Proximity to suppliers, 
and more importantly, to market reduces lead time also provides more flexibility and 
customer responsiveness.   
Firms facing higher production costs in offshore markets are also more likely to 
see successful reshoring outcomes.  This type inflation results from increasing labor 
costs, increasing energy costs, natural resource availability, and even currency exchange 
rates between countries.  With so many avenues for cost increases, factor market rivalry 
may go unnoticed until a detailed analysis of global procurement procedures is 
conducted.  Also relevant is the finding that offshore relationship value greatly reduces 
the effect of factor market rivalry.  Thus, firms with vast experience producing and 
selling in overseas markets might gain little by reshoring, while firms who ultimately 
over-extended by trying to compete abroad might easily reverse the negative effects by 
reshoring.  At this time, this research cannot provide a definitive guide to decisions from 
a strategic standpoint, though.  With unexpected results from both long-term variables, 
further research is needed to provide viable insights regarding risks and rewards 
involving strategic resources.  
5.3 Limitations 
As with all empirical research, this dissertation is subject to several limitations.  
Quite a few limitations result from the recency and immediacy of the reshoring 
phenomenon.  Access to decision makers was also a great concern when designing the 
study.  Because of these issues, the study was conducted using archival data, which 




sample size and a smaller ranger of years to examine.  Due to the limited size and scope 
of the target sample, single-item measures were used in the regression analysis.  While 
additional measurements were also presented, proxy variables always increase the risk of 
measurement error. Although the longitudinal research design helps to limit these 
shortcomings and offers more predictive capability, the limited range of focus coupled 
with the potential for measurement error must still be considered.     
Selection bias due to secondary data limited to publically traded companies.  
While quantitative models can effectively control for the influence of large firms, the 
impact that reshoring decisions on smaller, privately owned firms might not be accurately 
represented in this sample.  Another source of potential bias of secondary research could 
be in the inability to conclude with certainty that control firms have not reshored or 
transplanted considerable portions of operations.  While it is easy to search company 
histories, 10-K reports, and press releases, to determine if factories have opened or 
closed, there is no way to determine how much upstream purchasing might have been 
transferred to or from the U.S.  However, any bias of this type would actually make the 
estimates more conservative.   
Given the limitations involved in the current research and the wide-reaching 
implications of the study topic, many opportunities for future research exist.  As the 
number of reshoring firms continues to grow, quantitative analysis using survey data 
should prove to be more insightful. The use of carefully designed questionnaires provides 
researchers the ability to derive specific answers that cannot be determined with archival 
data.  This type of research will provide the ability to determine how the position within 




procurement for retail and other distribution channels should also be considered. Most of 
these factors cannot be found consistently in public financial statements.  
Even if subjective data becomes viable means of research, archival studies should 
not be abandoned.  The need still exists for archival and qualitative analysis in the 
literature.  For instance, this study could easily be broadened to include nearshoring as a 
preferred sourcing method.  Given the narrow window of focus for this study, a 
replication would prove fruitful in two to four years.  This would provide much better 
insights into the long-term effects of reshoring.  It would also allow for a bigger sample 
size and broader range of years.   
Opportunities also exist for research relative to public policy.  With current calls 
for research on anti-consumption, reshoring should be a primary topic of interest for 
environmental sustainability.  As reshoring creates shorter supply chains, the resultant 
production process should be leaner, involving much less wasteful production.  Recent 
growth in closeout stores and discount chains relative to traditional retail chains should 
serve as a bellwether to indicate the overproduction caused by global outsourcing.  
Although slow-steaming dramatically reduces nautical emissions, marine pollution is still 
a serious concern considering the amount of ocean-borne traffic created by global 
outsourcing.  Finally, environmental regulations are more stringent in high-cost 
economies.  Thus, reshoring from emerging countries helps to ensure that pollution is 
prevented while global resources are better preserved.  
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
This study began with the purpose of developing a conceptual framework to 




derived from reshoring, and any firm-facing or market-facing situations that might 
accelerate or attenuate success in reshoring.  However, no conceptualization could be 
empirically tested without first determining the economic benefits of reshoring.  To 
accomplish both tasks, an event study was conducted to isolate economic gains and losses 
attributable to reshoring, followed by second generation structural equation modeling 
utilized to determine the factors affecting the outcome of reshoring.   
The results of the long-run event study offer strong support for the theory that 
American firms can significantly improve performance by relocating manufacturing 
operations from offshore locations to the United States.  Of the 96 firms sampled in this 
study, 62% showed immediate positive changes in economic returns, with a median 
increase in ROA of .5% in the first year relative to industry control groups.  Industry-
controlled ROA continued to increase at a decreasing rate for all years included in this 
study, with two-thirds of the sample firms showing positive changes in economic returns 
in the three-year period following reshoring.  These changes in economic returns are year 
over year improvements, and therefore represent cumulative gains.  Thus, the benefits of 
reshoring appear to be sustainable for mid- and long-range strategic planning.  
The proposed conceptual framework also proved beneficial, although additional 
research will be required to produce more detailed information.  Path modeling results 
suggest that both economic drivers are reliable predictors of reshoring success.  At the 
macro level, increasing factor market rivalry for the previous country of origin and higher 
total logistics costs prior to reshoring led to greater abnormal returns after the reshoring. 
Both were significant and positive in models, however the magnitude of the effect was 




markets.  Product innovativeness significantly increases the effect of total logistics costs, 
while offshore relationship value significantly reduces the impact of factor market rivalry 
in foreign markets.   Both strategic drivers of reshoring, however, produced conflicting 
results.  Both were significant, yet in the opposite direction.  Thus, further research is 
needed to draw insights on the causal relationship.   
The rigor involved in conducting an event study includes a strong qualitative 
element in case selection, a rigorous financial approach to industrial matching, as well as 
an objective quantitative data analysis.  Thus, this dissertation is one of the earliest 
empirical papers on reshoring in the United States, and possibly the first to empirically 
link reshoring to any form of financial measure of firm performance.   Considering the 
immediacy of the reshoring phenomenon, insights drawn from these results are directly 
applicable to current global supply chain decisions, but also serve as a springboard to 
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APPENDIX A – SUPERIOR OPERATING EFFICIENCY MPI MATCHING GROUP 
A.1 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 1 
Figure 11: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 1 for MPI Matching Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 12: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 1 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
A.2 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 2 
Figure 13: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 2 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Figure 14: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 2 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




A.3 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 3  
Figure 15: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 3 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 16: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 3 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 











APPENDIX B – SUPERIOR OPERATING EFFICIENCY RELATIVE TO PI GROUP 
B.1 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 1 
Figure 17: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 1 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 







Figure 18: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 1 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
B.2 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 2 
Figure 19: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 2 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Figure 20: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 2 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
B.3 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 3 
Figure 21: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 3 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Figure 22: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 3 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 











APPENDIX C – SUPERIOR FIRM PROFITABILITY RELATIVE TO MPI GROUP 
C.1 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 4 
Figure 23: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 4 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 24: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 4 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
C.2 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 5 
Figure 25: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 5 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Figure 26: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 5 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
C.3 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 3 
Figure 27: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 6 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 28: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 6 for MPI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 












APPENDIX D – SUPERIOR FIRM PROFITABILITY RELATIVE TO PI GROUP 
D.1 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 4 
Figure 29: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 4 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 30: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 4 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
D.2 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 5 
Figure 31: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 5 for PI Group 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 32: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 5 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
D.3 Path Modeling and Bootstrapping for Structural Model 6 
Figure 33: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 6 for PI Group 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 34: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 6 for PI Group 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 











APPENDIX E – ALTERNATIVE ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE 
E.1 Superior Operating Efficiency Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression 
Table 30: Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Results  
Superior 
Operating 
Efficiency       
MPIS            
n = 96 
Model 1: Control Model 2: Direct Model 3: Moderation 
Std.β t Sig. Std.β t Sig. Std.β t Sig. 
          
Constant .044 1.854 .067* -.078 -1.237 .220 -.754 -2.377 .020** 
Ln(TEV)Y0 -.118 -1.046 .299 -.100 -.871 .387 -.067 -.600 .550 
PPP -.230 -2.127 .036** -.186 -1.714 .091* -.191 -1.808 .075* 
NPP -.053 -.487 .627 -.083 -.747 .457 -.055 -.498 .620 
CapEx%Y0 -.103 -.530 .597 -.166 -.866 .389 -.238 -1.289 .201 
CapEx%Y+1 .202 .994 .323 .179 .893 .375 .338 1.726 .089* 
CapEx%Y+2 -.087 -.610 .543 -.087 -.615 .540 -.147 -1.072 .287 
PI .318 2.976 .004*** .259 2.329 .022** -.309 -1.009 .316 
ORV -.040 -.349 .728 -.022 -.191 .849 2.724 2.304 .024** 
FMR    .358 1.723 .089* 1.678 2.630 .010*** 
TLC    .258 1.796 .076* .131 .834 .407 
SRE    -.505 -2.327 .023** -1.738 -3.149 .002*** 
SCDR    -.155 -1.272 .207 -.176 -1.444 .153 
PI x TLC       .653 1.979 .052** 
ORV x FMR       -2.475 -2.218 .030** 
ORV x SRE       1.488 2.489 .015** 
          
          
Model Predictive Capability 
F   2.045   2.027   2.559 
Sig   .051   .033   .004 
R2   .168   .240   .342 
Adjusted R2   . .086   .122   .208 
∆ R2      .072   .101 
Where TEV = Total Enterprise Value, PPP = Prior Positive Performance, NPP = Negative Prior 
Performance, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, FMR = Factor Market 
Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, and SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption 
Risk. 
   *Significance is two-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is two-tailed: p<.05 








E.2 Superior Firm Profitability Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression 
Table 31: Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Results  
Superior Firm 
Profitability       
MPIS            
n = 96 
Model 1: Control Model 2: Direct Model 3: Moderation 
Std.β t Sig. Std.β t Sig. Std.β t Sig. 
          
Constant .159 3.037 .003*** -.172 -1.276 .206 -1.576 -2.356 .021** 
Ln(TEV)Y0 -.247 -2.284 .025** -.211 -1.998 .049** -.211 -2.205 .031** 
PPP -.118 -1.142 .257 -.063 -.632 .529 -.056 -.622 .536* 
NPP -.200 -1.923 .058* -.248 -2.413 .018** -.234 -2.500 .015* 
CapEx%Y0 -.001 -.007 .994 -.068 -.388 .699 -.152 -.962 .339 
CapEx%Y+1 .016 .083 .934 -.009 -.050 .961 .129 .772 .443 
CapEx%Y+2 -.075 -.548 .585 .089 -.681 .498 -.095 -.803 .424 
PI .266 2.608 .011** .192 1.876 .064* -.733 -2.817 .006*** 
ORV -.068 -.615 .540 -.063 -.589 .557 2.587 2.369 .020** 
FMR    .391 2.043 .045** 1.369 2.481 .015* 
TLC    .305 2.301 .024** .027 .202 .841 
SRE    -.648 -3.237 .002** -1.839 -3.741 .000*** 
SCDR    -.140 -1.246 .216 .634 1.835 .071* 
PI x TLC       1.072 3.820 .000*** 
ORV x FMR       -1.988 -2.028 .046** 
ORV x SRE       1.520 2.806 .006*** 
ORV x SCDR        -.878 -2.243 .028** 
          
Model Predictive Capability 
F   3.188   3.519   5.170 
Sig   .003   .000   .000 
R2   .239   .354   .531 
Adjusted R2   .164   .254   .428 
∆ R2      .115   .177 
Where TEV = Total Enterprise Value, PPP = Prior Positive Performance, NPP = Negative Prior 
Performance, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, FMR = Factor Market 
Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, and SCDR = Supply Chain Disruption 
Risk. 
   *Significance is two-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is two-tailed: p<.05 







APPENDIX F – ALTERNATIVE MEASUREMENT ITEMS 
F.1 Multiple Indicator Measurement Items 
F.1.1 Control Index 
Positive Prior Performance in matching year (Y-3) 
Negative Prior Performance in matching year (Y-3) 
Firm Size 
Capital Expenditure Percentage in Reshoring Year (Y0) 
Capital Expenditure Percentage in Y+1 
Capital Expenditure Percentage in Y+2 
 
F.1.2 Product Innovativeness 
Pr_Inv 1 Research and Development Intensity in Y0 
 
F.1.3 Offshore Relationship Value 
ORV 1  Percentage of Revenue from Outside United States 
 
F.1.4 Factor Market Rivalry 
FMR 1  Global Competitive Index Country Scorea* 
FMR 2  Global Competitive Index National Ranka 
FMR 3  Boston Consulting Group Manufacturing Cost-Competitive Indexb 
FMR 4  Boston Consulting Group Manufacturing CCI 10-year Changeb 
 aItem obtained from World Economic Forum Global Competitive Index  




F.1.5 Total Logistics Costs 
TLC 1   Aerial Distance Between Countriesa 
TLC 2   Ocean-borne Transit Time Between Countriesb 
TLC 3   3-Year Change in Bunker Oil Price (Y0 through Y+2)c 
TLC 4  Average Yearly Bunker Oil Price at Y0c 
TLC 5  Logistics Performance Index National Rankd 
TLC 6  Logistics Performance Index Country Scored* 
 a Item obtained from Google Maps 




 c Item obtained from Capital IQ Commodity Index - Fuel Oil 
 d Item obtained from World Bank Data – Logistics Performance Index 
 *Reverse-scored 
 
F.1.6 Strategic Risk Exposurea 
SRE 1  Control of Corruption* 
SRE 2  Regulator Quality* 
SRE 3  Voice and Accountability* 
SRE 4  Political Stability and Absence of Violence* 
SRE 5  Government Effectiveness* 
SRE 6  Rule of Law* 




F.1.7 Supply Chain Disruption Riska 
SCDR 1  Country Risk Score* 
SCDR 2 Country Risk National Rank 
SCDR 3 Economic Disruption Score* 
SCDR 4  Economic Disruption National Rank 
SCDR 5 Supply Chain Disruption Score* 
SCDR 6 Supply Chain Disruption National Rank  
SCDR 7 Resilience Index Global Score* 
SCDR 8 Resilience Index Global Rank 







F.2 Superior Operating Efficiency Relative to MPIS Matching Group 
F.2.1 Structural Model 1 
Figure 35: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 1 with Multi-Item Measures 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
Table 32: Construct Reliability for Model 1 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Composite 




(AVE) P Values 
Control Factors     
FMR 0.726 .000 0.771 .000 
ORV     
PI     
SCDR 0.880 .000 0.567 .000 
Superior Operating Efficiency 1.000  1.000  
SRE 0.982 .000 0.915 .000 
TLC     
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Table 33: Outer Loadings and Weights for Model 1 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Control 




0.984       
FMR_2 
 
0.982       
FMR_3 
 
-0.616       
ORV_1 
 
 1      
Pr_Inv_1 
 
  1     
SCDR_1 
 
   0.851    
SCDR_2 
 
   0.911    
SCDR_3 
 
   0.448    
SCDR_4 
 
   0.485    
SCDR_7 
 
   0.864    
SCDR_8 
 
   0.815    
SRE_1 
 
    0.985   
SRE_2 
 
    0.974   
SRE_3 
 
    0.886   
SRE_4 
 
    0.949   
SRE_5 
 
    0.985   
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 
 
     1  
Outer Weights 
CapEx%Y0 -0.027        
CapEx%Y1 -0.323        
CapEx%Y2 0.339        
Firm Size 0.508        
PriorNegPerf 0.276        
PriorPosPerf 0.644        
TLC_1        0.196 
TLC_2        0.228 
TLC_3        0.882 
TLC_5        -0407 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 



























ORV -> FMR 0.069 0.106 0.070 0.037 0.011 0.176 0.979 .164 
PI -> FMR 0.044 0.097 0.059 0.053 0.003 0.078 0.750 .227 
PI -> ORV 0.160 0.165 0.080 0.005 0.020 0.280 2.008 .022 
SCDR -> FMR 0.894 0.903 0.034 0.010 0.845 0.948 26.221 .000 
SCDR -> ORV 0.144 0.178 0.060 0.033 0.041 0.211 2.420 .008 
SCDR -> PI 0.113 0.149 0.082 0.036 0.035 0.235 1.375 .085 
SOE -> FMR 0.022 0.109 0.071 0.087 0.002 0.021 0.306 .380 
SOE -> ORV 0.023 0.112 0.084 0.089 0.000 0.052 0.277 .391 
SOE -> PI 0.272 0.257 0.150 -0.015 0.032 0.519 1.819 .034 
SOE -> SCDR 0.074 0.131 0.068 0.057 0.013 0.122 1.085 .139 
SRE -> FMR 0.941 0.945 0.036 0.004 0.885 1.000 25.959 .000 
SRE -> ORV 0.039 0.092 0.060 0.053 0.009 0.060 0.653 .257 
SRE -> PI 0.048 0.096 0.057 0.049 0.010 0.069 0.831 .203 
SRE -> SCDR 0.878 0.877 0.036 -0.001 0.801 0.923 24.244 .000 
SRE -> SOE 0.085 0.131 0.080 0.046 0.020 0.204 1.063 .144 
SRE -> SCDR 0.878 0.877 0.036 0.000 0.798 0.923 24.094 .000 
SRE -> SOE 0.085 0.131 0.080 0.046 0.021 0.202 1.068 .143 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 






















Table 35: Measures of Collinearity for Model 1 with Multi-Item Measures 
 Outer VIF  Inner VIF 
CapEx%Y0 3.440 Control FactorsSOE 1.067 
CapEx%Y1 3.885 FMR-->SOE 4.234 
CapEx%Y2 1.966 ORV-->SOE 1.096 
FMR_1 12.771 PI-->SOE 1.067 
FMR_2 12.238 SCDR-->SOE 1.663 
FMR_3 1.395 SRE-->SOE 5.191 





















Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 






Figure 36: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 1 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





































Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
SOE R2 0.226 0.345 0.105 0.119 0.063 0.277 2.152 .016** 
SOE Adjusted R2 0.165 0.293 0.114 0.128 -0.011 0.220 1.452 .073* 
Path Coefficients (β)  
Control Factors -> SOE -0.275 -0.353 0.120 -0.079 -0.385 -0.027 2.290 .011** 
FMR -> SOE 0.264 0.245 0.198 -0.019 0.051 0.832 1.333 .091* 
ORV -> SOE -0.030 -0.083 0.063 -0.053 -0.078 0.000 0.476 .317 
PI -> SOE 0.261 0.210 0.116 -0.052 0.085 0.471 2.261 .012** 
SCDR -> SOE -0.049 -0.181 0.164 -0.132 -0.110 0.000 0.298 .383 
SRE -> SOE -0.269 -0.271 0.213 -0.002 -0.818 -0.037 1.261 .104 
TLC -> SOE 0.227 0.253 0.100 0.026 0.028 0.358 2.281 .011** 
Calculated Effect Sizes (f2) 
Control Factors -> SOE 0.091 0.192 0.148 -0.445 -0.775 -0.775 0.616 .269 
FMR -> SOE 0.021 0.030 0.041 0.224 0.000 0.024 0.515 .303 
ORV -> SOE 0.001 0.014 0.020 -0.084 -0.396 -0.396 0.051 .480 
PI -> SOE 0.083 0.076 0.073 0.127 0.000 0.179 1.131 .129 
SCDR -> SOE 0.002 0.021 0.031 -0.183 -2.091 -2.091 0.060 .476 
SRE -> SOE 0.018 0.038 0.059 -0.289 -1.419 -1.419 0.308 .379 
TLC -> SOE 0.060 0.080 0.060 0.193 0.000 0.039 1.007 .157 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
 
Table 37: Predictive Validity of Model 1 with Multi-Item Measures 
n=96 SSO SSE 
Q²                     
(=1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-validated Redundancy 
Control Factors 567.000 567.000  
FMR 287.000 287.000  
ORV 96.000 96.000  
PI 96.000 96.000  
SCDR 576.000 576.000  
SOE 288.000 247.192 0.142 




TLC 384.000 384.000  
Indicator Cross-validated Redundancy 
CapEx%Y0 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y1 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y2 95.000 95.000  
FMR_1 96.000 96.000  
FMR_2 96.000 96.000  
FMR_3 95.000 95.000  
Firm Size 90.000 90.000  
ORV_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 96.000 96.000  
PriorNegPerf 96.000 96.000  
PriorPosPerf 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_1 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_2 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_3 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_4 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_7 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_8 96.000 96.000  
SRE_1 96.000 96.000  
SRE_2 96.000 96.000  
SRE_3 96.000 96.000  
SRE_4 96.000 96.000  
SRE_5 96.000 96.000  
TLC_1 96.000 96.000  
TLC_2 96.000 96.000  
TLC_3 96.000 96.000  
TLC_5 96.000 96.000  
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 81.409 0.152 
Winsorize5_MPI_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 81.567 0.150 
Winsorize5_PI_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 84.216 0.123 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





F.2.2 Structural Model 2 
Figure 37: Path Coefficients and R2 for Model 2 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Table 38: Construct Validity for Model 2 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Composite 




(AVE) P Values 
Control Factors     
FMR 0.726 .000 0.771 .000 
ORV     
PI     
PI x TLC 0.396 .004 0.576 .000 
SCDR 0.880 .000 0.576 .000 
SOE 1  1  
SRE 0.982 .000 0.915 .000 
TLC     
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Table 39: Outer Loadings and Weights for Model 2 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Control 
Factors FMR ORV PI 
PI x 
TLC SCDR SRE SFP TLC 
Outer Loadings 
FMR_1  0.984        
FMR_2  0.982        
FMR_3  -0.616        
ORV_1   1.000       
Pr_Inv_1    1.000      
SCDR_1      0.851    
SCDR_2      0.911    
SCDR_3      0.448    
SCDR_4      0.485    
SCDR_7      0.864    
SCDR_8      0.815    
SRE_1       0.985   
SRE_2       0.974   
SRE_3       0.886   
SRE_4       0.949   
SRE_5       0.985   
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2        1.000  
Outer Weights 
CapEx%Y0 -0.027         
CapEx%Y1 -0.323         
CapEx%Y2 0.339         
Firm Size 0.508         
PriorNegPerf 0.276         
PriorPosPerf 0.644         
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_1     0.496     
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_2     0.313     
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_3     -.0.024     
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_5     -0.324     
TLC_1         0.196 
TLC_2         0.228 
TLC_3         0.882 
TLC_5         -0407 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 


























ORV -> FMR 0.069 0.107 0.068 0.038 0.011 0.163 1.002 .158 
PI -> FMR 0.044 0.097 0.059 0.052 0.003 0.078 0.745 .228 
PI -> ORV 0.160 0.164 0.080 0.004 0.021 0.284 1.998 .023 
PI x TLC -> FMR 0.176 0.211 0.064 0.035 0.090 0.240 2.745 .003 
PI x TLC -> ORV 0.118 0.168 0.060 0.050 0.021 0.164 1.959 .025 
PI x TLC -> PI 0.826 0.734 0.185 -0.092 0.487 0.976 4.464 .000 
SCDR -> FMR 0.894 0.902 0.033 0.009 0.848 0.951 26.859 .000 
SCDR -> ORV 0.144 0.176 0.060 0.032 0.038 0.210 2.391 .008 
SCDR -> PI 0.113 0.149 0.082 0.036 0.036 0.234 1.386 .083 
SCDR -> PI x TLC 0.199 0.239 0.055 0.041 0.105 0.249 3.588 .000 
SOE -> FMR 0.022 0.107 0.069 0.085 0.004 0.021 0.313 .377 
SOE -> ORV 0.023 0.114 0.084 0.091 0.000 0.048 0.275 .392 
SOE -> PI 0.272 0.257 0.150 -0.015 0.030 0.516 1.812 .035 
SOE -> PI x TLC 0.343 0.340 0.150 -0.004 0.096 0.565 2.287 .011 
SOE -> SCDR 0.074 0.132 0.068 0.058 0.012 0.122 1.074 .141 
SRE -> FMR 0.941 0.944 0.036 0.003 0.886 1.001 26.334 .000 
SRE -> ORV 0.039 0.092 0.059 0.053 0.012 0.059 0.657 .255 
SRE -> PI 0.048 0.097 0.057 0.049 0.007 0.065 0.840 .200 
SRE -> PI x TLC 0.200 0.215 0.054 0.015 0.110 0.277 3.710 .000 
SRE -> SCDR 0.878 0.877 0.036 0.000 0.798 0.923 24.094 .000 
SRE -> SOE 0.085 0.131 0.080 0.046 0.021 0.202 1.068 .143 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
















Table 41: Measures of Collinearity for Model 2 with Multi-Item Measures 
 Outer VIF  Inner VIF 
CapEx%Y0 3.440 Control Factors 1.074 
CapEx%Y1 3.885 FMR-->SOE 4.270 
CapEx%Y2 1.966 ORV-->SOE 1.096 
FMR_1 12.771 PI-->SOE 2.021 
FMR_2 12.238 PI x TLC-->SOE 2.005 
FMR_3 1.395 SCDR-->SOE 1.704 
Firm Size 1.105 SRE-->SOE 5.258 
ORV_1 1.000 TLC-->SOE 1.108 
Pr_Inv_1 1.000 
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_1 7.893 
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_2 5.759 
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_3 1.135 



















Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 38: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 2 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 











































Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
SOE R2 0.265 0.381 0.104 0.117 0.080 0.317 2.551 .005*** 
SOE Adjusted R2 0.197 0.324 0.113 0.127 -0.005 0.255 1.739 .041** 
Path Coefficients (β)  
Control Factors -> SOE -0.290 -0.347 0.123 -0.057 -0.437 -0.041 2.358 .009*** 
FMR -> SOE 0.226 0.227 0.191 0.001 0.038 0.758 1.185 .118 
ORV -> SOE -0.032 -0.084 0.063 -0.052 -0.089 0.000 0.507 .306 
PI -> SOE 0.071 0.112 0.084 0.041 0.002 0.192 0.842 .200 
PI x TLC -> SOE 0.252 0.254 0.126 0.002 0.046 0.467 1.995 .023** 
SCDR -> SOE -0.009 -0.174 0.186 -0.164 -0.007 0.000 0.050 .480 
SRE -> SOE -0.219 -0.244 0.200 -0.025 -0.713 -0.026 1.092 .137 
TLC -> SOE 0.237 0.257 0.102 0.020 0.040 0.378 2.326 .010*** 
Calculated Effect Sizes (f2) 
Control Factors -> SOE 0.106 0.193 0.152 -0.453 -0.774 -0.774 0.702 .241 
FMR -> SOE 0.016 0.026 0.038 0.211 0.000 0.017 0.426 .335 
ORV -> SOE 0.001 0.015 0.021 -0.085 -0.393 -0.393 0.060 .476 
PI -> SOE 0.003 0.016 0.023 0.108 0.000 0.001 0.146 .442 
PI x TLC -> SOE 0.052 0.059 0.054 0.202 0.000 0.057 0.956 .170 
SCDR -> SOE 0.000 0.016 0.025 -0.174 -2.140 -2.140 0.003 .499 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
 
Table 43: Predictive Validity of Model 2 with Multi-Item Measures 
n=96 SSO SSE 
Q²                     
(=1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-validated Redundancy 
Control Factors 567.000 567.000  
FMR 287.000 287.000  
ORV 96.000 96.000  
PI 96.000 96.000  
PI x TLC 384.000 384.000  
SCDR 576.000 576.000  




SRE 480.000 480.000  
TLC 384.000 384.000  
Indicator Cross-validated Redundancy 
CapEx%Y0 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y1 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y2 95.000 95.000  
FMR_1 96.000 96.000  
FMR_2 96.000 96.000  
FMR_3 95.000 95.000  
Firm Size 90.000 90.000  
ORV_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_2 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_3 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_5 96.000 96.000  
PriorNegPerf 96.000 96.000  
PriorPosPerf 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_1 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_2 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_3 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_4 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_7 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_8 96.000 96.000  
SRE_1 96.000 96.000  
SRE_2 96.000 96.000  
SRE_3 96.000 96.000  
SRE_4 96.000 96.000  
SRE_5 96.000 96.000  
TLC_1 96.000 96.000  
TLC_2 96.000 96.000  
TLC_3 96.000 96.000  
TLC_5 96.000 96.000  
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 76.686 0.201 
Winsorize5_MPI_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 78.253 0.185 
Winsorize5_PI_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 81.616 0.150 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 







F.2.3 Structural Model 3 
Figure 39: Path Coefficients and R2 for Model 3 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
Table 44: Construct Validity for Model 3 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Composite 




(AVE) P Values 
Control Factors     
FMR 0.726 .000 0.771 .000 
ORV     
ORV x FMR 1.000  1.000  
ORV x SCDR 1.000  1.000  
ORV x SRE 1.000  1.000  
PI     
SCDR 0.880 .000 0.567 .000 
Superior Operating Efficiency   1.000  
SRE 0.982 .000 0.915 .000 
TLC     
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Table 45: Outer Loadings and Weights for Model 3 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Control 
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Outer Weights 
CapEx%Y0 -0.027           
CapEx%Y1 -0.323           
CapEx%Y2 0.339           
Firm Size 0.508           
PriorNegPerf 0.276           
PriorPosPerf 0.644           
TLC_1           0.196 
TLC_2           0.228 
TLC_3           0.882 
TLC_5           -0407 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 



























ORV -> FMR 0.069 0.105 0.068 0.037 0.012 0.173 1.006 .157 
ORV x FMR -> FMR 0.092 0.145 0.088 0.054 0.013 0.206 1.037 .150 
ORV x FMR -> ORV 0.261 0.232 0.121 -0.029 0.081 0.486 2.159 .015 
ORV x SCDR -> FMR 0.224 0.176 0.087 -0.048 0.117 0.422 2.595 .005 
ORV x SCDR -> ORV 0.228 0.215 0.130 -0.013 0.035 0.467 1.749 .040 
ORV x SCDR -> ORV x FMR 0.541 0.639 0.259 0.098 0.009 0.843 2.088 .018 
ORV x SRE -> FMR 0.092 0.119 0.070 0.027 0.020 0.210 1.316 .094 
ORV x SRE -> ORV 0.302 0.292 0.146 -0.011 0.069 0.556 2.064 .020 
ORV x SRE -> ORV x FMR 0.873 0.798 0.182 -0.075 0.508 0.927 4.801 .000 
ORV x SRE -> ORV x SCDR 0.715 0.724 0.266 0.009 0.015 0.935 2.691 .004 
PI -> FMR 0.044 0.097 0.060 0.052 0.005 0.079 0.742 .229 
PI -> ORV 0.160 0.164 0.079 0.005 0.026 0.288 2.014 .022 
PI -> ORV x FMR 0.136 0.127 0.080 -0.009 0.025 0.301 1.690 .046 
PI -> ORV x SCDR 0.051 0.098 0.084 0.047 0.001 0.163 0.600 .274 
PI -> ORV x SRE 0.122 0.131 0.102 0.009 0.016 0.366 1.196 .116 
SCDR -> FMR 0.894 0.904 0.034 0.010 0.846 0.949 26.052 .000 
SCDR -> ORV 0.144 0.176 0.060 0.032 0.042 0.210 2.420 .008 
SCDR -> ORV x FMR 0.227 0.219 0.090 -0.008 0.107 0.407 2.538 .006 
SCDR -> ORV x SCDR 0.217 0.228 0.081 0.011 0.068 0.333 2.689 .004 
SCDR -> ORV x SRE 0.227 0.227 0.079 0.000 0.102 0.362 2.871 .002 
SCDR -> PI 0.113 0.148 0.083 0.035 0.036 0.236 1.369 .085 
SRE -> FMR 0.022 0.107 0.070 0.085 0.003 0.021 0.310 .378 
SRE -> ORV 0.023 0.114 0.084 0.091 0.000 0.048 0.277 .391 
SRE -> ORV x FMR 0.000 0.105 0.077 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.001 .500 
SRE -> ORV x SCDR 0.008 0.164 0.114 0.156 0.000 0.005 0.071 .472 
SRE -> ORV x SRE 0.121 0.166 0.117 0.046 0.005 0.326 1.029 .152 
SRE -> PI 0.272 0.260 0.149 -0.012 0.026 0.511 1.823 .034 
SRE -> SCDR 0.074 0.132 0.067 0.058 0.013 0.121 1.093 .137 
SOE-> FMR 0.941 0.945 0.037 0.004 0.877 0.999 25.207 .000 
SOE -> ORV 0.039 0.092 0.058 0.053 0.011 0.057 0.671 .251 
SOE -> ORV x FMR 0.089 0.121 0.063 0.032 0.032 0.189 1.403 .080 
SOE -> ORV x SCDR 0.242 0.190 0.085 -0.052 0.139 0.421 2.837 .002 
SOE -> ORV x SRE 0.145 0.155 0.077 0.010 0.045 0.286 1.887 .030 
SOE -> PI 0.048 0.096 0.057 0.048 0.003 0.069 0.835 .202 
SOE -> SCDR 0.878 0.877 0.036 0.000 0.803 0.923 24.281 .000 
SOE -> SRE 0.085 0.131 0.079 0.046 0.021 0.199 1.077 .141 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Table 47: Measures of Collinearity for Model 3 with Multi-Item Measures 
 Outer VIF  Inner VIF 
CapEx%Y0 3.440 Control Factors 1.073 
CapEx%Y1 3.885 FMR-->SOE 4.536 
CapEx%Y2 1.966 ORV-->SOE 1.187 
FMR * ORV 1.000 ORV x FMR-->SOE 4.925 
FMR_1 12.771 ORV x SCDR-->SOE 2.636 
FMR_2 12.238 ORV x SRE-->SOE 7.077 
FMR_3 1.395 PI-->SOE 1.083 
Firm Size 1.105 SCDR-->SOE 1.96 
ORV_1 1.000 SRE-->SOE 5.616 
Pr_Inv_1 1.000 TLC-->SOE 1.163 
PriorNegPerf 1.120 
PriorPosPerf 1.096 


















Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 







Figure 40: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 3 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 













































Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
SOE R2 0.298 0.412 0.102 0.215 0.343 0.114 2.919 .002*** 
SOE Adjusted R2 0.215 0.343 0.114 0.128 -0.015 0.281 1.887 .030** 
Path Coefficients (β)  
Control Factors -> SOE -0.271 -0.330 0.119 -0.060 -0.408 -0.038 2.267 .012** 
FMR -> SOE 0.126 0.230 0.183 0.104 0.003 0.366 0.691 .245 
ORV -> SOE -0.003 -0.088 0.067 -0.085 -0.001 0.000 0.045 .482 
ORV x FMR -> SOE -0.592 -0.446 0.287 0.146 -1.591 -0.292 2.062 .020** 
ORV x SCDR -> SOE -0.190 -0.298 0.338 -0.108 -0.950 -0.015 0.561 .287 
ORV x SRE -> SOE 0.684 0.439 0.300 -0.245 0.412 1.787 2.278 .011** 
PI -> SOE 0.257 0.203 0.115 -0.054 0.094 0.468 2.228 .013** 
SCDR -> SOE -0.067 -0.193 0.191 -0.126 -0.177 0.000 0.349 .363 
SRE -> SOE -0.133 -0.253 0.202 -0.120 -0.374 -0.002 0.660 .255 
TLC -> SOE 0.235 0.241 0.101 0.006 0.058 0.394 2.335 .010*** 
Calculated Effect Sizes (f2) 
Control Factors -> SOE 0.097 0.167 0.123 -0.428 -0.776 -0.776 0.790 .215 
FMR -> SOE 0.005 0.026 0.037 0.225 0.000 0.001 0.137 .446 
ORV -> SOE 0.000 0.015 0.021 -0.088 -0.495 -0.495 0.001 .500 
ORV x FMR -> SOE 0.080 0.063 0.068 -0.526 -2.126 -2.126 1.183 .118 
ORV x SCDR -> SOE 0.019 0.030 0.046 -0.317 -4.348 -4.348 0.419 .338 
ORV x SRE -> SOE 0.098 0.054 0.064 0.341 0.000 0.202 1.543 .061* 
PI -> SOE 0.087 0.075 0.076 0.116 0.000 0.189 1.135 .128 
SCDR -> SOE 0.003 0.020 0.030 -0.196 -3.248 -3.248 0.106 .458 
SRE -> SOE 0.004 0.032 0.051 -0.258 -2.229 -2.229 0.089 .465 
TLC -> SOE 0.068 0.073 0.056 0.173 0.000 0.062 1.205 .114 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SOE = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 






Table 49: Predictive Validity of Model 3 with Multi-Item Measures 
n=96 SSO SSE 
Q²                     
(=1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-validated Redundancy 
Control Factors 567.000 567.000  
FMR 287.000 287.000  
ORV 96.000 96.000  
ORV x FMR 96.000 96.000  
ORV x SCDR 96.000 96.000  
ORV x SRE 96.000 96.000  
PI 96.000 96.000  
SCDR 576.000 576.000  
SOE 288.000 237.651 0.175 
SRE 480.000 480.000  
TLC 384.000 384.000  
Indicator Cross-validated Redundancy 
CapEx%Y0 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y1 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y2 95.000 95.000  
FMR * ORV 96.000 96.000  
FMR_1 96.000 96.000  
FMR_2 96.000 96.000  
FMR_3 95.000 95.000  
Firm Size 90.000 90.000  
ORV_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 96.000 96.000  
PriorNegPerf 96.000 96.000  
PriorPosPerf 96.000 96.000  
SCDR * ORV 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_1 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_2 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_3 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_4 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_7 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_8 96.000 96.000  
SRE * ORV 96.000 96.000  
SRE_1 96.000 96.000  
SRE_2 96.000 96.000  
SRE_3 96.000 96.000  
SRE_4 96.000 96.000  




TLC_1 96.000 96.000  
TLC_2 96.000 96.000  
TLC_3 96.000 96.000  
TLC_5 96.000 96.000  
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 79.508 0.172 
Winsorize5_MPI_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 78.600 0.181 
Winsorize5_PI_AbROA_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 79.543 0.171 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Operating Efficiency. 
 
F.3 Superior Firm Performance Relative to MPIS Matching Group 
 
F.3.1 Structural Model 4 
Figure 41: Path Coefficients and R2 for Model 4 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 






Table 50: Construct Reliability for Model 4 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Composite 




(AVE) P Values 
Control Factors     
FMR 0.707 .000 0.782 .000 
ORV     
PI     
SCDR 0.917 .000 0.653 .000 
SRE 0.983 .000 0.921 .000 
Superior Firm Profitability 1  1  
TLC     
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
Table 51: Outer Loadings and Weights for Model 4 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Control 
Factors FMR ORV PI SCDR SRE SFP TLC 
Outer Loadings 
FMR_1  0.974       
FMR_2  0.965       
FMR_3  -0.682       
ORV_1   1      
Pr_Inv_1    1     
SCDR_1     0.740    
SCDR_2     0.619    
SCDR_3     0.730    
SCDR_4     0.755    
SCDR_7     0.980    
SCDR_8     0.962    
SRE_1      0.982   
SRE_2      0.978   
SRE_3      0.908   
SRE_4      0.947   
SRE_5      0.982   
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2       1  
Outer Weights 
CapEx%Y0 -0.198        




CapEx%Y2 0.175        
Firm Size 0.682        
PriorNegPerf 0.540        
PriorPosPerf 0.166        
TLC_1        -0.683 
TLC_2        0.930 
TLC_3        0.613 
TLC_5        -0.772 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
 



















         
ORV -> FMR 0.069 0.106 0.070 0.038 0.010 0.173 0.980 .164 
PI -> FMR 0.044 0.097 0.059 0.052 0.005 0.077 0.756 .225 
PI -> ORV 0.160 0.163 0.080 0.003 0.025 0.287 1.990 .023 
SCDR -> FMR 0.894 0.903 0.034 0.010 0.846 0.946 26.666 .000 
SCDR -> ORV 0.144 0.177 0.060 0.032 0.038 0.209 2.422 .008 
SCDR -> PI 0.113 0.149 0.082 0.036 0.036 0.234 1.378 .084 
SRE -> FMR 0.941 0.945 0.036 0.004 0.883 1.000 25.969 .000 
SRE -> ORV 0.039 0.093 0.061 0.054 0.008 0.056 0.646 .259 
SRE -> PI 0.048 0.097 0.057 0.050 0.007 0.066 0.834 .202 
SRE -> SCDR 0.878 0.877 0.036 -0.001 0.798 0.923 24.082 .000 
SFP -> FMR 0.098 0.128 0.075 0.030 0.015 0.221 1.306 .096 
SFP -> ORV 0.144 0.178 0.121 0.034 0.010 0.364 1.187 .118 
SFP -> PI 0.253 0.261 0.176 0.008 0.027 0.603 1.442 .075 
SFP -> SCDR 0.146 0.171 0.071 0.025 0.040 0.253 2.059 .002 
SFP -> SRE 0.192 0.198 0.090 0.006 0.044 0.337 2.132 .017 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 








Table 53: Measures of Collinearity for Model 4 with Multi-Item Measures 
 Outer VIF  Inner VIF 
CapEx%Y0 3.440 Control Factors SFP 1.175 
CapEx%Y1 3.885 FMR SFP 4.201 
CapEx%Y2 1.966 ORV SFP 1.180 
FMR_1 12.771 PI SFP 1.071 
FMR_2 12.238 SCDR SFP 3.095 
FMR_3 1.395 SRE SFP 5.768 





















Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 







Figure 42: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 4 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 












































Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
SFP R2 0.297 0.467 0.144 0.171 0.101 0.359 2.062 .020** 
SFP Adjusted R2 0.241 0.425 0.155 0.184 0.030 0.308 1.550 .061* 
Path Coefficients (β) 
Control Factors -> SFP -0.365 -0.471 0.179 -0.105 -0.578 -0.057 2.045 .020** 
FMR -> SFP 0.262 0.221 0.171 -0.041 0.070 0.793 1.534 .063* 
ORV -> SFP -0.075 -0.104 0.077 -0.028 -0.213 -0.004 0.983 .163 
PI -> SFP 0.244 0.213 0.143 -0.030 0.025 0.491 1.700 .045** 
SCDR -> SFP 0.069 0.162 0.141 0.093 0.000 0.194 0.489 .312 
SRE -> SFP -0.370 -0.295 0.191 0.074 -0.960 -0.144 1.936 .026** 
TLC -> SFP 0.180 0.206 0.101 0.026 0.013 0.319 1.776 .038** 
Calculated Effect Sizes (f2) 
Control Factors -> SFP 0.162 0.463 0.462 -0.632 -0.961 -0.961 0.350 .363 
FMR -> SFP 0.023 0.029 0.038 0.198 0.000 0.033 0.614 .270 
ORV -> SFP 0.007 0.026 0.036 -0.110 -0.439 -0.439 0.188 .426 
PI -> SFP 0.079 0.110 0.124 0.135 0.001 0.266 0.634 .263 
SCDR -> SFP 0.002 0.022 0.038 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.058 .477 
SRE -> SFP 0.034 0.042 0.052 -0.329 -1.197 -1.197 0.651 .258 
TLC -> SFP 0.030 0.057 0.051 0.176 0.000 0.020 0.589 .278 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
 
Table 55: Predictive Validity of Model 4 with Multi-Item Measures 
n=96 SSO SSE 
Q²                     
(=1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-validated Redundancy 
Control Factors 567.000 567.000  
FMR 287.000 287.000  
ORV 96.000 96.000  
PI 96.000 96.000  
SCDR 576.000 576.000  
SRE 480.000 480.000  




TLC 384.000 384.000  
Indicator Cross-validated Redundancy 
CapEx%Y0 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y1 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y2 95.000 95.000  
FMR_1 96.000 96.000  
FMR_2 96.000 96.000  
FMR_3 95.000 95.000  
Firm Size 90.000 90.000  
ORV_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 96.000 96.000  
PriorNegPerf 96.000 96.000  
PriorPosPerf 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_1 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_2 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_3 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_4 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_7 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_8 96.000 96.000  
SRE_1 96.000 96.000  
SRE_2 96.000 96.000  
SRE_3 96.000 96.000  
SRE_4 96.000 96.000  
SRE_5 96.000 96.000  
TLC_1 96.000 96.000  
TLC_2 96.000 96.000  
TLC_3 96.000 96.000  
TLC_5 96.000 96.000  
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 77.949 0.188 
Winsorize5_MPI_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 80.803 0.158 
Winsorize5_PI_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 85.133 0.113 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




F.3.2 Structural Model 5 
Figure 43: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 5 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
Table 56: Construct Reliability for Model 5 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Composite 




(AVE) P Values 
Control Factors     
FMR 0.707 .000 0.782 .000 
ORV     
PI     
PI x TLC 0.412 .004 0.565 .000 
SCDR 0.917 .000 0.653 .000 
SFP 1  1  
SRE 0.983 .000 0.921 .000 
TLC     
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Table 57: Outer Loadings and Weights for Model 5 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Control 
Factors FMR ORV PI PI x TLC SCDR SRE SFP TLC 
Outer Loadings 
FMR_1  0.974        
FMR_2  0.965        
FMR_3  -0.682        
ORV_1   1.000       
Pr_Inv_1    1.000      
SCDR_1      0.740    
SCDR_2      0.619    
SCDR_3      0.755    
SCDR_4      0.730    
SCDR_7      0.980    
SCDR_8      0.962    
SRE_1       0.982   
SRE_2       0.978   
SRE_3       0.908   
SRE_4       0.947   
SRE_5       0.982   
MPIS_AbROS_        1.000  
Outer Weights 
CapEx%Y0 -0.198         
CapEx%Y1 0.191         
CapEx%Y2 0.175         
Firm Size 0.682         
PriorNegPerf 0.540         
PriorPosPerf 0.166         
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_1     0.519     
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_2     0.293     
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_3     0.054     
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_5     -0.314     
TLC_1         -0.683 
TLC_2         0.930 
TLC_3         0.613 
TLC_5         -0.772 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 


























ORV -> FMR 0.069 0.105 0.069 0.036 0.012 0.174 0.998 .159 
PI -> FMR 0.044 0.097 0.061 0.052 0.003 0.076 0.733 .232 
PI -> ORV 0.160 0.164 0.080 0.004 0.020 0.286 1.988 .023 
PI x TLC -> FMR 0.176 0.209 0.066 0.034 0.088 0.247 2.657 .004 
PI x TLC -> ORV 0.118 0.167 0.060 0.049 0.031 0.162 1.959 .025 
PI x TLC -> PI 0.826 0.734 0.180 -0.091 0.503 0.977 4.595 .000 
SCDR -> FMR 0.894 0.903 0.035 0.009 0.847 0.950 25.878 .000 
SCDR -> ORV 0.144 0.177 0.061 0.033 0.035 0.211 2.387 .009 
SCDR -> PI 0.113 0.151 0.084 0.037 0.036 0.236 1.340 .090 
SCDR -> PI x TLC 0.199 0.240 0.058 0.041 0.112 0.254 3.448 .000 
SFP -> FMR 0.098 0.127 0.075 0.029 0.017 0.225 1.308 .096 
SFP -> ORV 0.144 0.178 0.120 0.034 0.008 0.363 1.194 .116 
SFP -> PI 0.253 0.266 0.175 0.013 0.028 0.591 1.449 .074 
SFP -> PI x TLC 0.415 0.413 0.187 -0.002 0.130 0.720 2.219 .013 
SFP -> SCDR 0.146 0.170 0.072 0.024 0.041 0.253 2.033 .021 
SRE -> FMR 0.941 0.945 0.037 0.004 0.883 1.003 25.634 .000 
SRE -> ORV 0.039 0.093 0.060 0.054 0.010 0.059 0.647 .259 
SRE -> PI 0.048 0.097 0.059 0.050 0.006 0.067 0.807 .210 
SRE -> PI x TLC 0.200 0.215 0.054 0.015 0.110 0.279 3.688 .000 
SRE -> SCDR 0.878 0.878 0.036 0.000 0.799 0.922 24.529 .000 
SRE -> SFP 0.192 0.197 0.090 0.005 0.050 0.340 2.134 .016 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 


















Table 59: Measures of Collinearity for Model 5 with Multi-Item Measures 
 Outer VIF  Inner VIF 
CapEx%Y0 3.440 Control Factors-->SFP 1.191 
CapEx%Y1 3.885 FMR-->SFP 4.24 
CapEx%Y2 1.966 ORV-->SFP 1.181 
FMR_1 12.771 PI-->SFP 2.111 
FMR_2 12.238 PI x TLC-->SFP 2.048 
FMR_3 1.395 SCDR-->SFP 3.118 
Firm Size 1.105 SRE-->SFP 5.892 
ORV_1 1.000 TLC-->SFP 1.568 
Pr_Inv_1 1.000 
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_1 7.893 
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_2 5.759 
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_3 1.135 



















Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 






Figure 44: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 5 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 

































Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
SFP R2 0.401 0.533 0.138 0.132 0.127 0.494 2.904 .002*** 
SFP Adjusted R2 0.346 0.491 0.151 0.144 0.047 0.448 2.294 .011** 
Path Coefficients (β)  
Control Factors -> SFP -0.407 -0.451 0.180 -0.044 -0.721 -0.112 2.266 .012** 
FMR -> SFP 0.198 0.203 0.162 0.005 0.028 0.612 1.221 .111 
ORV -> SFP -0.063 -0.102 0.075 -0.039 -0.179 -0.002 0.845 .199 
PI -> SFP -0.086 -0.104 0.081 -0.017 -0.259 -0.008 1.060 .144 
PI x TLC -> SFP 0.417 0.352 0.156 -0.065 0.203 0.690 2.675 .004*** 
SCDR -> SFP 0.118 0.143 0.140 0.025 0.015 0.455 0.847 .199 
SRE -> SFP -0.256 -0.241 0.167 0.015 -0.647 -0.048 1.532 .063* 
TLC -> SFP 0.240 0.223 0.104 -0.017 0.082 0.431 2.317 .010*** 
Calculated Effect Sizes (f2) 
Control Factors -> SFP 0.232 0.477 0.484 -0.683 -0.930 -0.930 0.479 .316 
FMR -> SFP 0.015 0.027 0.036 0.188 0.000 0.017 0.433 .332 
ORV -> SFP 0.006 0.028 0.038 -0.107 -0.459 -0.459 0.148 .441 
PI -> SFP 0.006 0.017 0.025 -0.109 -0.666 -0.666 0.240 .405 
PI x TLC -> SFP 0.175 0.160 0.134 0.177 0.000 0.296 1.299 .097* 
SCDR -> SFP 0.007 0.015 0.022 0.135 0.000 0.005 0.345 .365 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
 
Table 61: Predictive Validity of Model 5 with Multi-Item Measures 
n=96 SSO SSE 
Q²                     
(=1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-validated Redundancy 
Control Factors 567.000 567.000  
FMR 287.000 287.000  
ORV 96.000 96.000  
PI 96.000 96.000  




SCDR 576.000 576.000  
SRE 480.000 480.000  
Superior Firm Profitability 288.000 217.356 0.245 
TLC 384.000 384.000  
Indicator Cross-validated Redundancy 
CapEx%Y0 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y1 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y2 95.000 95.000  
FMR_1 96.000 96.000  
FMR_2 95.000 95.000  
FMR_3 96.000 96.000  
Firm Size 90.000 90.000  
ORV_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_2 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_3 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 * TLC_5 96.000 96.000  
PriorNegPerf 96.000 96.000  
PriorPosPerf 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_1 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_2 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_3 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_4 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_7 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_8 96.000 96.000  
SRE_1 96.000 96.000  
SRE_2 96.000 96.000  
SRE_3 96.000 96.000  
SRE_4 96.000 96.000  
SRE_5 96.000 96.000  
TLC_1 96.000 96.000  
TLC_2 96.000 96.000  
TLC_3 96.000 96.000  
TLC_5 96.000 96.000  
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 67.398 0.298 
Winsorize5_MPI_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 69.124 0.280 
Winsorize5_PI_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 80.834 0.158 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





F.3.3 Structural Model 6 
Figure 45: Path Coefficients and R2 of Model 6 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
 
Table 62: Construct Reliability for Model 6 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Composite 




(AVE) P Values 
Control Factors     
FMR 0.707 .000 0.782 .000 
ORV     
ORV x FMR 1  1  
ORV x SCDR 1  1  
ORV x SRE 1  1  
PI     
SCDR 0.917 .000 0.653 .000 
SRE 0.983 .000 0.921 .000 
Superior Firm Profitability 1  1  
TLC     
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Table 63: Outer Loadings and Outer Weights for Model 6 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Control 






SRE PI SCDR SRE SFP TLC 
Outer Loadings 
FMR_1  0.974          
FMR_2  0.965          
FMR_3  -0.682          
ORV_1   1         
FMR * ORV    1        
SCDR * ORV     1       
SRE * ORV      1      
Pr_Inv_1       1     
SCDR_1        0.740    
SCDR_2        0.619    
SCDR_3        0.755    
SCDR_4        0.730    
SCDR_7        0.980    
SCDR_8        0.962    
SRE_1         0.982   
SRE_2         0.978   
SRE_3         0.908   
SRE_4         0.947   
SRE_5         0.982   
MPIS_AbROS_          1  
Outer Weights 
CapEx%Y0 -0.198           
CapEx%Y1 0.191           
CapEx%Y2 0.175           
Firm Size 0.682           
PriorNegPerf 0.540           
PriorPosPerf 0.166           
TLC_1           -0.683 
TLC_2           0.930 
TLC_3           0.613 
TLC_5           -0.772 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 

























ORV -> FMR 0.069 0.105 0.071 0.036 0.012 0.185 0.968 .167 
ORV x FMR -> FMR 0.095 0.140 0.086 0.044 0.017 0.217 1.114 .133 
ORV x FMR -> ORV 0.250 0.241 0.122 -0.009 0.052 0.461 2.048 .020 
ORV x SCDR -> FMR 0.196 0.183 0.085 -0.013 0.068 0.360 2.312 .010 
ORV x SCDR -> ORV 0.254 0.239 0.132 -0.015 0.053 0.499 1.917 .028 
ORV x SCDR -> ORV x FMR 0.755 0.678 0.231 -0.077 0.124 0.904 3.269 .001 
ORV x SRE -> FMR 0.097 0.111 0.064 0.013 0.025 0.223 1.531 .063 
ORV x SRE -> ORV 0.294 0.296 0.147 0.002 0.051 0.540 2.008 .022 
ORV x SRE -> ORV x FMR 0.876 0.837 0.135 -0.039 0.648 0.921 6.512 .000 
ORV x SRE -> ORV x SCDR 0.881 0.791 0.225 -0.090 0.214 0.967 3.913 .000 
PI -> FMR 0.044 0.097 0.059 0.053 0.003 0.077 0.752 .226 
PI -> ORV 0.160 0.163 0.080 0.004 0.020 0.281 2.000 .023 
PI -> ORV x FMR 0.123 0.130 0.081 0.007 0.013 0.275 1.513 .065 
PI -> ORV x SCDR 0.019 0.090 0.079 0.070 0.000 0.047 0.244 .404 
PI -> ORV x SRE 0.106 0.124 0.087 0.018 0.009 0.268 1.222 .111 
SCDR -> FMR 0.894 0.904 0.033 0.010 0.844 0.943 26.792 .000 
SCDR -> ORV 0.144 0.177 0.059 0.033 0.041 0.208 2.440 .007 
SCDR -> ORV x FMR 0.220 0.225 0.087 0.005 0.100 0.386 2.519 .006 
SCDR -> ORV x SCDR 0.195 0.222 0.084 0.027 0.044 0.309 2.325 .010 
SCDR -> ORV x SRE 0.231 0.228 0.077 -0.002 0.109 0.365 2.985 .001 
SCDR -> PI 0.113 0.149 0.082 0.036 0.036 0.231 1.381 .084 
SRE -> FMR 0.941 0.946 0.036 0.005 0.883 0.998 26.172 .000 
SRE -> ORV 0.039 0.092 0.060 0.053 0.012 0.060 0.648 .258 
SRE -> ORV x FMR 0.095 0.117 0.059 0.022 0.041 0.206 1.609 .054 
SRE -> ORV x SCDR 0.228 0.205 0.080 -0.023 0.111 0.375 2.851 .002 
SRE -> ORV x SRE 0.152 0.152 0.072 0.000 0.055 0.299 2.100 .018 
SRE -> PI 0.048 0.097 0.057 0.049 0.006 0.070 0.831 .203 
SRE -> SCDR 0.878 0.877 0.036 0.000 0.801 0.923 24.466 .000 
SFP -> FMR 0.098 0.129 0.074 0.031 0.015 0.221 1.324 .093 
SFP -> ORV 0.144 0.179 0.121 0.036 0.007 0.358 1.193 .116 
SFP -> ORV x FMR 0.110 0.154 0.107 0.044 0.005 0.300 1.025 .153 
SFP -> ORV x SCDR 0.167 0.229 0.144 0.063 0.005 0.395 1.161 .123 
SFP -> ORV x SRE 0.241 0.249 0.152 0.008 0.026 0.512 1.589 .056 
SFP -> PI 0.253 0.266 0.176 0.013 0.029 0.597 1.440 .075 
SFP -> SCDR 0.146 0.172 0.071 0.026 0.040 0.254 2.049 .020 
SFP -> SRE 0.192 0.198 0.090 0.007 0.046 0.335 2.141 .016 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 




Table 65: Measures of Collinearity for Model 6 with Multi-Item Measures 
 Outer VIF  Inner VIF 
CapEx%Y0 3.440 Control Factors 1.194 
CapEx%Y1 3.885 FMR-->SFP 4.513 
CapEx%Y2 1.966 ORV-->SFP 1.245 
FMR * ORV 1.000 ORV x FMR-->SFP 4.641 
FMR_1 12.771 ORV x SCDR-->SFP 5.673 
FMR_2 12.238 ORV x SRE-->SFP 9.412 
FMR_3 1.395 PI-->SFP 1.096 
Firm Size 1.105 SCDR-->SFP 3.473 
ORV_1 1.000 SRE-->SFP 6.231 
Pr_Inv_1 1.000 TLC-->SFP 0.616 
PriorNegPerf 1.120 
PriorPosPerf 1.096 


















Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 





Figure 46: Path Coefficients and p-Values of Model 6 with Multi-Item Measures 
 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 


































Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
SFP R2 0.366 0.540 0.131 0.174 0.114 0.414 2.800 .003*** 
SFP Adjusted R2 0.291 0.486 0.146 0.194 0.009 0.345 1.995 .023** 
Path Coefficients (β)  
Control Factors -> SFP -0.344 -0.441 0.174 -0.097 -0.566 -0.071 1.976 .024** 
FMR -> SFP 0.127 0.193 0.154 0.066 0.005 0.380 0.822 .206 
ORV -> SFP -0.045 -0.100 0.074 -0.055 -0.119 0.000 0.602 .273 
ORV x FMR -> SFP -0.356 -0.318 0.255 0.038 -1.135 -0.082 1.398 .081* 
ORV x SCDR -> SFP -0.387 -0.382 0.311 0.006 -1.430 -0.099 1.244 .107 
ORV x SRE -> SFP 0.779 0.553 0.367 -0.226 0.356 1.811 2.122 .017** 
PI -> SFP 0.267 0.219 0.146 -0.048 0.033 0.509 1.824 .034** 
SCDR -> SFP 0.139 0.194 0.186 0.054 0.012 0.554 0.747 .228 
SRE -> SFP -0.335 -0.310 0.206 0.024 -0.825 -0.076 1.628 .052* 
TLC -> SFP 0.137 0.178 0.100 0.042 0.004 0.272 1.368 .086* 
Calculated Effect Sizes (f2) 
Control Factors -> SFP 0.157 0.403 0.387 -0.598 -0.979 -0.979 0.404 .343 
FMR -> SFP 0.006 0.025 0.035 0.187 0.000 0.002 0.162 .436 
ORV -> SFP 0.003 0.024 0.033 -0.102 -0.467 -0.467 0.076 .470 
ORV x FMR -> SFP 0.035 0.050 0.076 -0.353 -2.267 -2.267 0.456 .324 
ORV x SCDR -> SFP 0.043 0.070 0.094 -0.425 -2.932 -2.932 0.459 .323 
ORV x SRE -> SFP 0.104 0.087 0.101 0.448 0.000 0.200 1.037 .150 
PI -> SFP 0.103 0.128 0.149 0.117 0.001 0.327 0.688 .246 
SCDR -> SFP 0.009 0.023 0.035 0.185 0.000 0.006 0.248 .402 
SRE -> SFP 0.028 0.047 0.054 -0.339 -1.293 -1.293 0.521 .301 
TLC -> SFP 0.018 0.048 0.049 0.160 0.000 0.012 0.373 .354 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 






Table 67: Predictive Validity of Model 6 with Multi-Item Measures 
n=96 SSO SSE 
Q²                     
(=1-SSE/SSO) 
Construct Cross-validated Redundancy 
Control Factors 567.000 567.000  
FMR 287.000 287.000  
ORV 96.000 96.000  
ORV x FMR 96.000 96.000  
ORV x SCDR 96.000 96.000  
ORV x SRE 96.000 96.000  
PI 96.000 96.000  
SCDR 576.000 576.000  
SRE 480.000 480.000  
Superior Firm Profitability 288.000 235.259 0.183 
TLC 384.000 384.000  
Indicator Cross-validated Redundancy 
CapEx%Y0 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y1 95.000 95.000  
CapEx%Y2 95.000 95.000  
FMR * ORV 96.000 96.000  
FMR_1 96.000 96.000  
FMR_2 95.000 95.000  
FMR_3 96.000 96.000  
Firm Size 90.000 90.000  
ORV_1 96.000 96.000  
Pr_Inv_1 96.000 96.000  
PriorNegPerf 96.000 96.000  
PriorPosPerf 96.000 96.000  
SCDR * ORV 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_1 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_2 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_3 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_4 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_7 96.000 96.000  
SCDR_8 96.000 96.000  
SRE * ORV 96.000 96.000  
SRE_1 96.000 96.000  
SRE_2 96.000 96.000  
SRE_3 96.000 96.000  
SRE_4 96.000 96.000  




TLC_1 96.000 96.000  
TLC_2 96.000 96.000  
TLC_3 96.000 96.000  
TLC_5 96.000 96.000  
Winsorize5_MPIS_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 74.677 0.222 
Winsorize5_MPI_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 77.914 0.188 
Winsorize5_PI_AbROS_Y0Y1Y2 96.000 82.668 0.139 
Where FMR = Factor Market Rivalry, TLC = Total Logistics Costs, SRE = Strategic Risk Exposure, SCDR = 
Supply Chain Disruption Risk, PI = Product Innovativeness, ORV = Offshore Relationship Value, and SFP = 
Superior Firm Profitability. 
   *Significance is one-tailed: p<.10 
 **Significance is one-tailed: p<.05 
***Significance is one-tailed: p<.01 
 
